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
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**JAPANESE EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN POLICIES**



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JAPANESE EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLICIES

BY

JAMES FRANCIS ABBOTT, PH.D.

**SOMETIME INSTRUCTOR IN THE IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVAL ACADEMY**

SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE

IN this little book, I have attempted to give the facts upon which I base my opinion that war between Japan and America during the present generation is a most unlikely contingency. The fact that such a war is not an impossibility is the chief reason why the American people should inform themselves thoroughly regarding Japan and our relations with that Empire. For if war comes, it will be largely our own fault.

Americans know that in 1914 the absence of any personal animosity whatever between the different peoples of warring Europe had no weight in preventing the great war. And in consequence they are little inclined to consider the long historic friendship between Japan and America from any other than a cynical viewpoint. Accordingly, while giving due weight to this, so to speak, academic factor and, in particular, to the prime necessity, on our part, of cultivating such a Japanese friendship, I have tried to base my argument upon the more concrete and matter-of-fact aspects of the case.

The first three chapters I have devoted to a brief

PREFACE

historic résumé, in order that the reader may orient himself with respect to the whole problem. The next four chapters deal with the material upon which is based the central conclusion of the book—that war with America would be national suicide for Japan. The last two chapters are an appeal to Americans to recognize Japan's aspirations as an Oriental power, in the belief that it will be to our own advantage to do so.

J. F. A.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
ST. LOUIS, MO.,
October, 1915.

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**JAPANESE EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN POLICIES**



JAPANESE EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLICIES

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

"JAPAN will make China a vassal and will militarize its millions. Then it will be for your country [America] to look out. Admiral Togo once said to a European, 'Next will come a general European war, then will come a great war in which my race will be against yours.'"

Such were the statements credited in the press last December to Admiral von Tirpitz, the chief of the German navy. It is unlikely that Admiral von Tirpitz said this; it is highly improbable that Admiral Togo did. Yet, in a way, it does not make any difference whether they did or not. So long as such statements are published periodically all over America and so long as hundreds of thousands of readers never dream of questioning their accuracy or authenticity they might as well be true as otherwise.

Repeatedly during the past ten years have similar remarks been made and similar fears been expressed. And not always so crudely, nor through the channel of an anonymous newspaper reporter. Public men, both in Congress and elsewhere, have essayed the rôle of Cassandra, in season and out. Bankers, globe-trotters, merchants, and editors have enlightened us with their views until we have reached a state of mind in which the notion that "we are going to have trouble in the Pacific one of these days" has become almost an obsession. Said the Hon. James R. Mann of Illinois in the House of Representatives October 1, 1914:¹ "We who are legislating now, who do not bear in mind the inevitable conflict, commercial or otherwise, which we will meet in the Far East, have forgotten the principles that ought primarily to actuate us. [*Applause.*] I have no doubt that it is as certain as that the sun will rise tomorrow morning that a conflict will come between the Far East and the Far West across the Pacific Ocean; all of that which has taken place in the world during the history of the human race up to now teaches us that the avoidance of this conflict is impossible. I hope that the war will not come; I hope that there will be no conflict of arms. But I have little faith that in this world of ours people and races are able to meet in competition for a long

¹ Congressional Record, 63d Congress, p. 17466.

period of time without an armed conflict. A fight for commercial supremacy in the end leads to a fight with arms because that is the final arbiter among Nations. We command the Pacific Ocean today with the land that we have on this side, with the islands which we possess in the sea and with the Philippines on the other side. Will we surrender our command? I say no, never." [Applause.]

A few years earlier Mr. Hobson said on the floor of the same chamber: ¹ "We are short on providing equilibrium in the Atlantic and we have not a single battleship in the Pacific and our relative naval strength is steadily declining. War is therefore a physical certainty." "I will tell you frankly that in my judgment you can count almost on the fingers of your two hands twice around, the number of months. In my judgment war will come before the Panama canal is completed!"

"Ever since this Nation went into the Hawaiian Islands the Japanese nation served notice that they would never acquiesce. Ever since 1898 when we went into the Philippines, and Japan asked us to let her go in there with us and we refused; ever since her citizens have come to this country in great numbers and our people, following the natural law of segregation of races, have not given them the treatment that they thought they

¹ Congressional Record, Feb. 20, 1911, p. 2989.

ought to have, they have been preparing for war. . . . I repeat, in my judgment, war is inevitable and not far off. . . . It will be humiliating, of course, for us to see the Philippine Islands occupied practically without a struggle. All we can hope to do there will be to hold out at Corregidor. Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and I have already mentioned Panama, San Francisco and the Puget Sound region, the whole Pacific Coast will be occupied without serious opposition on our part."

The prospect of a hostile nation "occupying" a stretch of coast line (with its hinterland) 7000 miles long and 5000 miles from her home base, to say nothing of the Philippines 1000 miles away in a different direction, is sufficiently startling, but more than one writer has pointed out precisely how it is to be done. One of the most detailed of these programs is that of Homer Lea's extraordinary book, "The Valour of Ignorance."¹ But military men also have discussed the invasion of California so often that a share of the public has grown to accept it as an inevitable coming event.

¹ Not the least extraordinary feature of Lea's work is the apparent seriousness with which it has been considered. William James, Norman Angell, and others have discussed his theses as if they represented the opinions of an expert militarist. As a matter of fact "General" Lea was an adventurer who never had any real position in China nor any real military training.

On October 18, 1912, General Leonard Wood is reported to have stated that it would be "very easy for an enemy to land in force in San Francisco unless we had a west-coast army of 450,000 men." (The regular United States army today is between 80,000 and 85,000 men, and England had but 250,000 men at the outbreak of the European war of 1914.) Of course such an invading army could not be other than Japanese. Says another expert:¹ "If 200,000 fighting men of any first-class hostile power should be landed on our Pacific Coast tonight, we should have no course save regretfully to hand over to a foreign nation the rich Empire west of the Rockies, with its cities, its harbors, and the wealth of its valleys and mountains."

Now the American of influence is a hard-headed man of affairs, endowed with a sense of humor and not given to panic. He has taken the dire prophecies with a grain of salt. When the Panama canal was finished without a Japanese war, he recalled Mr. Hobson and smiled.

For many years we have grown accustomed to prophecies of wars, particularly of the certainty of war in Europe. We have treated them all in the same tolerant fashion. We are an optimistic people and not easily alarmed. We thought that Europe had too much to

¹ Wheeler, "Are We Ready?" New York, 1913.

lose by war, that European nations were too closely knit together, that the spirit of socialism was too strong, that we had grown too wise to make a wreck of our civilization, that the bankers would not furnish the money, etc.

Then came the cataclysm of August, 1914, and when we had recovered our senses, we began to recall the prophecies of the past. We read von Bernhardi's book and realized that common sense has its limitations when it comes to the judging of foreign politics. We reread books and articles that had vociferously predicted the European conflict and realized that the prophet for once had come into his own.

And now that the first shock has passed and we have grown somewhat accustomed to the incredible situation across the Atlantic, we recall once more the foretellings of coming war in the other direction and our self-complacency is a bit shaken. After all, may there not be something in it? If we were all wrong in smiling away the predictions of the European débâcle, are we all right in disregarding those of a coming American-Japanese conflict? The man who is in the presence of an earthquake loses his confidence in the stability of all things terrestrial.

In spite of our skepticism, the constant reiteration of the idea has left its mark. Subconsciously we have

stored away in the back of our minds tags and ends of anti-Japanese statements, the while we have repudiated the conclusions based upon them. There is no question but that as a nation our former rather sentimental friendship toward the Sunrise Kingdom has cooled. Not knowing the best, we suspect the worst, and the background for a national sentiment is slowly crystallizing.

We might regain some peace of mind if we were careful to sort out from among the predictions those which hold a Japanese war to be inevitable from those which hold such a one to be merely probable or possible.

The writer does not think such a war is probable, but that is a purely personal opinion, worth only what it will bring. That such a war is possible cannot be questioned. Anything is possible in international politics. All wars have an economic basis, but most of them have a sentimental inception. Hardly a more striking example could be found than our own most recent conflict with Spain. Whether sooner or later we should have drifted into war in 1898 is not worth discussing. What did plunge us into war precipitately was the blowing up of the *Maine*. And the wave of unreasoning passion that swept over the United States took no heed of circumstances nor of consequences.

Now if during some racial controversy in California, such as might attend the passage of a new and drastic alien land law, after the press of both countries had been filled with acrimonious discussions, a Japanese cruiser should be anchored in San Francisco harbor, or an American man-of-war in Yokohama harbor, and either should be blown up,—no matter from what cause,—war would not only be possible but very likely inevitable. And this, in spite of the fact that the explosion might be entirely accidental. Such an accident, or some other of the same sort, might happen at any time, and happening by chance at a critical time, might have the direst consequences. Yet change the scene a little. Suppose that such a thing should happen to either a Japanese or an American warship in the harbor of Buenos Ayres. War with Argentine on account of it, in the absence of any evidence of hostility, would be absurd. And why? Because there would be lacking the background of suspicion and irritation which gives the mob-mind a chance to coalesce and overwhelm the rational thought and judgment of a nation.

Now it is precisely the constant reiteration of fears and suspicions of a foreign nation, of speculations as to her designs upon us and of anxiety as to the future, that spins the tissue of such a background. Nothing is harder to confute than vague accusations and aspersions

of motives. Nothing is more persistent than a falsehood that is welcomed by the hearer.¹ The innocent victim of a libel discovers that no amount of damages will compensate him or entirely wipe out the memory of the falsehood in the minds of his fellows. We have found it necessary to provide a libel law to protect the individual. Let us hope that the time will come when libels upon nations may be brought to some sort of an international bar of justice. The old English law applicable to sovereigns stated, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel." Whatever opinion we may have of that with regard to individuals, it is worthy of consideration in the present case. Suppose that we have grievances and that Japan has also. Nations are no more perfect than the people that compose them. Let us not talk about them too much. We have our appointed official representatives upon whose shoulders rests the responsibility.

¹ A shining example is the oft-repeated statement that the Japanese are so dishonest that they cannot trust one another to handle bank funds, but are forced to employ the more trustworthy Chinese. As a matter of fact Chinese are employed to a very limited extent in Japanese banks and then, not because of their superior honesty, but because they are skilled, through long experience, in detecting the multitude of counterfeit coins that circulate through the Orient.

The great majority of Chinese who are observed by travelers in Japan to be employed in banks are not the employees of Japanese banks at all, but are the employees of Chinese and other foreign banks.

I would not favor a muzzled press nor a blind complacency and an indifference to what goes on in the world, nor should I care to see our national interests flouted nor our national pride humiliated. But at least, let us save our excitement for what does happen, not what we fear might happen. And let us allow the dust cloud of suspicion to settle instead of constantly stirring it up.

Wise old Francis Bacon said, long ago,¹ "There is nothing that makes a man suspect much more than to know little; and therefore men should remedy suspicion by procuring to know more and not to keep their suspicions in smother."

Americans are little given to keeping "their suspicions in smother," but the remedy of "procuring to know more" is open to all. And nothing is more apt to dissipate the cloud of war or render conflict unlikely. Nations that know one another well are much less likely to get to fighting than if the reverse is true. And the cost of a battleship would pay for much national education.

¹ Essays, XXXI, "On Suspicion."

CHAPTER II

JAPAN ON PROBATION

THE earliest inhabitants of Japan, according to the archæologists, were a race of pygmies perhaps related to the Philippine Nigritos, who lived in caves or pits in the ground and are known in Japanese (or rather Ainu), as *Koropokguru*. These were succeeded by a fierce and warlike, very hairy race, known nowadays as Ainu, who occupied the main island until after the beginning of the Christian era. The Ainu never got beyond the stone age nor achieved a written language.

About the fifth century B.C. there came an entirely alien race, or rather two of them, in two migrations. One of these migrations was by way of the northwest and the immigrants were Mongolian or Turanian. The other was by way of the south, originating doubtless from India and hence of Aryan origin, although without question mixed with Malay and other elements on the way. These two streams, almost as unlike in racial characteristics and physiognomy as Italians and North Germans are unlike, have nevertheless mingled together in harmony, and constitute the Japanese people we know

today. On the other hand, inherent racial prejudice has prevented intermarriage, and the different types are today very obvious to the casual observer. The Mongolian element outnumbers the other, twenty to one, and constitute the *heimin* or common people. The southern element is the ruling caste and has been for centuries. Its members are known as *shizoku* (*samurai*) or gentry. The officials of modern Japan, the politicians, the officers of the army and navy, the educated classes generally, who represent Japan to the world and absolutely control her internal and foreign affairs,—these are mostly all *shizoku*. The farmers, laborers, coolies, and incidentally the bulk of Japanese emigrants to other countries, are *heimin*. The gulf between these classes, although perhaps not recognized officially, is certainly recognized socially, and the distinction between the two is never lost in the Japanese mind. For Americans to fail to make this same distinction (and most of them do so fail) inevitably creates confusion of mind and judgment. The resident of Boston, whose acquaintance with the Japanese is confined to students and officials, quite misapprehends the point of view of the Californian, whose acquaintance with them is confined in the main to members of the *heimin* class. Each thinks the attitude of the other is perverse. In Japan the very language takes account of the difference. For

an ordinary laborer to address a gentleman with the same personal pronouns and verbal conjugations that the latter does him would be the height of calculated insult. This caste distinction is largely a relic of feudalism, and there are many such relics persisting in the modern Japanese social system. It is gradually breaking down today with the rise of the commercial middle class, but nevertheless it is still a powerful factor in Japanese life.

The incoming Japanese found the Ainu occupying the land and disputing their advance. The presence of a common foe welded the invaders together into a nation. The Ainu were gradually driven north, until today only a few hundred of them remain in the northernmost island of Hokkaidō.

Chinese missionaries introduced the Chinese written language, art, and culture about the sixth century, and the Island Kingdom flourished under the rule of the Mikados. Japan at this time was an absolute monarchy. Early in Japanese history the absolutism of the Emperor began to crumble and various powerful families occupied the rôle of "king-maker." Toward the close of the twelfth century a feudal system similar to that of Europe appeared. The actual rule was then usurped by subordinates who with the title of Shōgun held sway until 1868. The real Emperor was never

actually done away with, but was kept a helpless prisoner in Kyōtō while the Shōguns ruled in Yedo (the modern Tokyo).

During the eight centuries of feudalism Japan was divided up into fiefs, each ruled by a clan chief called the daimyō (literally, "great name"). The daimyō owed allegiance to the Shōgun alone. Within their own borders they were supreme, like the Barons of Europe, and their knights were subject to them. The *heimin* did the work and supported the military caste. Some of these families of daimyō were obscure, others were almost as great and powerful as the Shōgun himself. This clan spirit, persisting today, has been an important factor in modern Japanese politics. Two of these clans attained great power toward the end of the feudal era. One, the clan of Satsuma, had its seat at the southernmost end of the country; the other, the Chōshū, had its seat near the western entrance to the "Inland Sea." The combination of the two, called in Japan the "Sat-Chō" group, has largely controlled governmental affairs. The army today is officered chiefly by Chōshū men, the navy by Satsuma men.

It is important to remember how very recent the feudal system is in Japanese history. Japan has today a constitutional government with a parliament, but this does not necessarily imply the same things that are true

of England and her government, any more than the fact that Venezuela is a republic implies any similarity between her government and that of the United States. Eight centuries of feudalism cannot be wiped out of existence in a generation, no matter what verbal changes may be inaugurated.

Intercourse with the Occident

In 1542 the Portuguese discovered Japan, and seven years later the famous missionary St. Francis Xavier arrived. His proselyting was very successful. Both nobles and common people accepted the Faith by the thousands, and the land was in a fair way to become a Christian one. But the missionaries were overzealous and attempted to combine temporal with spiritual power. In consequence, the Japanese, fearing for their national existence, turned on the foreigners and their religion, forbade the practice of the Christian faith, expelled the missionaries, and closed up the country absolutely. In doing so they had the active assistance of the Dutch. This was in 1624. For over two hundred years Japan maintained her seclusion. Only the Dutch were allowed to have a trading post at Nagasaki, where they were compelled to pay annual tribute to the Shōgun and were subject to very humiliating restrictions.

But the later generations of Shōguns did not have

the strength of the earlier ones. Their authority crumbled. Japanese historians began to investigate the history of their country and to call attention to the fact that the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was the real ruler, whereas the Shōguns were usurpers. There grew up also a restless element in the large cities that was ripe for revolt.

Accordingly, when Commodore Perry of the United States navy appeared in Tokyo bay in July, 1853, with his little fleet of four warships, his coming was the last push that sent the tottering structure of the Shōgunate to the ground. The watchword now became, "Restore the Emperor to his full power." The Shōgun and his staff were between two fires. The Americans were followed by the English, Russians, and French, and insurrection in the name of the true Emperor broke out against the Shōgun's party, that had opened the gate to the hated foreigner. In 1866 the reigning Shōgun died. The next year the old Emperor died, and in 1868 the young Emperor came to the throne which he was to occupy until 1912.

It is a mistake to think that Perry, as it were, "happened upon" Japan at a fortunate time to negotiate. As a matter of fact, Americans, officially and unofficially, had made previously several futile attempts to enter into relations with the proud and warlike Japanese.

Russia, England, and France had also made fruitless efforts. In 1797 an American vessel had visited Nagasaki, chartered by the Dutch, who were the only people the Japanese would permit to trade. When, a little later, the captain of the same ship tried to trade on his own account, he was sent away.

In 1837 an elaborate expedition was fitted out with the avowed purpose of returning to Japan a number of shipwrecked Japanese who had been picked up adrift on the open sea. This boat was fired upon and driven away both from Tokyo and Kagoshima, the seat of the Satsuma clan. History does not record that the shipwrecked Japanese ever saw their native land again.

In 1845 another attempt was made to return to Japan some Japanese castaways, twenty-two in all. This time the Japanese were allowed to land, but not the Americans. The next year an official expedition was dispatched under Commodore Biddle. This embassy was contemptuously received and was entirely unsuccessful.

These attempts had been made in the interest of furthering American trade, a very legitimate one, of course. But it was brought to the attention of the State Department soon after, that another reason existed for desiring some sort of understanding with Japan. The North Pacific at this time was full of American whalers who not infrequently suffered shipwreck. When these

shipwrecked sailors were cast up on the inhospitable shores of Japan, their plight was a pitiable one. They were imprisoned and treated with great cruelty, even subjected to torture. Some of these sailors were rescued in 1849 by an American ship of war dispatched for the purpose.

Perry's expedition was the culmination of these various attempts. Every effort was made to give it a dignified and official character. A personal letter of President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor¹ was inclosed in a magnificent case. All sorts of valuable presents were carried, including a miniature railway with engine and cars, telegraph instruments, champagne, and "many barrels of whisky."

Perry's squadron, the first steam vessels ever seen by the Japanese, went up Tokyo bay against a head wind, with black smoke belching from the funnels, and carried consternation and dismay to the people on land, although the panic was somewhat allayed when the threatened invasion did not occur.

The Japanese tried the same tactics they had adopted on previous occasions, but Perry insisted upon treating with no one but a high official, and while showing every consideration and a consummate tact, yet demanded

¹ In reality, the Shōgun; the Americans did not appreciate the true situation with regard to the Japanese sovereign.

the respect and dignity due to the personal ambassador of one of the great nations of the earth. The Japanese made a virtue of necessity and finally consented to receive the President's letter, contrary to their own laws, as they said. They, however, professed themselves quite unwilling to grant the American's request to conclude a treaty. Wisely refraining from pressing the matter too far or provoking hostilities which would have defeated the purpose of the mission, Commodore Perry departed, with the reminder that he would return with a larger squadron in the spring for his definite answer.

The Americans "felt highly gratified at what had been accomplished. They had received different treatment from any foreigners who had visited Japan for two centuries. They had commanded respect and secured intercourse upon the basis of equality. They held direct communication with the highest imperial authorities without the intervention of the Dutch at Nagasaki.¹ They disregarded or caused to be with-

¹ When the Ambassador of the Dutch trading company was granted audience by the Shōgun, "he crawl'd on his hands and knees, to a place shew'd him, between the presents ranged in due order on one side and the place where the Emperor sat on the other, and then kneeling, he bow'd his forehead quite to the ground, and so crawl'd backwards like a crab without uttering a single word. So mean and short a thing is the audience we have of this mighty monarch." [Kaempfer, "History of Japan, 1691."] We may well believe that a Yankee naval officer would decline to participate in any such performance. On another occasion during

drawn local regulations which were derogatory to the dignity of their nation. On the other hand, while exhibiting firmness as to their rights, they showed the utmost regard for the sovereignty and rights of the Japanese. The crews of the vessels were not permitted to go on shore. No native was insulted or maltreated; no woman was outraged; no property was taken; no police regulation was violated — practices quite common on the part of the crews of other foreign ships.”¹

It is important to keep in mind this attitude of the Japanese toward foreigners. A proud, self-satisfied people, with an extraordinarily complex and subtle code of etiquette, which was of course a sealed book to the Westerner, could not help but look upon the outsider as the same visit the Emperor condescended, for the edification of his ladies, and Kaempfer relates that “he ordered us to take off our Cappa or Cloak, being our Garment of Ceremony, then to stand upright that he might have a full view of us; again to walk, to stand still, to compliment each other, to dance, to jump, to play the drunkard, to speak broken Japanese, to read Dutch, to paint, to sing, to put our cloaks on and off. Meanwhile we obeyed the Emperor’s commands in the best manner we could, I join’d to my dance a love song in High German. In this manner and with innumerable such other apish tricks we must suffer ourselves to contribute to the Emperor’s and the Court’s diversion.” One is reminded of the Igorrotes in the Filipino village at the St. Louis World’s Fair. The Japanese idea of this may be gathered from a remark made to Kaempfer by the Governor of “Osacca” to the effect that “it was a singular favour to be admitted into the Emperor’s presence, that of all nations in the world only the Dutch were allowed this honor.”

¹ Foster, “American Diplomacy in the Orient,” Boston, 1903.

a hopeless barbarian, ignorant of everything that in the Japanese mind distinguished a cultured man from an ignorant boor. It cannot be gainsaid that the actions of sailors, traders, and others with whom they had previously come in contact had gone far to confirm this impression. The dignity and restraint of Perry was in sharp contrast to the demeanor of some of the foreigners that had come to Japan, and this, together with the suggestion of hidden powers revealed by his steamboats, impressed the Japanese dignitaries favorably in spite of their fears. The Dutch they frankly despised. That they granted a measure of "equality" to the Americans was a great concession, however absurd it may have seemed to the latter.

In February, 1854, true to his promise, Commodore Perry returned with a squadron of ten warships and carried through the somewhat delicate negotiations involved in making the treaty. Free trade in open ports was not obtained at once, but many concessions were gained; the best of feeling seemed to prevail between the Japanese and American officials, and Perry's successful conclusion of his difficult mission was acclaimed at home and abroad.

At once the United States took advantage of its newly gained treaty rights to send a consul to Japan. The man chosen was Townsend Harris. The name of

Harris deserves as enduring a place in national memory as that of Perry. Unsupported by a powerful fleet, living for over a year in fact without communication with his home country, apparently forgotten in Washington (for Webster who had planned the Perry expedition was dead), in the midst of a semi-anarchy attendant upon the dissolution of the Shōgunate and the restoration of the Emperor, Harris nevertheless maintained a steadfastness of purpose, and displayed a tact and ability that deserve the highest praise. Every sort of obstruction was placed in his way by the Japanese, but in the end he won his way through to the conclusion of a treaty, so skillfully drawn that it served as the model for all subsequent treaties entered into by Japan with other foreign nations. Indeed it served as the basis of Japan's foreign relations until 1899. Harris refused to crawl upon his hands and knees before the Shōgun, and that monarch respected his prejudices in the matter.

While the name of Townsend Harris, almost unknown in America today, is highly respected by the Japanese, that of Perry is nearly as well known in Japan as that of any of their national heroes. In 1901 a monument was dedicated to the memory of Perry on the spot where he had landed, and this was made the occasion of striking and impressive ceremonies in which representatives both of the governments of Japan and the United States

took part. Perry is recognized in Japan as the instrument by which the empire took its first step on its reorganization as a modern nation. There exists also in the Japanese mind a subtler reason for venerating the memory of the American commodore. Perry forced the hand of the Shōgun and his government in compelling him to admit the hated foreigners. To so admit them was considered by the daimyō a betrayal of the country, and hence there rallied about the true Emperor the forces of opposition to the Shōgun which caused the overthrow of the latter and the restoration of the Mikado. Respect for their Emperor amounts almost to fanaticism with the Japanese. Since, therefore, Perry's visit contributed largely to the restoration of the Emperor, the Japanese have an additional reason to venerate his memory. On the other hand, the fair dealing which the Japanese received at the hands of our early representatives, at a time when the former were as innocent as children in the ways of international diplomacy, strengthened the bonds of friendship between ourselves and the Island Kingdom.

It was inevitable that in the disturbed political conditions incidental to the restoration clashes should occur between the foreigners and the fanatical warriors of the various clans. Some of the clans refused to abide by the decision to admit the foreigners, and numerous

riots and anti-foreign demonstrations occurred. The Secretary of the American Consulate was murdered and an Englishman named Richardson was cut down while attempting to break through the ceremonial procession of the Daimyō of Satsuma. The English government took cognizance of this and demanded an indemnity of the Shōgunate, which was paid, and another of the Prince of Satsuma, which was refused, whereupon Kagoshima, the capital of the province, was bombarded and burnt. A little later the American legation was burned by a mob, and all the foreign representatives were forced to leave Tokyo and take refuge in Yokohama under the guns of their warships.

The culmination of these disturbances was what is known as the "Shimonoseki affair." The straits of Shimonoseki communicate between the Inland Sea and the western waters between Japan and Korea. It was bordered by the lands of the Prince of Chōshū, a very powerful and anti-foreign daimyō who refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Shōgun in concluding treaties with the foreigners. He closed the straits and fired upon passing vessels, American, French, Dutch, and English. Representations were made to the Shōgun, but the latter confessed himself helpless to control the actions of the lord of Chōshū. So a combined fleet of the four nations involved, consisting of seventeen

warships, descended upon Shimonoseki and demonstrated to the Prince, with gunpowder, the futility of attempting independently to rule his own domain. As our Civil War was in progress at the time there was no American fleet in Japanese waters, and the Federal Government chartered a vessel from the Dutch in order to participate in the chastisement of the bumptious daimyō. After the affray the four nations demanded an indemnity of the Shōgun's government in the amount of \$3,000,000, an enormous sum for the impoverished treasury to pay. The booty was divided into four parts, one fourth to each nation, although the United States had but one gunboat in the fleet. This \$750,000 rested rather heavily on Uncle Sam's conscience, and twenty years later, by act of Congress, it was returned, with interest, to Japan, where it was gratefully accepted and used in improving Yokohama harbor. This example of altruistic endeavor has never been followed by the other nations involved, although England later used her share in a very questionable exchange.

A great deal of interest attaches to the Shimonoseki affair in the light of recent events. The control of the President of the United States over the actions of the governor and legislature of California is as defective as was that of the Shōgun over the Prince of Chōshū, and if at the passage of the Webb Act (debarring Jap-

anese from owning land in California) the American government had been poor and helpless, and the Japanese, with a powerful fleet in the Potomac River, had chosen to press their grievances, the exaction of an indemnity of Washington would have been on all fours with the Shimonoseki levy.¹

It is to the credit of our public officials, and a matter of much satisfaction to American citizens, that our dealings with foreign countries, particularly in the Orient, have been characterized in the main by a generous feeling and a sense of equity rather rare in international relations. It is true that in some matters nearer home, such as those of Texas and California, our motives have been somewhat Jesuitical, yet as a rule we have scorned to be sordid.

In 1856 the United States came into armed conflict with China or rather with a Chinese province. Collisions of various sorts finally led to a joint expeditionary force which attacked Tientsin. Americans were involved along with French, Russians, and English. Various losses to the property of American missionaries and merchants were met by the payment of an indem-

¹ As a matter of fact, in the well-known New Orleans lynchings the national government paid an indemnity to the families of the Italians killed, while at the same time confessing to the Italian government its inability to put any pressure upon the Louisiana authorities to punish the ringleaders of the mob.

nity to us by China of \$735,000. In 1885, however, we returned to China the unexpended balance of \$453,400. The only other time that we came into collision with an Oriental power was in 1900, at the time of the Boxer outbreak. At the conclusion of this brief campaign a crushing indemnity was levied. Again in a few years the American share of this booty, over and above what satisfied the actual damages, was returned to China.

Altogether, during the past century, our country has come into armed conflict with the Orient three times. None of the campaigns was of sufficient importance to be called a war. In each of them, however, indemnity was exacted,—in two of the cases only because the foreign powers were associated together in joint action. In every case the money was returned, except for the proportion that went to satisfy just claims.

This sort of action may be styled “playing to the gallery.” The justice of such a charge depends upon the sincerity of the motive. I think it cannot be questioned that the American people are overwhelmingly opposed to keeping money that does not belong to them. Oriental peoples have a very keen sense of justice, and it must be confessed that this trait has not been in the past a conspicuous characteristic of the way of an Occidental with an Oriental. This is particularly true of China.

But in the case of Japan another and very human element enters into the impression made upon public opinion by acts such as have just been described. When the Japanese knight or samurai was in his glory, an impassable gulf separated him from the tradesman. Even the artisan and the farmer were ranked higher. The tradesmen occupied the lowest rung of the social ladder. This accounted for a good deal of the contempt which was shown the Dutch at Nagasaki during the long years of seclusion. The latter were there for such money as they could make, and cared not for social indignities so long as they could take their profit. All foreigners were classed together in this regard by the Japanese, and accordingly it was held beneath the dignity of a noble to have intercourse with them. Perry's attitude and his dignified bearing in the negotiations of 1853 were a surprise to the Japanese and caused them to modify their original estimate of foreigners and perhaps to think of Americans as somewhat in a class by themselves.

The feudal contempt for trade has passed away with the growth of commerce and industrialism and with the entrance of men of high lineage into the field of business. But the old ideas still persist in part, particularly among the gentry. It is not "good form" in Japan today to pass money from one to another except when wrapped

in white paper (shopkeepers, of course, excepted). Even your tip to the landlord of the inn must be wrapped up and given with a disparaging remark. A Japanese gentleman would think it beneath his dignity to count his change. The writer once stirred up a hornet's nest about himself by innocently checking over a laundry list submitted to him by a houseman, who turned out to be a samurai in very reduced circumstances. Even in America the Far Westerner who doesn't bother to wait for his change has a certain contempt for the resident of the Atlantic seaboard who counts his pennies.

Now the open-handed disregard for money for its own sake, implied in the remission of indemnities originally levied by joint action of the "Powers," produced in the Japanese mind a more favorable reaction than it would in any other country, on account of the national attitude described above, and has done much to aid the development of a real friendship between Japan and America.

In 1879 the Japanese people had an opportunity to demonstrate their enthusiastic friendship for us. In that year, ex-President Grant made a tour of the world. His travels in Japan were in the nature of a triumph. No foreigner, hardly any national hero before or since, has had such a spontaneous demonstration of popular enthusiasm. Books describing Grant's visit are still sold

in the bookstalls in Japanese cities. Grant was accorded royal honors and acted with great tact throughout the trip.¹ He was asked to arbitrate between China and Japan with regard to a controversy concerning the Riu-Kiu Islands and carried out the delicate commission with success.

The United States had yet one other opportunity of demonstrating its friendship for the Island Kingdom when the time came to revise the treaties that were drafted at the beginning of foreign intercourse. The original treaties drafted, one might say dictated, by the Western Powers, followed the precedent that had been adopted in establishing relations with semi-civilized states in the past. At the time of the Restoration, torture was an important feature of Japanese judicial procedure, just as it had been in Europe not many centuries before. Under such circumstances it was inconceivable that Western nations should leave their own nationals to the tender mercies of Japanese judges, and accordingly a clause providing for extraterritoriality was inserted in all the treaties. This prevails today in a modified form in China and was but very recently abrogated in Turkey. Under the working of the

¹ Instance his refusal to cross the sacred bridge at Nikkō, a privilege reserved to the Emperor and offered to a foreigner for the first time in history when Grant was invited to cross.

“extraterritoriality” provision, the control of all foreigners resident in Japan was in the hands of the foreign consuls, who, as judges, tried all cases involving foreigners, from petty larceny to murder. American consuls, being political appointees, in many cases had not a vestige of legal training or judicial experience. Of course the Japanese could not permit foreigners over whom they had no control to wander at will through the country, and the right of residence was therefore restricted to the foreign “concessions” of the treaty ports. When foreigners traveled or resided outside these concessions, they had to be provided with police passports. This situation, which was inevitable in the early days of intercourse, soon became galling to the proud Japanese, anxious to assume a place in the family of nations.

Another clause of these early treaties was even more a source of irritation. The Japanese who signed them were wholly ignorant of the nature of modern international relations and placed their interests unreservedly in the hands of the one they most trusted, the American consul-general, Townsend Harris. The latter drew up a tariff in the best interests of the Japanese, with foodstuffs and raw materials on the free list and liquors at 35 per cent *ad valorem*. Lord Elgin, at that time in charge of British interests, negotiated a tariff treaty soon afterwards. He utilized the English share of the

Shimonoseki indemnity in a way suggestive of an American "gold-brick" expert, trading it back to the confiding Japanese in exchange for a reduction to 5 per cent of the import duty on wool and cotton manufactures. Now there is a clause rarely omitted in international treaties, termed the "most favored nation" clause, by virtue of which any concession made to one nation is of necessity shared by all other treaty-powers. This English treaty resulted therefore in a reduction to 5 per cent *ad valorem* all around. The Japanese were helpless in the matter, and the good offices of the American representatives were unavailing against the rapacity of the Europeans. As cotton manufactures in particular constituted at that time the bulk of the imports, and was the industry most in need of "protection," this resulted in a very unjust restriction upon Japanese commerce. In fact, until the treaty revision of 1899 the customs receipts never reached four million dollars, the largest annual total (that of 1899) being but \$3,140,000. This sum barely paid the cost of collection.

The worst of it was that the Japanese soon awoke to the fact that not only had they bargained away to the European Jacobs their rights of control over foreigners in their own dominions and the right to fix their own tariffs, but more than this, that they had done so, not for a period of years, but apparently in perpetuity. At

least when they sought to improve their status, they discovered that on account of the absence of a definite date to terminate such treaties the Western powers decided that the agreements should remain in force until the said powers should agree to change them.

Still relying on the justice of the nations of Christendom, the Japanese in 1871 dispatched a special embassy, with Prince Iwakura, then foreign minister, at its head, to make a tour of America and Europe, present the claims of Japan to recognition and sovereignty and pave the way for a new and more equitable revision of the existing treaties. This embassy included some of the leaders of the New Japan and altogether comprised more than one hundred persons. They came first to America, where they were made the official guests of the nation, were entertained royally, and received the assurance of the State Department that the United States was prepared to take up treaty revision on terms more favorable to Japan. But when the embassy reached Europe, they found a very different attitude. Great Britain was then the chief exponent of the "mailed fist" in the Far East, and English commerce profited too greatly by the tariff with Japan to permit any change. It is but fair to suppose that if American commerce had been to any degree comparable with that of England at the time, the embassy might not have found so altruistic,

not to say avuncular, an attitude displayed toward them in this country.

The fact remains, however, that when the Japanese returned to their own land from their fruitless quest and summed up the results of their endeavor, the attitude of the United States stood out in bold contrast to that of the European powers and produced a profound impression, not only upon the official classes, but upon the mass of the people. Nothing was left, however, but to build up Japan to a status upon which she might assert her independence and defend her rights. This she forthwith bent every energy to accomplish. As might be expected, the Japanese turned to America for the help which was freely granted. An American organized the efficient postal system; most institutions of higher learning had Americans as professors in all departments (except medicine, which was imported bodily from Germany, and law, in which the methods of the French are more congenial to Japanese institutions than those of Anglo-Saxondom); the national fiscal system was remodeled by officials from the United States Treasury Department. Americans have constantly been retained in the capacity of advisors to the Foreign Office. In general, Americans both officially and privately have been largely instrumental in shaping the externals of New Japan and enabling the modern nation to get

upon its feet. This relation has been intensified by the great number of Japanese students who have come to America to study in our colleges and universities. These invariably have been shown every attention and given every opportunity. Nor should we neglect to mention the influence for the past forty-five years of the missionaries, most of whom have been American. As to the success of their proselyting there may be two opinions, but with regard to the influence upon Japanese public opinion and thought, of the presence of American families of the highest type scattered throughout the Empire, there can be but one. These missionaries, broad-minded and catholic in thought, college graduates as a rule, speaking the language fluently, associating on a plane of equality with the most influential of the Japanese intellectual and official classes, have been as bits of leaven scattered through the mass of the Japanese population, often unconsciously and unintentionally acquainting the Japanese with American ideas and ideals, and removing the greatest of all barriers to international amity, that of prejudice and ignorance of the foreigner. The net result of all these factors is that the Japanese people, high and low, know a great deal more of America and the American people than we do of them.

But the Japanese realized that it was not sufficient to remodel Japan on the basis of Western jurisprudence,

commerce, medicine and science. They had been slow indeed if they had failed to take into account the place that arms and force have occupied in Occidental diplomacy. Moreover, it would be too much to expect that a whole population of professional warriors, the *samurai*, would find places in an economic system that did not include an army. Accordingly they sought the aid of European drillmasters and began the not difficult task of making over the army according to European standards and of establishing a modern navy. The use to which they have put these adjuncts to modern civilization will be discussed in the next chapter.

Summary

Japan has emerged from a condition of complete feudalism into that of a modern constitutional monarchy within the experience of men now living. For two centuries and a half previous to this change she had shut herself off from intercourse with other nations, jealously guarding against the entrance of any outside barbarians and developing a high degree of civilization in which flourished the arts of peace as well as those of war. By the middle of the nineteenth century internal disintegration had paved the way to revolution, and when in 1853 the American Commodore Perry called with his fleet, conditions were favorable for insisting

upon the assumption of friendly relations with the Western nations.

Japan then signed treaties, first with America and later with other powers, in which she yielded up the right to control foreigners within her dominions and to fix her own tariffs. Being unable to secure a change in these hard conditions until she should have made over her national life upon Western models, she set herself the great task of transforming a collection of eighty-six semi-independent fiefs into a unified nation on Occidental lines. This she accomplished in a remarkably short space of time through the ability and foresight of her leaders, the sterling qualities of her common people, and the devotion of all classes to the Imperial throne. In all this she received much help from Western countries, and particularly from the United States.

As a whole and practically without exception, the relations that existed between Japan and America for the last half of the nineteenth century were more than friendly. On the side of America they partook of the attitude of a proud teacher toward the exploits of an apt pupil (ignoring naturally the fact that the young Empire had other instructors). In the mind of Japan the position of America was that of "elder brother," an Oriental relationship that is hard to appreciate in the Occident, where family connections are, by comparison,

relatively insignificant. This attitude of America was in part due to the fact that until 1897 America had hardly attained self-consciousness as a nation of the world. Constitutional America is only about seventy-five years older than constitutional Japan, and to future historians with the perspective of a couple of centuries, the transformation of our own nation during the nineteenth century may seem more wonderful than that of Japan. The two nations are not unlike two boys who grow up together. And it is a common human experience that two bosom companions of youthful days may find their paths diverge as maturity comes, and the romantic affections of nonage cool to the more business-like relations of men of the world.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN COMES OF AGE

WHEN the Japanese had reformed their judiciary and their diplomatic and postal services, had established the machinery for commerce, remodeled their educational system, and, in general, made over their national garments by an Occidental pattern, they rather naturally supposed that their years of probation were ended and that the irritating restrictions of extraterritoriality and lack of tariff autonomy would be removed by the nations that had been so prominent in leading Japan from the darkened chamber of feudalism into the light of Western civilization.

They were doomed to a bitter disappointment. In the attempt to mitigate the more irritating of these two restrictions, Count Inouye, one of the ablest of Japan's new leaders, after tedious discussions, at last in 1886 secured the concession that Japanese judges should be allowed to serve on the bench in cases involving aliens. But the foreign judges were to be nominated by the European diplomats, were to constitute a majority, and to control the rules of procedure.

This concession came so near to realizing the Japanese proverb of "pointing at a stag and calling it a horse," that great public indignation was aroused and the conferences were broken off. The American minister alone supported the Japanese demands for recognition in opposition to his colleagues. Count Inouye's successor to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Count Ōkuma, tried to revise the treaties by negotiating with each nation separately. America had long before expressed her willingness; Germany, France, and Russia were finally won over, but Great Britain stood out to the end against any concession. This aroused such public indignation, and the snub was felt so keenly by the Japanese, that Ōkuma, who was responsible for the situation, was also forced to resign — however, not before a fanatic had blown off his leg with a bomb.

The reaction from these disappointments was keen and took the form of an anti-foreign sentiment expressed not so much against foreigners themselves, as against foreign ideas, dress, usages, etc., and the superiority of native institutions began to be preached. The government, however, went on with its reforms, and in 1889 the Emperor promulgated the Constitution, organizing a Diet and a machinery of government modeled after that of Prussia.

But the Japanese were not stupid in reading history

nor in observing it. They well knew that the professions of disinterestedness on the part of European powers are frequently contradicted by their actions. Even Perry's success was in no small part attributable to his gunboats. The Japanese realized that however far toward social perfection in the individual relations the Western nations may have progressed, in international relations the law of the jungle still holds good. And they knew that their motives, their cleverness, their positive achievements in art, letters, and science, would continue to count for little with nations whose politics are still based upon comparative military power. Japan had tried to gain her place by achievements in the arts of peace. She had failed. She therefore determined to qualify in the arts of war. Her success in the eyes of the West has an aspect almost ludicrous.

To say that Japan, with a brand new army and navy, was itching to show them off before the world, and was therefore only too glad of an excuse to fight, would be to state something impossible to prove. There never yet has been a war that was not only wholly justifiable — but really inevitable — to the power that declared it.

Unfortunately for China, whenever any other nation wishes an excuse to fight her, she is more than accommodating. The attitude of the great Chinese Empire toward the upstart Japanese, whom their earliest

chronicles contemptuously term "dwarfs" and "shrimps," has never been one calculated to allay irritation. Nor has Korea behaved any better. In fact, after the fall of the Shōgunate, when Japan was endeavoring to remodel her government on an Occidental pattern, the Koreans considered such action traitorous to the cause of the Orient and became very contumacious. In 1875 they fired on a Japanese gunboat and Japan was compelled to dispatch a squadron *à la* Commodore Perry to force a treaty of "amity and commerce" from the defiant Koreans.

This assertion of national independence on the part of the Hermit Kingdom did not in the least suit China, who had all along tried to maintain the fiction that Korea was a vassal state. And Chinese officials began to exercise an influence in Korean affairs, directed in the main toward promotion of trouble with Japan.

The history of Korea is one long chronicle of corruption and misrule. As the activities of Japan and her ascendancy in the eyes of the world were particularly odious to those Korean officials who profited most by the then political condition of the peninsula, and as China was disposed on her own account to back up the latter, conflicts and disputes between Korea and Japan became frequent. When the latter country tried to press her own claims upon Korea, she was met by the

Chinese contention that Korea was a tributary state of China, a stand which China was prepared to support by arms. Finally, in July, 1894, insurrection broke out in Korea and things came to a crisis.

Nothing could have suited Japan better. However scrupulous or fearful the statesmen of the rejuvenated kingdom might have been, the army and navy were spoiling for a fight. Nor were the Japanese as a whole averse to the idea of "reforming" Korean institutions. No one is so zealous as the new convert, and certainly Korea has long been in chronic need of reformation. China feared that Japan was bent upon annexing Korea — a fear that has been completely justified by subsequent events, although it is doubtful if it were justified at the time. When war actually broke out, the campaign was short and decisive. China was provided with battleships and Krupp guns, and on paper was the better equipped, but the hopeless inefficiency of the Chinese as a fighting man was most thoroughly demonstrated and she was beaten in every battle. The war lasted seven months and the Japanese lost altogether 1000 men killed with 5000 wounded. China's indemnity was fixed at 200,000,000 taels, and in addition she was forced to cede to the victor the island of Formosa and the Liao-Tung peninsula, with the fortress of Port Arthur.

Japan thrilled with her success.¹ At last she was become a power in the world and a member of the family of nations. Great Britain, long so obstinate, hastened to conclude treaties with her, abrogating extraterritoriality in five years and granting to her the long-sought tariff autonomy; began the moves indeed that eight years later culminated in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan felt that recognition was at last achieved.

This was certainly true, but the recognition of Japan's prowess on the part of the rest of Europe was not at all according to the cards. European nations had not been so indifferent to Japan's progress as she had imagined. At least one monarch had watched it with misgivings. This was the German Emperor. With his active imagination he saw disaster breeding from this awakening of the Orient. Attributing to the Far East the same motives of aggression that have actuated the West, he had a vision of hordes of Orientals swarming over Asia into

¹ Probably this was one of the most *successful* wars that have been fought in modern times. Mr. Roosevelt has recently pointed to Japan ("America and the World War") as a nation that has "profited" by successful war. Japan, in 1896, published the cost of the Chinese war to be \$97,246,210. The indemnity, therefore, represents a cash "profit" of about 35 per cent. The paradoxical consequence of this success, however, was that military expenditure in Japan jumped from \$6,405,000 in 1894 to \$12,059,000 in 1896, and \$19,471,000 in 1898. And the Japanese citizen's taxes advanced accordingly.

Europe, wiping out European civilization with the sword which the short-sighted West had put into their hands. Such was the "Yellow Peril" which the Kaiser was to figure later in his famous cartoon.

The victory of Japan came as an unpleasant shock to Germany. Yet, if the Kaiser had read history to better purpose, he would not have been so surprised. The Japanese have ever been aggressive and warlike and are most apt in imitation. They had merely grafted the newest fashions in man-killing upon ancestral instincts and abilities. The ethics, instincts, and abilities of the Chinese, on the other hand, are antithetical to war, in spite of their unquestioned bravery. But to the European statesman, at the time, all Orientals were yellow, and, *ipso facto*, a "peril" to be anticipated.

One way to overcome the Yellow Peril was to kill it before it should become a peril, to turn it back, as a conflagration is stopped by backfiring. That Japan should get a foothold upon the continent of Asia was intolerable. The peace-treaty between China and Japan should not be allowed to stand. So Germany stepped in and, having persuaded France and Russia to back her up, compelled Japan to cede back to China the Liao-Tung peninsula and Port Arthur, in order to preserve the "balance of power." Japan's interest in

Port Arthur was at this time a political, not a colonial one. It holds the key to Peking, the hinterland of Manchuria, and Korea, and her possession of it is a great guarantee of safety for the Island Empire. Moreover, the peninsula is interposed, as it were, between China and Korea and would pretty effectually block off China from further interference in the latter country. Japan was very reluctant to give up the fruits of her victory, but the depleted condition of her war-chest and the mobilization of the navies of three powers left her no recourse. A Japanese writer asserts that, "The historical significance of this memorable incident deserves special emphasis. It is not too much to say that with it Eastern Asiatic history radically changed its character."¹ But in retroceding Port Arthur it apparently did not occur to the Japanese to provide against any other power getting hold of it. Perhaps it would not have mattered anyway, since she was in no position to enforce her demands.

The immediate effect of Japan's victory was to stimulate European aggression in the Orient. On the Teutonic principle that "attack is the best defense" the Powers hastened to intrench themselves before Japan could be in a position to checkmate them. "Spheres of influence" rapidly began to condense out of the nebula

¹ K. Asakawa, "Russo-Japanese Conflict." Boston, 1904.

of Oriental politics, and for the next ten years it seemed as if China was to cease to exist as a nation.

Russia assumed the rôle of a devoted friend to China against the hated Japanese; loaned her half the money (without security) to pay the indemnity and guaranteed (in the secret "Cassini convention") to protect her against her enemies. China was not ungrateful for this help, and, in return, in 1898 "leased" to Russia for 99 years the same Port Arthur that Europe had forced out of the hands of Japan. Port Arthur thus became for Japan what Alsace-Lorraine has been for France for forty years, and the first move of the Russo-Japanese war-game was played.

There was something of a motive of self-protection in Russia's action. The first aggressor was Germany, and the leasing of Port Arthur was a sort of counter-move. One of the finest harbors on China's coast is that of Kiao Chau in the rich and populous district of Shantung. Germany for some time had had her eye upon this port, but it was not wise to attempt to gain a foothold while Russia might object. For a few years following the conclusion of the Chinese-Japanese war Russia was very busy strengthening her "fences" in Manchuria, and Germany saw her opportunity. Fortunately two Catholic priests were lynched November 1, 1897, by a mob in Shantung. The governor of the

province ordered an investigation at once and in three weeks the ringleaders were caught. But it was too late. Already the German warships were in Kiao Chau harbor and German marines had seized the town. As no diplomatic representations had been made to Peking, the Chinese authorities were left to infer that the seizure was a punishment for the murders. Meanwhile Prince Henry of Prussia had been sent by the Kaiser with a squadron to proclaim the doctrine of the "mailed fist" and to force the "lease" for 99 years of Kiao Chau. Germany's justification for this action was expressed by Herr von Bülow in the Reichstag April 27, 1898, when he said: "Mention has been made of a partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveler cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it does start. The devil takes the hindmost." And in Germany's contest with the devil, Herr von Bülow intended that her place should be far from the rear.¹

¹ Close students of this phase of Germany's policy will note that von Bülow's Imperial Master did not take quite the same *laissez-faire* point of view. In his famous speech at Bremen, to the troops departing for China to participate in the quelling of the Boxer outbreak (July 27, 1900), Kaiser Wilhelm said: "The Chinese have overthrown the law of Nations; . . . preserve the old Prussian thoroughness; show yourselves as Christians in joyfully

Germany's action was immediately followed by Russia's in Port Arthur, and a little later England claimed equal privileges in Wei-hai-wei. Even Italy spoke for a share, but was frowned upon by the others for her presumption. France had long since strongly intrenched herself in Tonking on the south. England and Germany both wanted the rich territories of the Yangtse valley, and it is not unlikely that they might have gone to war about it on some pretext or other by this time if the Russo-Japanese war had not deflected the trend of events. In short, the "break-up" of China seemed very imminent. In this aggressive campaign, which suggests a pack of jackals quarreling over the body of a dying ox, Japan was a disturbing element. Actuated by no especially altruistic sentiments toward China, she was nevertheless confronted by the prospect of having her future markets preëmpted by hostile powers and her own development checked. On the other hand, the latter recognized in Japan, since her bearing your trials; may honor and glory follow your flags and weapons. You know very well that you are to fight against a cunning, brave, well-armed, and terrible enemy. If you come to grips with him, give no quarter, take no prisoners. Use your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance. Show your manliness. The blessing of God be with you. The prayers of an entire people and my wishes accompany you every one. Open the door for culture once for all!" [Official version printed in the *Reichsanzeiger*, translated by Christian Gauss.]

easy victory over China, the only considerable obstacle to the success of their aggressive campaigns on the continent.

One other event, a little later, strengthened the fears of Europe and gave the Powers pause. This was the notorious "Boxer" outbreak of 1900. The relief expedition incident to the affair afforded another opportunity to show the world the proficiency of Japanese arms. Ever since the conclusion of the war of 1895 a seething current of anti-foreign propaganda had whirled beneath the surface of things in China. A few foreigners had seen the outbreak coming and had uttered warnings, but they went unheeded. The seizure of territory on the part of the European powers at this time was resented the more deeply because a national self-consciousness was beginning to stir throughout the inchoate Chinese Empire. Germany's activities were particularly resented. Japan was an Oriental country, and while the Chinese may have despised her they could hardly resent her presence as a next-door neighbor. Formosa was a prize of war and was not a part of the sacred Empire anyway. Russia's activities were confined to sparsely settled outlying districts. England and France had been established so long that in a measure the Chinese had grown accustomed to them. But Germany's presence on Chinese soil was so un-

called for, the excuse so flimsy, and her actions so threatening that a very profound effect was produced.

Shantung, the province in which is located Kiao Chau, is one of the oldest and the most densely populated of all China. It was the birthplace of Confucius and is often referred to as the "sacred province." In order to strengthen their grip on this province and their control in the immediate hinterland of Kiao Chau, the Germans began to construct a railway, the concession for which was most unwillingly granted. Now any long-settled district in China is one vast graveyard, and nothing is so repugnant to the sensibilities and religion of the Chinese as the desecration of the grave of an ancestor. Granting that the Germans would not wantonly affront the Chinese, yet to build such a railroad without interfering with graves is a physical impossibility, and it is certainly true that in constructing the relatively short line now in operation, thousands of graves were violated. This particular act (which has been repeated to a greater or less degree whenever railways have been built in the empire) did much to inflame Chinese feeling. Again, the very great credulity and superstition of the common people led them to accept all sorts of wild tales regarding the hated foreigner. Distrust of the missionaries also contributed a part to the general feeling, and economic influences

likewise were not lacking, for the growth of foreign trade and the introduction of Western manufactures in many cases threatened to disturb the economic balance of this very conservative people.

There has existed in China, for over a century, a secret society (analogous let us say to our "Odd Fellows" or "Knights of Pythias") called the *I Ho Tuan* and referred to by foreigners as "Boxers." This society, half benevolent, half mystical, and wholly patriotic, undertook to clear their native land of the detested foreigners who profaned it. The Boxer anti-foreign campaign rapidly gained headway in Shantung and soon got quite out of hand, for the Chinese soldiers sent to subdue them went over to the Boxer side.

It would not be pertinent to devote space here to a description of the startling and melodramatic crisis of this agitation. The details of the siege of Peking and the relief of the foreign legations by the troops of the allied powers will be found in any modern history of China.¹ But two aspects of this campaign of the foreign troops in North China deserve especial mention. In the first place, the emergency was a very sudden one in spite of the repeated warnings. America had troops in the Philippines, and Japan was of course next door. But the latter was disinclined to court criticism

¹ See especially "China in Convulsion," by A. H. Smith.

by acting too precipitately, and as a matter of fact international jealousies played a conspicuous part in determining the relative proportion of troops each nation should contribute to the expeditionary force dispatched to Peking. Russia was differently situated. The Trans-Siberian railway was but just completed, and the "Chinese-Eastern" branch, planned to exploit Manchuria, ran for 1000 miles through a region sufficiently wild and dangerous even under ordinary circumstances. To guard this railway, and incidentally to get a firmer grip on the three provinces, Russia at the first outbreak of trouble began to pour in troops from Siberia. The exact number will probably never be known, but it was upward of 30,000. When the Boxer campaign was ended and peace reigned once more in China, Russia manifested a great reluctance to withdraw any troops from Manchuria. To the protests of the Powers, she answered by converting her army of occupation into "railway guards." These guards were constantly being shifted and, to the Japanese, the meaning of their presence was only too clear. Russians began to employ the present instead of the future tense in speaking of Manchuria as Russian territory.

Thus was a second round in the Russo-Japanese game played and the trick taken by Russia. The Boxer outbreak also tended to hasten the climax for another

reason. The dispatch of the composite force up to Peking afforded a most interesting laboratory demonstration of the comparative efficiency of the different armies as they marched and fought side by side against a common foe. In this, not only did the Japanese troops stand comparison with any others in efficiency, but in their conduct they shone above the majority. The soldiery of Europe seemed bent upon justifying, once and for all, the Chinese designation of Westerners as "foreign devils." Looting, rapine, murder and devastation followed in their wake. After Peking had been entirely subdued, the inertia of destruction led them into private "punitive expeditions" into various parts of the country. In these, the Japanese (and the Americans) took no part. The troops of both these nations were under the complete control of their officers and maintained the most perfect discipline. In bravery and military efficiency the Japanese caused all the Occidental experts to "take notice" and the diplomats to think some long thoughts. If a handful of troops showed themselves so efficient, what might the nation under arms be like? If the West had made its own comparisons, had not the East done likewise? Verily this Oriental Carthage must be destroyed. Japan must not be allowed to get so strong as to challenge the interests of Europe in China.

Thus the moves and countermoves on the diplomatic chessboard grew more and more complex. It was no longer the "Powers" against China and against one another; it was the Occident against the Orient. The entrance of militant Japan into the game threatened the success of the whole policy of aggression. In the excited fancy of students of "*welt-politik*" whose knowledge of the subject had not been gained at first hand, and to whom all Orientals looked alike, Europe was soon to be at the mercy of Asia, newly aroused to self-consciousness, and possessed of the war tools of the West.

Germany and France therefore had nothing to lose by encouraging Russia to put down upstart Japan. England saw a chance to profit herself by utilizing the new militant power against her "hereditary foe" (destined, in the inconsistency of politics, to be her ally in 1914), and concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Japan thus found that the immediate effect of her demonstration of military prowess was to make herself both courted and feared.

By way of parenthesis let us note that the panicky fear of a "Yellow Peril" rests upon a fallacy which has only to be stated to be self-evident. This fallacy is the assumption that a people can be both barbarous and civilized at the same time. Ages ago, to be sure, Mon-

golian hordes overran Eastern Europe, but conditions have changed since the times of Genghis Khan. Mere barbarians would stand no chance against the machine guns and trained soldiery of a modern state. But it is forgotten for the time being that for any people to compete with a modern nation in war, that people must be equally "civilized." For military ability nowadays demands not only the possession of modern arms, but much more, the possession of a capacity for organization, wealth, credit, a specialized commissariat, efficient agencies for combating disease, etc. In proportion, therefore, as an Oriental people should evolve in ability to compete in a military way with Europe, it would be compelled at the same time to evolve in the accompanying features of civilization,—to become, in other words, a civilized state. And when it should reach such a point, it would be inhibited, *ipso facto*, from being the menace to civilization it might have been, potentially, before such an evolution began. For a member of the modern family of nations has as little freedom of individual action in comparison with a barbarian tribe as a man, the member of a highly organized social community, has in comparison with his brother of the jungle. This does not mean of course that an armed Orient may not in some future time challenge the supremacy of Europe in war. Let us assume an analogous instance. It is

conceivable, for example, that war may occur some day between Germany and the United States. But it is inconceivable that the peasantry of Germany, the shopkeepers, bankers, students, and artisans, should simultaneously drop their several duties in the complex social organization of that Empire, and in a frenzy of predatory migration, swarm across the Atlantic to invade America and attempt to replace our putative Anglo-Saxon civilization with a Teutonic one. Assuming that the Orient for centuries has been "uncivilized" in the Western sense (an assumption wholly gratuitous), the Occident never need fear the sort of peril that Kaiser Wilhelm so eloquently voiced.

Events moved fast in the Orient during the first few years of the new century. Japan would only too gladly have delayed the climax, but she was like a man tied to a runaway wagon, who either has to run himself or fall and be dragged. Admiral Alexieff became the Russian Viceroy of the Far East, and the Russian policy became more aggressive, more domineering, more regardless of outside opinion. Diplomatic intrigue, never absent from Korea, fairly subcharged the atmosphere of that unhappy peninsula. Not content with Port Arthur, the Russians began to set the stage for the acquisition of Masamphō at Japan's very door. More disquieting even, to Japan, was the ascendancy that

Russia was rapidly gaining over the Chinese officials at Peking. M. Pavloff, the Russian minister at Seoul, professed the most supreme contempt for the Japanese and all their work. In the face of all this, Japan was not idle. She bent every energy in feverish haste to prepare for the inevitable conflict. Every one in the Far East knew that the shock would come, except, apparently, the Russians.

When war broke, the Japanese quickly established the command of the seas by practically annihilating the Russian fleet. From their near-by base they swarmed over Korea and into South Manchuria. Port Arthur was besieged, and the Manchurian armies began to work their way north along the line of the railway. Port Arthur put up a stubborn resistance, and the Japanese threw away many thousands of men in the assaults upon the various forts that crowned the steep hills. Eventually these fell, one by one, and Port Arthur for a second time became the possession of Japan. Meanwhile the Japanese armies slowly pushed the Russians back toward the Siberian frontier with longer battle fronts and heavier losses than the world had hitherto seen. But all the while the former were getting farther from their home base and the Trans-Siberian railway was responding better and better to the strain put upon it, pouring in more Russian troops from the north.

Japan's credit was strained to the utmost. In spite of her apparently continuous victories, she began to find herself in a precarious position.

The Far Eastern campaign, however, was very unpopular in European Russia, and internal troubles began to multiply at home which made the Russian situation equally difficult. Consequently, when President Roosevelt proposed a truce, both sides were glad to cease fighting.

The people of Japan hailed this as a complete victory for their arms and, naturally, it would have been impolitic for their leaders to undeceive them. They looked for a great indemnity to recompense them for the huge outlays and sacrifices they had made. But the Japanese plenipotentiaries who came to Portsmouth to arrange the terms of the treaty knew before they started that they could expect no indemnity from an enemy whose territory was not even touched by the conflict. In the end, a line was drawn at the point (Changchun) where the armies had faced each other at the conclusion of hostilities. This line practically divided Manchuria into a northern half and a southern half. South Manchuria thus became the "Sphere of Influence" of Japan, while Port Arthur passed into her hands as the successor of Russia to the "lease." An intimate control was established over Korea, and a few

years later the unhappy kingdom was to find itself annexed to Japan as an integral part of that Empire.

It must not be forgotten that it was Russia's troubles at home that were largely responsible for her desire to stop fighting, rather than the complete victory of Japanese arms. But the masses of Japan did not know that, and they gave voice to loud indignation when they learned that there was to be no indemnity.¹ As Roosevelt was identified in their minds with the stopping of the war, they quite illogically but not unnaturally associated America with the loss of their anticipated indemnity.

The attitude of the American people before and after this conflict is an interesting study in mob psychology. The mind of the American is rather emotional than logical and his instinct is to favor the underdog. With a mental picture of the relative sizes, on the map, of Japan and Russia, and quite ignoring the comparative efficiencies of the two armies and navies, Americans were almost unanimously and emphatically on the side of Japan during the war. This state of mind was but natural in the light of past history, for the most amicable of relations had existed between Japan and America, while at the same time Russia had appealed to us as the

¹ A certain allowance was made Japan for the expense of keeping Russian prisoners.

home of oppression and the antithesis of every ideal that we most cherished. This pro-Japanese sentiment was abundantly fostered by the fact that practically all the sources of publicity upon which American newspapers depended were in the hands of Japan or her ally, England.

Continental Europe could not look with equanimity upon the accretion of power on the part of Japan or the possible defeat of Russia by an Oriental country, and realizing that our position facing the Pacific gave us a peculiar interest in what was happening in East Asia, Europeans were quite unable to comprehend our attitude. This was because, as stated above, our point of view, unlike that of Europe, was dictated, not by reason, but by emotion. But it is dangerous to be the popular idol of an emotional people. Hardly was the war over when our enthusiasm began to cool, and, as is the way with enthusiasts, we went to the opposite extreme.

There were several reasons for our change of mind, and, as usual, we were again, as a people, the victim of a press whose sources, if not tainted, were at least hardly unprejudiced.

For one thing, Japan found herself in a difficult position with regard to Korea and China, a position that has not been without parallels in our own recent history.

When the cast of the die found us in 1898 in possession of the Philippines, official Washington was nonplused by the problem of what we should do with them. In the beginning, President McKinley did not favor retaining the islands. But when the commissioners appointed to negotiate the peace treaty finally received their instructions, the President wrote: "Without any original thought of complete or partial acquisition, the presence and success of our armies at Manila impose upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. *The march of events rules and overrules human action.*" So the Commissioners were directed to demand the cession of the island of Luzon.

But the imperialistic spirit of the American people had been kindled and there arose differences of opinion among the Commissioners themselves. President McKinley, never unresponsive to the pressure of public opinion, finally changed his mind and cabled the United States Commissioners to demand the cession of the entire archipelago. This was done, and the islands became our "property" against the vehement protests of the Spanish Commissioners, who were put in "the painful strait of submitting to the law of the victor." The sincerity of their protests need not concern us. The fact remains that in a brief space of time we found it expedient to act quite differently from our announced intentions.

It is rather absurd, though not at all unnatural, that we should blandly forget all this and take umbrage at Japan only a few years later, when she revised her policy in a somewhat similar manner. During the six months preceding the Russo-Japanese war the diplomatic communications that were constantly exchanged between the two nations never failed to assert and reassert that the "integrity and independence of Korea" (and on Japan's side of Manchuria as well) was the one thing sought and cherished above all others. In the Japanese Imperial rescript declaring war upon Russia (after hostilities had begun) occur the words: "The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of gravest concern to our Empire, not only because of the traditional relations between the two countries, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our Empire." More than this, the Japanese government went out of its way to assure the world of its good intentions regarding Korea, in the Korean-Japanese Protocol,¹ in which Japan pledged herself to guarantee "for all time the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire" and the "safety and response of the Imperial House of Korea."

In spite of all this, only five years after the cessation of hostilities, Korea found itself annexed as a part of

¹ Feb. 27, 1904.

the Japanese Empire, and her country "administered" by Japanese officials in a way that left no doubt in the minds of Koreans and foreigners as to the meaning of the situation. So soon did Japan find her announced intentions "overruled" by the "march of events."

To enter upon a discussion of the rights and wrongs of this change of attitude is not the writer's purpose. The Japanese have, of course, justified their actions as we did ours in the matter of the Philippines. Their necessity, however, coincided in time with the natural reaction in America from our excessively pro-Japanese feeling described above, and we began to suspect the motives of the Oriental Empire more than we otherwise should have done. But not only did the press and the public revise their opinions suddenly and decidedly. Almost at the same time the State Department began to show a quite different countenance toward America's former protégé.

With the advent of William H. Taft to the Presidential chair came Philander Q. Knox as Secretary of State to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Knox was a corporation lawyer whose relations with "Big Business" were intimate, and his influence was soon felt in the Far East. When the Russians evacuated Manchuria after the occupation of 1900, one of the conditions arranged for with China was the opening of three

ports to trade. To these three new treaty ports the United States promptly appointed consuls, and American trade began to make a showing. The apparent importance of our trade was due to the general lack of trade credited to other nations rather than to the great amount of it in itself. The American Tobacco Company, ousted from Japan, sought to create a market in Manchuria, with the Japanese government as its only competitor. The Standard Oil Company began to build up a profitable trade. We have done a good business in high-grade sheetings. But there has never been much in the way of general and varied imports, and of the importance of Manchurian trade with America there has been a great deal of misstatement and exaggeration in the newspapers and the speeches of politicians.

After the fighting had ceased, but before the Japanese troops had evacuated South Manchuria, and while foreigners of other nationalities were strictly debarred from the province, Japanese traders swarmed over the country and, backed by the government, with its systems of drawbacks and rebates, the important Japanese commercial houses, such as the Mitsui family, established a firm foothold.

The American firms that had laid the foundation for a profitable business saw their prospects dwindling and began to bring pressure upon the State Department.

The Japanese, while protesting their adherence to the doctrine of conserving the independence and integrity of Manchuria and Korea, had been equally prompt in promising to retain the "Open Door," into which Secretary Hay had thrust a foot at the beginning of the war. But the "march of events" seemed indeed to give good reason to believe that there was as little likelihood of the maintenance of the "Open Door" in Manchuria as there was of its "integrity."

Theoretically Manchuria is still a Chinese province. In the north, Americans not long ago established their status with reference to the Russians by refusing to deliver their passports to the Russian police for reference, as one is required to do in Russia. In other words, they claimed to be foreigners, not in Russian, but in Chinese territory. In theory, the same thing holds south of Chang Chung. As a matter of fact, South Manchuria is to-day Japanese territory in a much more intimate way than Canada is British. There is nothing in the pompous phrases of the various state papers to indicate this, however. Nor is the status officially accepted by China.

In 1907 Japan came to a full understanding with Russia regarding their mutual interests in Manchuria, and in an agreement signed July 17, the two powers mutually engaged to maintain the *status quo*.

The heart of the Japanese control is the railroad. Without the South Manchurian Railroad, Japan's occupation of Manchuria would amount to but little. Keenly realizing this, Japan, early in the game, secured from China the treaty by which the latter forswears any project of paralleling the line or of establishing a rival.

Many and detailed were the complaints that arose from Americans concerning the alleged violations of the "Open Door" agreement on the part of Japan. Finally Mr. Knox stepped in. With a blandness almost Chinese, in assumed innocence of anything but the assured intentions of Japan to carry out her pledges, Mr. Knox proposed an easy way to guarantee to China the integrity of her Manchurian provinces. This was to neutralize the South Manchurian Railway, and to loan China \$100,000,000 with which to buy it back. The money was to be raised by a joint loan to be participated in by the various powers.

The proposal was received with bewildered astonishment, dismay, and indignation in Japan. When they had caught their breath, the Japanese protested that the war had cost them ten times one hundred millions, to say nothing of 130,000 human lives; that they alone had prevented Russia from occupying Manchuria to the exclusion of every other interest, and that China

had been helpless to protect herself. Did any one imagine that the clock could be put back to the period before the war and have things again just as they were?

Very well, Mr. Knox had something in his other hand. This alternative proposal was to build a railway from Kin-chau to Aigun on the Amur River,— a line paralleling the South Manchurian Railway. Such a line, China was inhibited from building by the terms of her post-bellum agreement with Japan. The scheme was to be financed by the coöperation of the English firm of Paulings and an American group consisting of J. P. Morgan and Co., Kuhn Loeb and Co., The First National Bank of New York, and the National City Bank. On the assumption that Manchuria was still Chinese territory, of course no other country than China could offer valid objection to such a concession nor could any other nation offer objection except to China.

This proposal amounted to a forcing of Japan's hand, and put her statesmen in a quandary. But in the end her face was saved by the British bankers dropping out of the agreement. Whether this action was due to pressure brought to bear by the British government at the instigation of her Oriental ally, Japan, has not been made public, of course, but one may surmise as much. The American bankers did not care to undertake the project alone and the matter was dropped.

The net result of Mr. Knox's Japanese policy was nil from the standpoint of either diplomacy or of practical achievement. An old guide to chess-playing used to have the rule, "Avoid useless checks." Mr. Knox's proposals seem very much like useless checks. He could hardly have anticipated a successful outcome to his neutralization scheme. And if his idea was to "show up" Japan to the world, it is hard to see what diplomatic advantage could lie in so doing.

Of course, if, as would have been the case with Russia or Germany or England, these Manchurian maneuvers had been merely the first move in a game in which they should be followed up by a display or use of force; if, in other words, it had been the intention, the soberly decided policy of the United States to become a participant in Oriental politics, as European powers are participants, then there would have been an explicable motive in the American action. But a democratic government like our own cannot undertake policies that are not supported by public opinion, and certainly public opinion in this country would never tolerate the use of the military arm of the nation to back up its aggressive commercial diplomacy. Without this intention Mr. Knox's attempt was meaningless.

But this does not mean that his proposals were unimportant. On the contrary, their effect upon Ameri-

can-Japanese relations has been most profound and permanent. They mark the end of the "elder brother" period. There still remain many thousands of the older generation in both countries who cannot forget the amicable relations that used to exist, or the attitude of disinterested helplessness of American officials toward Japan, that meant so much to the latter in her early struggles for a place in the Eastern sun. But from now on, America and Japan, as nations, can never again be on the same old footing. Each will always suspect the other's motives. Perhaps the situation could not have been avoided sooner or later. Both peoples merely have emerged from a period of national adolescence, with its natural enthusiasms, into maturity, with its cold practicality and its own selfish interests. Yet good feeling between alien peoples is a valuable political asset, and Mr. Knox's activities have done a good deal to destroy the former American-Japanese friendship without gaining any corresponding advantage.

One immediate effect of the American proposals was to throw the two erstwhile combatants into each other's arms. A little over five months after Japan had declined the neutralization proposal, she concluded (July 4, 1910) an agreement with Russia to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria. The next year, however, Russia began to extend her boundaries in the Sea of

Okhotsk, and Japan replied by dispatching cruisers thither. Russia offered to arbitrate the matter at The Hague, but Japan in turn proposed to concede the Russian demands if she could get as a *quid pro quo* the full recognition of her own claims in Manchuria. Russia consenting, the two powers, in a new understanding executed in 1912, agreed to defend jointly their interests in that province.

Summary

The history of Japan's foreign relations during the second half of the nineteenth century is mainly that of a struggle for national autonomy, particularly in regard to the control of aliens in her own dominions (extra-territoriality) and the right to adjust her own tariffs. These rights the Western nations refused to concede to Japan until she had demonstrated her military prowess in the war with China (1894-5). During this period the "personal" relations between Japan and America were intimate and cordial. America was in the lead in granting to Japan her national rights and in helping her upon her feet. For this reason, Japanese learned to look upon the United States with especial friendliness.

Following the Chinese war, in which the Japanese were overwhelmingly victorious, Europe began to fear

for the success of the aggressive projects that the various "Powers" had undertaken in China, which looked to the ultimate partition of that country. The rise of Japan was viewed with misgivings. As a consequence, the European powers, especially Germany, Russia, and England, hastened to intrench themselves firmly before Japan should be strong enough to checkmate them. The direct result of this activity, particularly that of Germany in Shantung, brought on the "Boxer outbreak" in 1900, in the quelling of which Japan showed herself to be on a par with any other country in modern warfare.

The Boxer trouble gave Russia a chance to establish herself in Manchuria and to gain a preponderant influence in Korea and even in Peking. The impossibility of Japan and Russia coming to an understanding with regard to their mutual interests in continental Asia and the arrogant attitude of the Russian officials, who depended upon bluff and were convinced that Japan would not fight, led finally in 1904 to the war between the two countries. The earlier victories in this war were all on the side of Japan, particularly on the sea, but it is doubtful what the final outcome might have been. Internal troubles in Europe led Russia to accept President Roosevelt's offer of mediation, and the conflict ceased with neither side really victorious. The loss

of an expected indemnity led to ill feeling toward America on the part of the Japanese populace.

In order to gain what advantage she could, Japan hastened to root herself securely in Manchuria and annexed Korea. This was contrary to her announced intentions and aroused the suspicion of Americans and the antipathy of the United States State Department, under the temporary influence of "Big Business." As a result, impossible proposals were made to Japan by America which have been the cause of ill feeling and suspicion toward us, where only friendly feelings previously existed. On the other hand, the activities of Japan on the Continent, which she has felt were necessary for her own protection and future, have done much to dissipate our previously extra-friendly attitude toward her. As a consequence, the end of the first half century of American-Japanese intercourse finds both nations on the point of abandoning the standpoint of international amity that has been so characteristic of their relations in the past.

The feeling of gradual estrangement has been accompanied in America by the fear that the rise of a strong militant power in East Asia may have in it elements of danger to our own commercial policies and aspirations. Particularly since the Spanish war our possession of the Philippines renders us peculiarly vulnerable to at-

tack in the event of an international controversy arising, and compels us to look toward Japan from a very different point of view than we should have had if a whimsical fate had not bequeathed us an Oriental problem of our own.

CHAPTER IV.

AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES

THE "Philippine Problem" occupies a large share of public attention at present, and rightly so, for few situations that we have ever been called upon to face have demanded so much far-seeing statesmanship or have so put to the test our national honor and responsibility, concerning which we have such a good opinion. The ultimate solution of this problem will have most significant consequences for the future not only of the Philippines but of the United States as well. For with it is bound up the portentous "Problem of the Pacific," which is the occasion of much high-sounding and alarming oratory, in Congress and out.

In the latter connection, Japan of course comes in for much attention, and without doubt, in the event of a war with Japan, it would make a great deal of difference to America whether we retain our sovereignty over the Islands or not, and if so, to what extent.

It is not my intention to discuss the pros and cons of the Philippine question with regard to our relations with the Islands present and future, nor the question of

their independence; rather I shall confine myself solely to such topics as have a bearing on American-Japanese relations.

How We Got the Islands

The Spanish-American war of 1898 is one of the most significant milestones in our national history, not so much because of the importance of that conflict in itself as because it opened the eyes of Americans to their place in the world. Previously, we as a people had been so preoccupied with home affairs that we had become provincial. The Spanish war with its unexpected consequences shook us out of this attitude, once for all, and brought us face to face with world movements and world problems.

The most unforeseen consequence of the war to the American people, as a whole, was the acquisition of the Philippines. To nearly every one, previous to 1898, the name was without meaning; we hardly knew of the existence of the islands or of the fact that Spain had colonies in the Pacific.¹ Of course the State and Navy Departments were fully informed regarding the archipelago, but when Admiral Dewey was sent with his

¹ Dean C. Worcester, one of the leading authorities on the Philippines and their problems, relates that after his return to America as a member of the first Philippine Commission a good old lady at his Vermont birthplace asked him: "Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin' the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?"

squadron to seek the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor, there was no other intention in his or any one's else mind than that of attacking an enemy wherever he might be exposed to attack. Yet there had not been lacking far-sighted students of world-politics even among the Filipinos (J. Rizal) who had foreseen the western expansion of the United States, foreshadowed in the occupation of Hawaii and Samoa¹ and had predicted that the Islands would some day come under the sway of America.

The Spanish in their control of the Philippines had pursued the same policy that they did in the two Americas; that is, they had exploited the country entirely for the benefit of the privileged classes at home, incidentally extending the benefits of the church to the "heathen." Paternal and benign in the beginning, by the end of the eighteenth century this control had developed in many respects into a downright tyranny.

As a consequence, before the war, there had been fomenting an active opposition to the rule of Spain on the part of some of the Christian races of the Philippines, which was on the point of bursting into open rebellion, when the coming of Dewey and the collapse of Spanish authority changed the whole situation.

During the progress of the peace negotiations, as

¹ See LeRoy, "The Americans in the Philippines," I.

already described, the idea of retaining the whole archipelago possessed the American people. The Spanish Commissioners hoped to the last for European intervention and purposely protracted the discussion. Moreover, they protested that to relinquish both the Philippines and the West Indian Islands, while at the same time retaining the debt of the latter, would precipitate a crisis in Spain and force a resumption of the war, suicidal as such a course would be. Such an outcome was not without danger to America on account of the possibilities of European intervention. One power, Germany, was apparently not averse to such intervention. It was discovered, unofficially, that Spain would not be insulted at the offer of a cash compensation, and the feeling on the part of the Americans was that such a payment would be much less than the cost of resuming war. Twenty million dollars was agreed upon finally as the price for the transference of the whole Philippine group to the United States. Of course all that we had really captured by arms was Manila and its environs, and in the other islands were many thousands of Moros, Igorrotes, and other races who did not discover till some time afterwards that there had been a war or that they had been "sold." They would indeed have resented the idea that they had ever been "owned" by Spain or anyone else.

As we look at these peace negotiations across the space of eighteen years, it is evident that the Spanish nobles were more than a match for the Yankees in driving a good bargain. And the Spanish cartoons current in 1898, picturing Uncle Sam as a pork-butcher obsessed by the worship of the dollar, acquire a quite unintentional slant of humor.

The unforeseen dropping into our laps of a rich colony that many nations would have fought to obtain not unnaturally stirred the imperialistic spirit of the American people. There has always been a minority in the United States, however, who looked into the future, and foreseeing the complications that must inevitably follow the participation of America in Oriental politics, believing that the retention of the islands will unquestionably involve such participation, and failing to discover enough profit in the possession of them to justify the danger involved in keeping them, have opposed the whole Philippine program.

These "anti-imperialists" found their hands strengthened by the Filipinos themselves. (Perhaps it would be truer to state it the other way round.) Before the American occupation, insurrection was well under way and the leader of the insurrectos, Aguinaldo, strove to get as much credit out of the fall of Spanish rule as possible. The Christian Filipino appears to

have many of the attributes of the Latin-American. In both cases, perhaps, this is a heritage from Spain. Like the Spanish-American, he is much given to oratory, to intrigue and personal politics. If America had not so unexpectedly stepped in in 1898, it is not at all unlikely that within a few years conditions, in some of the islands, at least, would be comparable to those in Mexico to-day, inviting intervention, possibly by Germany, possibly by Japan, and annexation to some other country.

The Filipino protested violently against being sold or traded as a chattel, and it cannot be gainsaid that the transfer for a money consideration of an alien land and its inhabitants from any country to the United States would have worried the signers of the Declaration of Independence or the American statesmen of the '60's. It is hard to say how sincere the Filipino agitators were. It is much more certain that the American occupation deprived them of their chance to shine as saviors of their country from the yoke of Spain.

At any rate, supported by the discontented element in the Islands and the anti-imperialists in America, armed resistance was offered to the Americans after the transfer had been effected, and for three years our soldiers fought an inglorious guerilla war with the Filipinos. In the end the Islands were pacified. The

whole situation has been complicated by the lack of any permanent policy on the part of the American Congress toward the Islands and their people.

It is repugnant to the ideals of the people of this country to hold subject any nation against its will. The practice of exploiting a weaker race for the benefit of the strong is equally obnoxious. The fallacy of one nation "owning" another or profiting by such ownership is pretty well understood here too. Altogether there is a very general consensus of opinion that so long as we remain in the Philippines we shall do so for the good of the Filipinos, not for our own profit. Such a policy has not always been followed by other colony-owning nations. Wholly altruistic at first sight, in the long run, if successful, it will bear practical fruits. For the establishment of an independent nation across the seas, educated by American methods, with American ideals and every reason for friendliness toward the nation that has given them their chance, cannot help but redound to the commercial advantage of the country which has played the part of a foster parent.

But apart from this consideration we feel that it is our duty to lend every aid possible to a weaker people that chance has thrown upon our hands, and with characteristic thoroughness we have gone ahead. The history of the introduction of American schools and school

teachers in the Islands is too well known to need repeating. The education has been practical in the extreme. The Filipino has learned the dignity of labor and the means of making a living. Most striking of all has been the success of the tactful American administrators among the wild Mohammedans or the heathen tribes of the hills. For the first time in ages peace reigns in districts where heretofore head hunting has been the only occupation. And the benefits of peace are beginning to be felt. Among all the many tribes of various origins and characteristics American schools have been established. One effect is becoming obvious. Heretofore no community of interest was possible where the population was split up into scores of groups, speaking different dialects. Now a common language, English, is beginning to effect a solidarity previously non-existent. Such a result would have been absolutely impossible if exploitation of the people had been the motive of the Americans. It would disappear as by magic should a policy of exploitation be inaugurated. In the opinion of Mr. Worcester, expressed before the Senate Committee, considering the recent Philippine bill: "There is a great deal more English spoken in the Philippines to-day, after a decade and a half of American rule, than there was Spanish spoken after something more than three centuries of Spanish rule."

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The American is not given, temperamentally, to counting pennies. Nowhere else in the world are charities so lavish. Altruism costs money, and we expect to pay for the luxury. But the cost of the Philippine enterprise has daunted even the American. It has repeatedly been stated in Congress that we have expended over a billion dollars in the Islands since our occupancy there. This again has been vehemently denied.¹

Hardly any two authorities agree on the cost of retaining the Philippines. We may believe, however, that it is a sufficiently large sum. At any rate it approaches \$10,000,000 per year for the direct expense of the army during a decade of more profound peace than the archipelago has ever known before. The House Committee

¹ Perhaps as dependable a statement as may be found is the one filed with the Senate Committee on the Philippines by Brigadier General McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. This statement covers the years 1903 to 1914 inclusive, and therefore does not include the \$20,000,000 paid Spain in the beginning, nor the cost of putting down the insurrection.

Quartermaster Corps	\$ 98,063,695.03
Medical Department	360,553.35
Engineering Department	7,574,946.84
Ordnance Department	7,174,170.25
Signal Service	538,006.35
Coast and Geodetic Survey	1,947,379.82
Congressional Relief Fund	3,000,000.00
Philippine Census	351,925.50

Total\$119,010,677.14

Yearly average (War Department), \$9,475,947.65. These may be taken as the ultra-conservative rock-bottom figures.

in charge of the subject reported in 1912 that the United States government expends directly and indirectly approximately \$50,000,000 annually on the Islands.

The People of the Philippines

The "civilized" peoples of the Islands, exclusive of whites, number about 7,000,000, distributed among eight groups. Of these, the most numerous are the Visayans and the most cultured are the Tagálogs. All are Malayan in origin, although, in places, Chinese and other strains have intermingled. Successive waves of oversea migration appear to have struck the various islands. Each new wave seems to have defeated and driven back the inhabitants of the coast to the mountains of the interior and to have replaced them. An extraordinary diversity of tribes and dialects has thus resulted. Some of the islands are very densely populated, Cebu, for instance, having a population of 337 to every square mile, but little less than that of Great Britain.

The islands were discovered by Magellan in 1521. In 1584 one Miguil de Legaspi was sent to be governor of the Philippines for life. He proceeded forthwith not only to pacify, but to Christianize the people and met with extraordinary success, except among those tribes that had already embraced Mohammedanism (the present-day Moros) or were too remote to reach. So

thoroughly Christianized did the northern peoples become that in 1677 the Filipinos themselves sent out missionaries to Siam, China, and Japan to convert the heathen in those lands. But the Japanese were little amenable to this process and tortured and killed the missionaries. The Filipinos thereupon canonized the martyrs and enshrined their memories in popular history. Their attitude toward non-Catholics being precisely that of the Spanish or of the inhabitants of Latin America, it has resulted that the Japanese are held in popular estimation, even now, to be little better than barbarians, an opinion that is not shared at all by the better-informed and more open-minded people of North America and Northern Europe.

This attitude of the Filipinos toward the Japanese is an important factor to keep in mind in the present discussion. At various times in the past, the proposition has been made that if the Philippines are a burden to the United States, the latter might sell them to some other country with a greater itch for territory and fewer scruples. England, Germany, and Japan were suggested. The rumor was revived on two occasions when ex-President Taft visited Japan. In both cases it was reported that the Filipinos were aroused to a frenzy of indignation at the idea of being "sold," particularly to "pagan Japan." It is needless to say that

there never was any official basis for such an idea, but it is interesting to discover the reaction of the Filipinos toward it.

The Chinese are much more numerous in the archipelago than the Japanese, and to some extent have intermarried with the Filipinos. Practically the entire retail business of the Islands is in their hands, as well as the greater part of the money. They have been characterized as the "Jews of the Orient," and the average Catholic Filipino has the same economic background for his dislike of them that the Catholic European has.

On the whole, although the Filipino is a Malay, his racial antipathies are against the Oriental and his racial sympathies are with the European.

The "non-Christian" Filipinos (including the wholly savage Ngritos, the semi-civilized pagan Igorrotes, and the Moslem Moros) are much less numerous, perhaps because of their persistent activity in head hunting. The Moros, moreover, have a very definite object in killing non-Mohammedans, at once the most pleasing and effective way of securing a safe passage to the Moslem paradise. The opinion has been expressed that had Legaspi not come three and a half centuries ago, the active Moros might have "Moslemized" the whole archipelago by now. These internecine and anti-

Christian feuds are at present stilled by the omnipresence of the American rule. Should it be removed now, without question they would break out anew.

The Resources of the Philippines

The tropics are the regions of the earth in which Nature has been most lavish in her gifts to man. Rubber, coffee, cocoa, dyestuffs, and drugs, gums, sugar, teak, mahogany and other precious woods, jute and hemp, tea, tobacco, and many valued fruits,—these are exclusively or in large part tropical products. The use of them on the part of the inhabitants of temperate climates is constantly increasing.¹ The interest of Europe and temperate America in the tropics is therefore well founded. And of all tropical countries, the Philippines appear to offer the greatest diversity of riches coupled with a greater accessibility than is the case with any other except the Dutch Indies.

The archipelago is in many places very wild and mountainous and its mineral wealth is to a great extent still undiscovered. Yet copper, gold, lead, petroleum, zinc, mercury, antimony, platinum, and iron have been found in quantity, and some day the mineral resources of the Islands will be a conspicuous item in their natural wealth. That day, however, must wait upon the invest-

¹ See Benjamin Kidd, "The Control of the Tropics." 1898.

ment of large amounts of capital, and capital will wait upon the permanent establishment of stable conditions. An exception must be made in the case of coal. In some of the islands, notably Batán and Pollilo, enormous beds of excellent coal are found. In the former field, government engineers have estimated that there are 76,000,000 tons in sight. Nevertheless these sources are practically unworked, and nearly all the coal used in the islands is imported from Japan, with a small proportion from Australia.

Yet it is in its agricultural wealth that the Philippine archipelago is most noteworthy, for the growing season is twelve months of the year and there is really no limit to Nature's supplies of this sort. No less than 665 different kinds of hardwoods are found. Some of these are of rare and exquisite beauty when finished, and the Filipinos are being taught in the American trade schools to make high-grade furniture that compares with any produced in Europe or America.

The chief export and most valuable product is hemp, which is the finest in the world for cordage, and because of its superiority enjoys almost a monopoly in the market. Much of this comes to America and a great deal used to go to Europe. It constitutes likewise the most important item of export to Japan, where it is manufactured into hats. Hemp requires a "steaming

climate," and a great deal of it comes from the wild Moro province of Mindanao.

Next to hemp in importance is copra, the dried fruit of the cocoanut, which, before the great war, found its market chiefly in Marseilles and Hamburg. The average annual export of copra is 115,000 tons, valued at about \$11,000,000.

Another valuable agricultural product is sugar, which however, is of low quality and finds most of its market in China. Sugar-cane growing is attended with more risk and demands more capital than almost any other industry now exploited in the Philippines. Locusts, droughts, and typhoons have proved heavy handicaps, and the large concerns that have recently invested heavily in sugar production have not as yet succeeded in making a striking profit.

Tobacco is a product that in the minds of Americans is associated with the Philippines more than any other. Tobacco growing and curing was greatly stimulated by the Spanish. Great quantities are consumed by the Filipinos themselves, and tobacco forms but 4 or 5 per cent of the total export.

Rubber is a development of the future. In addition to the rubber and gutta-percha trees, there are several wild vines that carry a high percentage of rubber and are easily treated.

The Needs of the Islands

For centuries the interior of the large islands has been the haunt of head-hunting savages and the southern islands have been controlled by fierce and untamable Moros. Some of the same head hunters (the Bontoc Igorrotes) have achieved extraordinary skill in rice culture. Yet it is a fact that except in the densely populated island of Cebu the present population tends to huddle together in villages, leaving unoccupied the vast spaces of land between the settlements. The amount of arable land that is at present under cultivation is but a fraction of what might be so utilized. This situation is doubtless a legacy from unsettled conditions in the past which made pioneering dangerous, although it may be due to a lack of ambition on the part of the inhabitants, for whom life is too easy.

Before the Philippines shall have taken their place in the world they must have developed their agricultural resources to the point at which they not only supply their own food, but produce an excess to exchange for the manufactured products of Europe and America, upon which they will always be dependent. At present this is far from being the case. Today large quantities of foodstuffs, particularly rice, are imported into the Philippines. The amount of these im-

ports, however, is rapidly dwindling. In 1912, over 22 million dollars' worth of foodstuffs were imported, although in 1914 this amount had dropped to less than 13 million. This one item is indicative of the lack of development of the islands in a commercial way.

Nevertheless the effect of the American occupation for a decade and a half is becoming evident. The total exports and imports have about doubled in that interval; and the imports from the United States have risen from 10 per cent of the total in 1901 to 50 per cent in 1914.

The prosperity of the islands, in the main, will depend upon the development of their natural resources, mineral and agricultural, and this in turn will depend upon two factors: on the one hand, the investment of large amounts of capital, and on the other hand, an increased efficiency of the available labor. Both of these, but particularly the former, in turn, are dependent upon long-continued peaceful conditions. The timidity of capital is axiomatic. At the present time, and for some years, few, if any, large investments have been made on account of the uncertainty regarding the plans and purposes of the United States toward the Philippines. This timidity has not been allayed, either by the introduction of party politics in the present Philippine administration or the recent agitation in connection with

the so-called Jones bill introduced in the 63d Congress.

We may take it as demonstrated that the laborers, upon whose shoulders the success of commercial development finally rests, will of necessity continue to be Filipino, Hindu, Chinese, or some race that is able to withstand a tropical climate. The American cannot do so, nor can the Japanese. As a laborer, the white man cannot exist in the tropics, at any rate not in competition with the darker-hued peoples. Says Professor Benjamin Kidd in connection with the attempt to acclimatize the white man in the tropics: "Excepting only the deportation of the African races under the institution of slavery, probably no other idea which has held the mind of our civilization during the last three hundred years has led to so much physical and moral suffering and degradation, or has strewn the world with the wrecks of so many gigantic enterprises." (This was written before the building of the Panama canal, which forms a conspicuous exception to the above statement.)

One pressing need of the Philippines has been met in great part by the American officials in control. This is the opening up of communications, which not only enable the Filipino farmer to bring his produce to market or shipping point, but also bind the whole people together in a community of intercourse that they have

never experienced hitherto. In a country of steep mountains and torrential tropical rains, of course such roads require constant care to keep them in condition.

International Relations

In the first flush of possession, the Philippine Islands appealed to many citizens of this country as a tremendous addition to our national wealth,—as a very valuable asset. We have seen something of what the cost of this possession has been,—the overhead charges, so to speak. And there has been gradually brought home to us the fact that, speaking still in commercial terms, they are a liability, not an asset. At the same time we have realized that the only justification for our presence in the islands is the benefit of the Filipino, not of ourselves, unless we wish to make the Filipino one of ourselves, which is not a popular wish.

The reiterated phrase, "Trade follows the flag," is not true. Trade follows the line of least resistance.¹ In 1901 imports into the islands from the United States were only about three fifths of what they were from Great Britain and only half again as great as those from Germany. Even in 1914 they were only one half

¹ A British student of foreign affairs said in *Blackwood's Magazine* thirteen years ago: "It is true that trade follows the flag. It is sad to be obliged to confess, however, that in the Pacific to-day, it is the trade of foreign nations which most successfully follows the Union Jack."

of the whole amount. As for exports from the Philippines to the United States, in 1901 they were only 40 per cent of those to England and in 1914 they had risen to only two fifths of the whole export total. And this in spite of the fact that until the passage of the Underwood Tariff Law, an export duty was levied on Philippine products, which was remitted in the case of exports to America. Moreover, on dutiable goods a rebate of 25 per cent has been given in favor of the United States.

From the wholly selfish standpoint of national profit we should have received enormously greater returns on our money if we had devoted the millions that have been expended in the Philippines to the development of commerce with South America or even with Europe. As a matter of fact, our experience with colonial possessions as a source of profit has been quite in line with that of England, France, and Germany. Of course we have our altruistic endeavor to console us.

Apart from direct pecuniary gain, there are those who point to the position of the Philippines on the "threshold of Asia," or particularly China, in the belief that we shall obtain an important advantage in the contests for the trade of that nation by such a foothold. The writer is quite unable to appreciate this point. Our trade with China consists in selling individual Chinese or Chinese firms, American products, particularly

American manufactures. None of this trade will ever go via the Philippines, nor will the islands nor their people ever be instrumental in increasing it to any great extent. It may, indeed, work out the other way. We feel that it is for the good of the Filipino not to subject him to keen competition, so that we have extended the Chinese exclusion act to the islands. The great anti-American boycott of 1906 was occasioned primarily by Chinese resentment at the administration of this same law. Its enforcement in the Philippines, for which we are responsible, may be the occasion of reviving the boycott and losing us still more trade.

But the objection is at once raised: "Trade has a political as well as a commercial aspect. Our foothold in the Philippines will give us a base from which to protect our Asiatic commerce. It is never claimed that they will be much of a factor in mere buying and selling." This introduces us to the portentous phrase, "The Mastery of the Pacific."

Few political questions have been more befuddled by shibboleths than those of the Orient and the Pacific.¹ The Pacific is the largest ocean. Its "mastery" has

¹ The "Yellow Peril" is a conspicuous example. The awful menace of this phrase would not be half so impressive if the color were any other than "yellow." Unconscious association and suggestion often completely overshadow reason. Compare Havelock Ellis, "The Psychology of Yellow." *Pop. Sci. Mo.*, vol. 68.

a Nietzschean flavor that is compelling. But let us analyze it.

In time of peace it is hard to conceive of any mastery of an ocean except on the part of the nation that ships the most goods across it. It is the goods, not the nationality of the carriers, that counts. American commerce, all over the world, before the European war, was great and increasing in spite of the fact that it was carried largely in foreign bottoms. The Japanese have recently awakened to the fact that their heavily subsidized Pacific steamship lines carry the larger percentage of their freight, not from Japanese ports, but from Hongkong, China, to America and back, so that, as their subsidy covers a prospective loss, they are taxing themselves for the empty glory of carrying foreign goods under the Japanese flag!

It is otherwise, of course, in time of war. The United States has discovered to its consternation that its trade may suffer from lack of American ships. On the other hand, there is no real analogy between Europe and Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is possible for England with her powerful fleet and the possession of Gibraltar and the English Channel in a measure to control the Atlantic so far as Germany is concerned. Such a condition would be out of the question in the vast expanse of the Pacific. The exploits of the will-o'-the-wisp

Emden in the autumn of 1914 are a striking commentary upon the inability of the great Japanese fleet to adequately patrol that waste of waters. No nation can dominate the Pacific, so long as any other nation can maintain a fleet there. And the Philippines, although an advantage to our fleet in the Pacific, are by no means a necessity.¹

The following colloquy at the hearing on the naval appropriations bill before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, December 15, 1914, is interesting in this connection:

MR. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question or two. Commander, you speak of controlling the seas. Is there any nation in the world that controls the seas?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Well, I think England comes probably nearer controlling it than any other nation.

MR. WITHERSPOON. They do not control the Baltic Sea.

COMMANDER STIRLING. No; I should say the Baltic Sea was controlled by Germany.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Does England control the Black Sea?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Well, no; her ally Russia does.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Does England control the Mediterranean Sea?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Well, her allies control it.

MR. WITHERSPOON. I did not ask you anything about that. I asked you about England.

¹ This is, of course, a consideration quite apart from the need of coaling stations at strategic points.

COMMANDER STIRLING. It amounts to the same thing; yes, sir.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Is it not a fact that France controls the Mediterranean Sea?

COMMANDER STIRLING. She has the greater force there.

MR. WITHERSPOON. And she put the greater force there for the very purpose of having control of that sea, and England has concentrated all her battleships in the North Sea for the purpose of controlling that. Is not that true?

COMMANDER STIRLING. For the purpose of watching the German fleet.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Well, she has got control of the North Sea, has she not? I mean England.

COMMANDER STIRLING. She has control over the North Sea.

MR. WITHERSPOON. And she has it because she has got her fleet concentrated there. Is not that true?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes, sir; one reason.

MR. WITHERSPOON. If she had her fleet divided and a part of it in her possessions all over the world, she would not have control of the North Sea?

COMMANDER STIRLING. If she reduced her fleet so that Germany thought she would have an equal chance of success —

MR. WITHERSPOON (interposing). Has England got control of the Atlantic Ocean?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes.

MR. WITHERSPOON. What ships has she got in the Atlantic Ocean as powerful as our fleet?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Now, of course, that opens up a little —

MR. WITHERSPOON (interposing). Well, she has not got anything in there except some cruisers?

COMMANDER STIRLING. No, sir.

MR. WITHERSPOON. She has not got a single battleship in the Atlantic Ocean?

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COMMANDER STIRLING. I consider that control means so far as the belligerents are concerned.

MR. WITHERSPOON. I am not talking about belligerents; I am talking about the control of the sea. You mean by the control of the sea the nation who has ships there powerful enough to dominate it? Is that what you mean by it?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes, sir; I consider a nation controls the sea that can send a dominant force into it.

MR. WITHERSPOON. That can do it?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes, sir. She may lose control of it for a month or a week, but if she can eventually dominate it by sending a force into it, she controls the sea.

MR. WITHERSPOON. But if England could send a fleet into the Atlantic Ocean and thereby control it, she would not have her fleet in the North Sea, and she would not have control of that, would she?

COMMANDER STIRLING. No; against the world, against a combination, I do not suppose England would be considered — I will take that back. England does not control the sea against a combination where the nation who is against her —

MR. WITHERSPOON (interposing). She could not control the Asiatic waters, could she? She has not any ships there powerful enough to control it as against Japan?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Against only Japan as an enemy she would control it.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Has she got any battleships?

COMMANDER STIRLING. No, but she could send them out there.

MR. WITHERSPOON. I am not asking you about that. I am talking about what exists today. Is it not a fact that no nation on earth is able to control but one part of the seas at the same time? Is not that true?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes, sir; that is pretty true. She only wants —

MR. WITHERSPOON (interposing). So that this thing of one nation controlling all the oceans and seas of the world is what a high French authority said when they adopted the policy of controlling the Mediterranean, that it is a mere chimera? Is not that true?

COMMANDER STIRLING. Yes; but at the same time, with one enemy, if you consider that she had only one enemy in the Pacific she could control the Pacific against that enemy.

MR. WITHERSPOON. Well, that really comes down to this: That if a nation has got a more powerful fleet than any other nation, it can control that nation rather than the ocean.

COMMANDER STIRLING. It can control the possible area of hostilities.

If the control of the Pacific is a mere chimera, as the writer, for one, believes it is, then the possession of the Philippines is to us not only a liability in an economical sense, but likewise in a political sense. For, to protect the archipelago with its enormous coast line against invasion would be a matter of stupendous difficulty. They would offer to Japan or any other putative enemy a vulnerable point to attack, as they did to us in the Spanish war. While the loss of the islands, in the light of the facts just presented, would be a real gain to us from the standpoint of self-interest, their sacrifice in war would involve a loss of prestige that the temper of the American people would not tamely endure.

What is the way out of this dilemma? At present there seems to be a confusion of counsel. We may cut

loose altogether; grant the Filipinos their absolute independence and let them shift for themselves. Yet those whose experience in the Philippines is most extensive agree in the belief that it would not be long before present-day conditions in Mexico were duplicated. But there is no Monroe Doctrine to protect the Filipino (at least it is questionable if Japan's would extend so far from home), and it would not be long before some other great power stepped in and restored order. The Filipino would be in a worse plight than ever. The United States would have lost national prestige and an opportunity to render a service to a dependent people, and her citizens would have lost much wealth.

We might, of course, as has sometimes been suggested, sell or give the archipelago to a nation of our choice. But such a course is out of the question for reasons discussed elsewhere. A protectorate is often proposed. The function of a protector is to protect. In what sort of a situation would Uncle Sam find himself "protecting" the adolescent Philippine nation against the consequences of its own bumptious acts, the control over which he had voluntarily resigned. Nothing, in the mind of the writer, would be so certain to involve our country in the perilous international controversies of the Western Pacific as to assume the responsibility for a

suddenly freed Philippine nation given over to its own devices. As a matter of fact, we need not announce such a protectorate. It would be inevitable, if the islands were given their independence now, on account of the predominant place that American interests have made for themselves in the present-day Philippines.

But such a course cannot be considered. Another plan that has been mooted is to give the Filipinos their independence subject to a joint protectorate, the islands being neutralized by treaty with England, France, Japan, Germany, and the United States.

Recent events have convinced the majority of Americans that such a treaty would not be worth drafting so far as Germany is concerned. And recalling the rapid changes of front indulged in by Japan in her continental diplomacy, many Americans feel that the same may be said of her. In other words, a treaty is a contract, and a nation that will not keep its word because it is to its disadvantage to do so thereby destroys the only asset that stands back of such a contractual obligation and makes it of any value. If a neutralization agreement were observed, it would only be because the United States stood back of it. And in such a case we might as well have the whole responsibility as the complications incident to sharing it with others.

It is the consensus of opinion that if the Filipinos

were given complete autonomy at present under such a neutralization scheme, it would not be long before conflicts of authority would occur between Filipino officials and aliens other than Americans, which might easily call for intervention on the part of the alien power. The United States would then be in a position either of taking sides with the Filipinos against the foreign power, or else of taking sides the other way round. In either event quite unnecessary and dangerous problems would be raised. In fact, any sort of a protectorate that assumes responsibility and at the same time that relinquishes control (as would, of course, follow the granting of Filipino autonomy) would be dangerous and likely to place us in an equivocal situation.

What the Japanese would do with the Islands

We may now focus the facts noticed in the preceding pages upon the Japanese aspects of the problem.

Let us suppose that, overnight, American rule in the Philippines were replaced by Japanese. That is to say, let us omit the uncertain and disturbing factor of a conflict that by force would bring such a thing about. Consider the *fait accompli*. In what situation would the Japanese find himself?

In the first place he would discover that he was a "heathen" in the midst of millions of Roman Catholics,

whose attitude toward him would be colored not only by the feeling of the conquered toward the conqueror, but also by the aversion due to religious prejudice. So far as the Japanese has had a chance to deport himself as an overlord in Manchuria and Korea, the prospect is not reassuring. The Japanese suffers from a lack of that sort of sentiment, conspicuous in the Anglo-Saxon, that inclines the latter to assume a fatherly attitude toward an alien or an inferior. His methods as a colonizer are rather more like the German — highly efficient but not wholly sympathetic. In Korea, where anarchy has been imminent for so long, he has felt it necessary to adopt strong measures as a deterrent to opposition. The Philippines, half conquered, would more than likely merit the same treatment in his eyes. But what would be the result of the adoption of repressive measures? We may help to answer this question by considering Formosa, which has been a Japanese possession for two decades. To-day the whole interior of this island is occupied by head-hunting savages. The subjugation of these has been an ever present problem for the Formosan authorities. Each year demanded a greater outlay until in 1908 the annual appropriation was nearly \$1,000,000. Then the Japanese authorities laid out a regular program to extend over five years, beginning 1910. Seven million five hundred thousand dollars was

appropriated. After four years' operations, involving 16,000 men and an expenditure, so far, of \$4,500,000, and hundreds of casualties, about one tenth of the program had been carried out. At this rate, if successful, the cost of subjugating the natives will be \$45,000,000.

In the Philippines, the Japanese would be most unlikely to follow out the disinterested policy of the Americans; indeed they could not afford to do so. The cost of an army of occupation, in view of the peculiar disadvantages under which they would labor, would be many times that of the United States. Under any circumstances, the Japanese control in the Philippines would never extend beyond the range of Japanese guns. A few years of such conditions, and the roads built and kept up with so much care under American direction would be washed out and destroyed. The people of the islands are not an industrial community like the population of Belgium. It would be impossible to destroy anything that would prostrate the population. Outside of Manila and a few other cities there is nothing to destroy that would matter.

Under such circumstances, and they seem to be inevitable, on the premise of a Japanese occupation by force, what would the Japanese profit? The Philippines cannot be colonized by Japanese laborers any more than by Europeans. Any products that Japan

might need would of necessity be produced by Filipino labor. Japan would get no rice, for the Philippines annually import millions of dollars' worth of that staple from other lands. It has been suggested that the Japanese might make a government monopoly of hemp and rubber as they have of camphor in Formosa. But these two products would be procured with the greatest difficulty under a military occupation and their cost would be enormously greater than now.

It would be far more profitable to deal with the islands as a foreign power, encouraging the development of their resources in order that they might have the more to exchange for Japanese goods, than to attempt by forced control to increase such an output beyond the limits of a fair exchange.

Above all, little development of the Philippines can take place even under the most peaceful conditions, without the investment of foreign capital. Pending such a development, the islands would be a useless burden to Japan, and the necessary capital she could never furnish herself.

Altogether no greater calamity could befall the Japanese Empire than to be compelled to assume control over the Philippine Islands, so rich in potential wealth and so poor in convertible assets. These facts become much more striking when we examine in some detail Japan's economic situation.

CHAPTER V.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION.

THE Japanese like to compare themselves with the English, and their Island Empire to the United Kingdom. Such a comparison has a certain justification. Both are relatively small island groups closely adjacent to a rich and populous continent. Each must depend upon a strong navy for national protection. Each is densely populated. So far as geographical influences are of significance, similar conditions may be expected to produce analogous results. One must not be too easily impressed by analogies, however, for the historical background of the English and the Japanese and the mental characteristics of the two races are as far apart as possible.

Before the period that Toynbee has called the "Industrial Revolution" (1760-1830), England was a self-sufficient agricultural country, growing her own food (in the seventeenth century her imports were only one fortieth of her total consumption, whereas now they are one fourth), and with her weaving and other industries carried on in the homes of the workers both in town

and country. This was Japan's economic status until a few decades ago; indeed to a great extent it is today, for Japan is in the midst of an industrial revolution, that, *mutatis mutandis*, is very similar to what England has undergone.

In England's case the transforming change was due in great part to a group of extraordinary inventors who, working all in the same period, perfected machines that very greatly increased the output of manufactured articles. At the same time there developed an oversea trade which brought enormous returns, and produced in England a very large supply of capital to be reinvested in industry. The social readjustment was painful and left many persistent ills in its train, but in the end a population essentially agricultural was transformed into one essentially industrial. Moreover, industry became wholly separated from state control and interference.

In Japan the acceleration of social change has been such that the people have not had time to accommodate themselves to new conditions, and the state has had to step in and not only assume direction of commerce and enterprise, but furnish the capital as well.

Japan as an Agricultural Country

In spite of the fact that Japan is an extraordinarily mountainous country, her population is mainly agricul-

tural. Nearly 65 per cent of the total population are farmers. When we find that the chief agricultural product is rice, mostly grown in flooded paddy-fields, and that only about 15 per cent of the land of the Empire is arable (only half of that paddy-fields), we may gain some idea of the degree of intensive agriculture to which this product is carried. It is a characteristic of all provincial peoples to be more conservative about their food than about anything else. Rice is the Japanese staple, and it will be a long time before it is voluntarily replaced by a substitute in the national diet. Nevertheless the rise in the cost of living has been as keenly felt in recent years on the other side of the globe as on this, and there are an increasing number of Japanese to whom rice is becoming more and more of a luxury. The increase in the price of rice during the past ten years has been nearly 50 per cent, and it is a commonplace that the Japanese farmer is too poor to eat the rice he grows. This condition makes it difficult for the nation to depend upon imported rice to any extent, as the cost of transportation must be added to the price of the foreign-grown product. Often rice is mixed with millet or barley to make it go farther. Not infrequently these grains replace the rice as a staple. The north provinces are adapted to the raising of oats, and the annual crop of this cereal has

increased by leaps and bounds in recent years. Wheat is grown in considerable amount, although the abominable quality of most of the bread sold in Japan is such as to offer slight inducement for any one to forsake rice for it except under compulsion. Nevertheless wheat and wheaten flour are consumed in increasing quantities year by year. In 1913 Japan imported from America nearly \$5,000,000 worth of wheat, over twice the import of 1912, and nearly \$500,000 worth of flour besides. Buckwheat, which is made into macaroni, and beans are also staple articles of Japanese diet. A large amount of wheat is consumed in the manufacture of soy (*shoyu*), the native sauce.

Altogether the enforced attention to the cultivation of grains other than rice may result in modifying the national diet and in extending somewhat the percentage of arable land in the Empire. Indeed about 75,000 acres of wild land are reclaimed annually. But this can by no means keep up with the great increase in the population.¹

The birth rate in 1904 and 1905 was 30.6 per 1000; in 1906 it was 29.1; in 1907 it was 33.2; and in 1908 and 1909 it was 33.7. The death rate for the same pe-

¹ For many reasons it would be of great advantage to the national welfare if meat could be made more of an item in the national diet, but the extreme poverty of the people precludes this to any great extent. Large amounts of seafood are of course consumed.

riod has remained nearly stationary, about 21 per 1000. This net increase in the population produces a cumulative effect. The population of Japan (excluding Korea, Formosa, etc.) in 1914 was 53,596,858, an increase of 3,342,387 since 1909. The annual increase is now 682,000 per year, although ten years ago it was but 500,000. This increase, without doubt, is due in part to better conditions of life, together with the high character of Japanese medical practice.¹

Growth of Industrialism

The consequence of this condition is apparent. With an arable area sharply limited by nature and a rapidly increasing population, one of two things must happen. Either the surplus population must migrate to other food-producing lands or else Japan must modify her national diet and buy her food of other countries. Migration presents many problems and practical difficulties, the discussion of which must be deferred. To buy her food abroad, however, she must have the wherewithal to pay for what she imports. Raw materials that may be exported are few in number and small in

¹ It is of interest to note that at no time since 1890 has the female moiety of the population exceeded the male. The annual birth rate of males exceeds that of females from 3 per cent to 8 per cent, averaging, as a rule, a fraction over 4 per cent.

amount.¹ Circumstances, therefore, rather than national instincts have forced Japan into the ranks of the industrial nations, earning her national living by utilizing the labor of her millions of hands to increase the value of raw materials supplied from abroad, and then passing them on to other countries in the channels of foreign trade.

The group of statesmen who have directed the affairs of Japan recognized this situation years ago, and the government has bent every effort to stimulate and foster industrial enterprise. This has been a much more difficult problem than it would be in an Occidental state. It must be recalled that only a half century ago Japanese society was feudal,—a feudalism that embraced not only the military aspects of life, but even more the arts and industries. Foreign commerce was something to be feared and opposed. A modern factory was unthinkable. Accustomed to look to their superiors for aid and initiative, no amount of economic pressure ever would have induced the people themselves to have embarked on industrial enterprise. The government therefore took the lead, and began to establish and sub-

¹ These are practically limited to coal and copper. The annual value of the total output of the former is \$35,000,000 (1913); that of the latter \$21,000,000 (1913). Although the export of both of these has increased greatly in the past two decades, the total amount is but a small part of the total export trade. (The export of coal in 1913 was about \$11,000,000 and that of copper \$14,000,000.)

sidize all sorts of manufacturing ventures. Since the Russian war it has had an additional incentive to participate in any enterprise in which a profit could be found, on account of the pressing need of getting hold of all available revenue to meet the heavy post-bellum expenditures. This policy has resulted in making the national government a partner in various commercial undertakings to a degree quite unknown in the western world. Cotton and silk-spinning factories, cement works, glassworks, match factories, shipbuilding, brick-making establishments, and iron foundries have been inaugurated by a paternal government. Some of these have been colossal failures.¹ Other have been transferred to private owners after a good start has been made. But such enterprises are fostered thereafter in every possible way,—by protective tariffs, transportation rebates, bonuses, even the relending to private companies, at a low rate of interest, of money borrowed by the government abroad.

In 1896 there were 7600 factories of all sorts, employing 434,832 operatives. In 1905 there were 9776 factories and 587,851 operatives. In 1913 there were 15,811 factories and 916,252 operatives. The place of women and girls in the Japanese factory system is sig-

¹ The annual deficit of the steel foundry operated by the state is about \$1,400,000.

nificant. In silk-reeling 90 per cent of the operatives are women; in weaving and cigarette making, over 80 per cent; in cotton spinning, over 60 per cent.¹

The predominance of women in Japanese industry is correlated with the scarcity or total absence of the "skilled artisan" type of man, a point to which we shall recur farther on. The average daily wages of the female cotton-factory operatives are 13.9 cents (gold) a day; those of men average 22 cents. The cotton-spinning factories run continuously, night and day, the operatives working in shifts.²

The government retains control of those industries which are of importance to the national welfare, such as dockyards, shipyards, arsenals, etc. In addition, the government, for financial reasons, has created monopolies in some lines of business, such as the manufacture and sale of cigarettes, camphor, and salt.

¹ This includes only factories in the American sense. A large percentage of the manufactured products of Japan is produced in the home and all the women and children of a family participate. This condition was also true of England until the industrial revolution.

² These figures are from the Official Report of the Japanese Department of Agriculture and Commerce and are for the year 1911 (the latest published). As the tendency has been for wages to constantly increase, the current average wage is doubtless a cent or two higher. The Japan Cotton Spinning Association compiles annually similar statistics, based upon reports from all the mills, and publishes the average wages for women (1911) to be 14.1 cents and for men 22.5 cents. About two thirds of the operatives are paid by piecework and one third by the day.

The Japanese Workman

The success or failure of an industrial system depends in the last analysis upon the character of the human element involved rather than upon machinery. Japan can purchase machinery to duplicate anything in a European or American factory. The success of the industrial system, however, must be gauged by the efficiency of the operatives and even more by the organizing ability of the executive departments.

With respect to the last point it is perhaps too soon to judge. In advertising, the Japanese have been quick to imitate the more obvious devices of the West, particularly of America. But it remains to be seen whether they will be equal to the demands laid upon the ingenuity and creative faculties of the executive heads of big business enterprises, such as will be necessary in a successful competition with Europe and America. In pushing retail sales, particularly by means of itinerant agents, the Japanese are most active, resourceful, and successful. In the opinion of the writer they lack, however, the patient persistence of the Germans and the imagination and brilliancy of the successful American sales manager.

The quality of the Japanese workman is much more evident. The traditions of Japanese social life are

responsible for the fact that in some lines Japanese workmanship surpasses that of any other people. This is particularly seen in the production of art-objects, including fine metal work, cloisonné, damascene, porcelains, inlaid wood, ivory carving, etc. This perfection of attainment is a national trait, fostered by feudalism and one of its lingering survivals. No Western nation, except perhaps the French, can hope to rival the Japanese in this line. Yet this ability is curiously limited. The Japanese artisan can produce an inlaid wooden box of which the nicety of construction of its hundreds of parts is a marvel to an Occidental, but he is quite incapable of finishing a scientific mechanism or instrument of precision so that it can compare with the product of a European or American workshop.

In the production of works of art, time is no object, but in the savage competition of international commerce, time is worth dollars. Now in commercializing her native industries, Japan stands a good chance to lose that artistic quality of her products that has largely created their markets. This is felt today in those artistic lines that have been stimulated by foreign demand. In ceramics, for example, one will look in vain for the old artistic qualities in the product of the big "factories" of Kyōtō and Nagoya. The adept who knows the by-ways will find what he seeks in the tiny

workshops of potters that have not yet been "commercialized." If one wishes the finest embroideries, he no longer finds them in the big shops of the cities. The best work is done in the country districts.

The Japanese workman as an artist knows no rival; as a skilled laborer in the Western sense one might almost say he knows no inferior. The amount of waste energy and waste time that is expended in putting through a given job would drive a foreign foreman to madness if he had an eye to the cost sheet. As a matter of fact the "skilled workman" type is practically nonexistent in Japan. This limits appreciably the national capacity for industrial development and probably explains in part the failures that have followed attempts to develop many lines of manufactures.

Silk reeling, cotton spinning, and such other processes as require not skilled effort but merely patient attention are, of course, successfully carried out by Japanese workmen (or more often workgirls). But the belief that the Japanese, given the machines, can be equally successful in all other manufacturing lines is quite unfounded.

In another group of industries, however, Japanese success is marked. This involves not factory, but home production, in which the family group, old and young, work together. All the fancy straw matting, of which

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in 1913 we bought \$1,500,000 worth, is made in this way in three provinces adjacent to Kobe. The myriads of cheap toys are similarly produced. Even silk is still largely reeled in farmhouses throughout the country districts of central and southern Japan. One of the




Diagram of Japan's Foreign Trade—1913.

great problems facing the government—one to which apparently not much attention is being paid—is the training of skilled workmen in those lines of manufac-

ture that are alien to Japanese traditions, in which, however, she hopes to compete with the Occident in supplying the rest of Asia.

Japan's Foreign Trade

Pursuant to the policy mentioned above, state-fostered foreign trade has steadily advanced. In 1890 the combined imports and exports totaled a figure that represented only \$1.71 per capita. By 1900 it was \$5.48 per capita. In 1913 it was \$13 per capita. The accompanying diagram expresses the distribution of this trade for the year 1913.¹ (The European war, of course, has rendered all trade conditions so abnormal that the quotation of statistics for 1914 would not be pertinent.)

¹ The actual figures for 1912 and 1913 are as follows:

	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
	1912	
United States	\$ 84,017,030	\$ 63,253,847
All America, north and south, except United States	3,536,417	1,258,943
All Europe	56,928,067	101,247,690
Australia	4,297,209	6,370,409
All Asia except Philippines and Kuantung	92,452,373	114,074,041
Philippines	2,756,678	2,627,565
Hawaii	2,600,533	14,650
Total (including other coun- tries)	\$262,426,952	\$308,258,154

From this diagram it will be seen that Japan sold to all the world, except America, much less than she bought. Of the great factors in this international trade, the United States bought of Japan in 1912, 25 per cent more than she sold to her, and in 1913, 33 per cent more. Furthermore, while Asia is a better customer of Japan than we are (to the extent of \$8,435,000 in 1912 and \$27,555,000 in 1913), yet in those same years, the greatest that Japanese export trade has known, nevertheless she bought of Asia as imports into Japan, in 1912, \$21,622,000, in 1913, \$34,721,000 *more than she sold* to Asia. These differences have been maintained approximately, year after year, in spite of the annual increase of the total value of the trade. Their great

	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
	1913	
United States	\$ 91,868,612	\$ 60,959,364
All America except United States	3,628,991	2,303,903
All Europe	73,320,864	109,704,487
Australia	4,298,273	7,441,686
All Asia except Philippines and Kuantung	119,424,371	154,145,655
Philippines	3,129,211	3,808,621
Hawaii	2,486,071	45,088
Total (including other countries)	\$314,965,186	\$363,256,960

significance in another connection will be seen a little later.

A detailed analysis of this trade would be quite out of place here. Yet some points stand out conspicuously.

Considering first the imports into Japan, we find that in 1913 these totaled \$363,356,960. Of this sum the United States contributed \$60,959,364, being exceeded only by Great Britain. This is more than one-sixth of her total imports. More than half of this is raw cotton, which in 1913 Japan purchased from the United States to the value of \$31,981,732.

The Importance of Cotton

Cotton is perhaps the most important single item in the daily life of the Oriental. Of the hundreds of millions of inhabitants of Japan and China, it constitutes the only material for clothing from January to December,—one thickness in summer; wadded and interlined in winter. The fraction of the population that can afford to dress in silk or wool is negligible. In Japan, thick cotton-stuffed *futon*, much like an American "comforter," form not only the universal covering for the Japanese bed, but the body of the bed itself. Japan is therefore a large consumer of cotton and cotton-goods. On the other hand, she is next door to China,

whose heavy demand for cotton goods must also be satisfied. These two facts make cotton a very important consideration in Japanese commerce and industry.

Now very little cotton is grown in Japan itself, and although experiments have been undertaken in growing this staple in Korea and Formosa, the climate of the former is not very favorable, and sugar and other crops are more profitable in the latter. All the raw cotton that is worked up into yarns and cloths in Japanese mills must be imported. For the decade from 1900 to 1910 the total imports into Japan were \$1,948,437,000, and of this \$473,143,000, or nearly one fourth, was raw cotton. This percentage is increasing. In 1911 raw cotton formed $28\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total imports; in 1912, $32\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; and in 1913, 32 per cent.

This large importation of raw cotton, ginned and unginned, comes chiefly from India, China, and the United States. Egypt contributes a relatively small amount, India, up to the present, has supplied one half, or more, of all the raw cotton consumed. American cotton is preferred because of its better quality, and until 1900 formed 40 per cent of the total annual import. But since then, with an occasional exception, the price has risen until the cheaper Indian cotton has displaced it to a considerable extent. Chinese cotton is cheap, but harsh and of short staple.

The factor of transportation plays an important rôle in this trade. Indian cotton takes about forty days in transit, and its importation is facilitated by subsidized steamer lines between Japan and Bombay and Calcutta. Until now, American cotton has had to travel either across the Atlantic and *via* Suez to the Orient, or else (the more usual route) overland *via* San Francisco and across the Pacific. This requires rehandling, often storage *en route*, and the use of the most expensive transportation facilities. The time between Houston, Texas, and Japan is about eighty days, but may be much longer. There is always loss of weight on the road, and the transportation charge is a heavy handicap. The rate from Houston to Kobe is \$30.24 per cubic ton, whereas that from Bombay to Kobe (deducting a rebate) is 10.59 rupees (\$3.48) and from Shanghai to Kobe \$3.34 (= \$1.67 gold).¹

It is obvious that American cotton must have characteristic excellencies to compete at all. "Chinese cotton is usually white, but does not possess any special luster, while most of the Indian cottons have a brownish tinge and both cottons are harsh. American cotton is softer and more lustrous and the addition of it not only adds to the strength but improves the feel and

¹ "Cotton Goods in Japan," U. S. Department of Commerce Spec. Agt. Series No. 86, 1914.

appearance of the yarn and enables the mills to obtain a better price." ¹

American cotton therefore will always have a market if the Japanese mill owner can afford it. The Panama canal ought to work an immediate and profound change in the cotton situation and establish the supremacy of our trade in that staple with Japan. Recognizing this, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha S.S. line to Seattle will be reorganized after 1915 and the service of those ships will thereafter be extended to the newly organized Panama line, for which a governmental subsidy of \$4,185,765 will be appropriated for the next five years.

Notwithstanding the great consumption of cotton in Japan, it figures also as a very important item in her export trade. An almost limitless market exists at present in China for cotton goods. In 1913 Japan sold nearly \$49,000,000 worth of cotton manufactures to China, over six times the value of the raw cotton she purchased from her. Thus a large part of American-grown cotton finds its way to the Chinese consumer by way of the Japanese factory.

Another important item of Japan's imports is that of iron, steel, and machinery, of which she bought in 1913, roughly \$40,000,000 worth,—Great Britain leading in this trade, with America and Germany con-

¹ *L.C.*, p. 27.

tributing about 25 per cent each. Kerosene oil is an important item of import. Its use is widespread and increasing and the oil fields of Northwest Japan never have been a very paying venture. The United States sells to Japan about \$4,000,000 worth of oil annually, and the Dutch East Indies half as much more. The importation of wheat and wheat flour, which is mostly supplied by America, is rapidly increasing and reaches a value of over \$6,000,000.

Turning to the other side of the ledger again, we find a few items relatively conspicuous. The following table will show this for the year 1913:

ITEMS	JAPAN EXPORTED TO		
	U.S.A.	Europe	Asia
Raw silk	\$62,703,000	\$30,555,000	
Silk mfg. (<i>Habutaye</i>)	2,494,000	9,236,000	\$ 3,393,000
Cotton yarns and textiles ..	158,000	78,000	60,872,000
Porcelains	1,368,000	354,000	125,000
Tea	4,424,000	85,000
Total exports	\$95,498,000	\$73,321,000	\$122,554,000

In the above table many important items are omitted in order to render more conspicuous the most important ones. Thus Australia and Canada are not mentioned, although Japan maintains a growing trade with both. A great variety of cheap manufactured goods, such as

clocks, matches, and umbrellas, is sold to China. It should be mentioned also that the exports to South Manchuria (Kuantung), which are listed in the official statistics, are omitted on the ground that, whatever may be the diplomatic fictions still maintained, this district is really part of Japan and its trade is "interstate traffic." Ceylon tea is getting to be a very strong competitor in the American market ¹ and of recent years has replaced Japanese tea to a great extent. The Japanese government, recognizing this, is now attempting, unsuccessfully so far, to meet it by stimulating the development of similar (dark) tea in Formosa. A trade which is of very recent origin, but one that will without doubt show an extraordinary development in the near future, is that of cheap toys and favors. There is a large market for these in America at Christmas, Easter, Halloween, and other festivals, which until very recently has been supplied by Germany. The writer has seen *godowns* in Kobe literally filled with thousands of kinds of these novelties. It only remains to create or enlarge the market in America. These goods are manufactured by the so-called "family industry" system rather than in factories, a method that has already been described.

¹ Over 80 per cent of the tea produced in Japan finds its market in America. The decline of the trade is seen in comparing the annual exports. In 1911 this represented \$7,189,000; in 1913, \$4,423,000.

The most striking item in this table is that of raw silk, which constitutes more than two thirds the entire export to the United States and of which we buy twice as much as all the rest of the world. Raw silk comprises nearly 30 per cent of Japan's entire export to the world. Many times and in various places the culture of silk has been attempted in this country, always without success. It requires a cheap grade of labor of a peculiar temperamental make-up in which the Oriental need fear no competition with the Occidental. The great value of this import is an index to our national wealth and luxury, for it is manufactured here into silk stuffs, most of which are consumed at home. In the manufacture of this raw silk into high-grade fabrics (other than *habutaye*) American mills lead the world, and it will be many a day before Japan can compete with us in the world's market in this line.

Approximately, Japan sells annually to America about 25 per cent less of goods than she does to Asia (chiefly China) and over 30 per cent more than she does to all Europe. Her total exports to the entire world for 1913, totaled \$314,965,186. Nearly one third of all the goods she sells, therefore, are bought by the United States.

The Balance of Trade

The difference between the total value of goods bought and sold by a nation in the channels of foreign commerce is known as the "Balance of Trade." This balance for many years has been against Japan. In 1913 the excess of the value of imports over exports was more than \$48,000,000. In other words, Japan had to pay out that sum in gold abroad, instead of cancelling the debt with the account on the other side of the ledger. The distribution of this balance is interesting and significant. In the account with Asia, that balance was \$36,000,000. With Europe the balance against Japan was almost the same, \$36,500,000. It is only when we come to America that we find the situation reversed, for in the same year we bought of Japan over \$32,000,000 worth of goods over and above what she bought of us. This point has an especial significance in connection with future contingencies.

Japan is the happy hunting ground of the well-to-do globe-trotter and the adverse balance of trade is considerably mitigated by the disbursements of tourists in Japan, which taken together with the remittances sent home by Japanese abroad (in Hawaii and California, for example) may in good years even up the account. An index of this is the number of foreigners

who land at Japanese ports during the year. This number in 1913 was 21,886, including over 4000 British and 5000 Americans.

Of course an occasional adverse balance of trade is not to be considered a national disaster, especially if the amount involved is represented by industrial investments that are later to bring profitable returns. But with a nation like Japan, carrying a very heavy per capita national debt and at the same time with an ambitious military program that diverts millions into unproductive channels, it is a much more serious matter.

In the thirteen years from 1900 to 1913, only twice has the trade balance been in favor of Japan (two and a half million dollars in 1906 and nine millions in 1909).¹ The total of the excess of imports into Japan over exports for the other eleven years is \$376,085,000.

Japan's Market in China

The "awakening of China" has been much heralded. A decade ago when the German Emperor had his vision of an armed "yellow peril" this awakening was viewed

¹ The first of these was due to business depression of that year; the second in part to the Imperial Bōshin rescript enjoining national economy. It must be understood that the phrase, "trade balance," as used above and as ordinarily used, refers only to "visible" exports and imports. Such an adverse trade balance may often be compensated, as in the case of England, by a favorable balance of "invisible" exports and imports.

with considerable alarm and European statesmen reminded one another when too late of the virtue in the adage to let "sleeping dogs lie." This panic has passed away. It is realized that from the standpoint of national aggression China was more like an unstimulated jellyfish than a slumbering dragon.

But the awakened China has none the less a persistent interest for the rest of the world. Four hundred million human beings beginning (so we imagine) to throw off the shackles of ages of conservatism and adopt at least the externals of Western civilization, with new ideas, new aspirations, new wants,— what a market is this for the trade of Christendom! A country of apparently limitless natural resources, almost untouched, with a population of unparalleled industry,— here are the factors to create the wealth that makes China a much-sought customer.

The recognition of this condition has long dominated the field of international diplomacy. The possession of India and the need for protecting her long sea lanes to that Empire are responsible for Gibraltar and the Suez canal. To get at the Orient by another route has been the central problem of other European nations with oversea ambitions, and the mainspring of much of their foreign policy. It is this that impelled the Russians to throw their 5000-mile railway across Siberia

to the Pacific and to seek there an ice-free port, a policy that led eventually to the war of 1904. It was the quest for the markets of China that led to all the political undertakings of Germany in Turkey and the near East, the struggle for a "place in the sun" and ultimately the European conflict of 1914.

Nature has relieved two great nations of the necessity for this struggle. Japan is at the very door of China and America is across the ocean. Australia may be a factor in the near future, but her relations so far have been with Europe rather than with Asia. Compared with America, Japan has the great advantage of proximity and a certain common basis of written language. America has the advantage of great wealth and natural resources. What America sells to Asia is largely raw materials. What Japan sells is of necessity chiefly manufactured products. It is but natural then that Japan should consider herself the middle man or comprador of the Orient and that she should seek every avenue to China's markets. In fact the dominance of this market is absolutely essential to that position of national prestige and influence which is her ambition. Her success so far has been very marked.

The amount of the exports from Japan to China has increased year by year until in 1913 they were about 160 per cent greater than they were in 1902, whereas

those of the United States had increased by only 20 per cent.¹ Both countries show a sharp fall in the year 1909 due to the Chinese boycott agitation. Japan quickly recovered, but America has done so but little. The gains for Japan from 1911 to 1913 are phenomenal, approximating \$20,000,000 a year. In 1913 this great gain (about two thirds of the entire American export trade) is assignable almost entirely to increased sales of copper (increase 100 per cent), cotton textiles and yarns (increase 33 per cent), and refined sugar (increase nearly 100 per cent). The sales of cotton goods alone were over \$10,000,000 greater in 1913

¹ The following table shows the increase in the value of Japan's exports to China for the past twelve years.

EXPORTS TO CHINA (INCLUDING HONG KONG)

	JAPAN	UNITED STATES
1902	\$36,357,000	\$22,604,000
1903	47,359,000	19,303,000
1904	48,572,000	21,886,000
1905	54,448,000	57,596,000
1906	58,890,000	33,327,000
1907	53,010,000	27,677,000
1908	40,472,000	26,672,000
1909	36,544,000	20,549,000
1910	56,748,000	16,160,000
1911	56,336,000	26,602,000
1912	71,482,000	26,736,000
1913	93,765,000	31,758,000
1914	97,824,000	35,395,000

than 1912. The great increase in sugar export, in spite of a heavy home consumption, is due to a strongly stimulated production of raw sugar in Formosa, where it has enjoyed government bounties, tariff drawbacks, and farm subsidies. Previously, almost all the raw sugar came from Java to be refined in Japan. Another item of great importance in Japan's China trade is that of small manufactures such as clocks, matches, lamps, and umbrellas. These things are luxuries for the moment, but quickly become necessities as the spread of Occidentalism continues in China. Suppose that education in Western conveniences had advanced to a stage at which the consumption of matches in China is one five-cent box a year for each inhabitant,—not a very extravagant prospect surely. Yet the sum total of that year's trade in matches would be \$20,000,000, almost as much as America's total exports to China today.

Of course this assumes that China would not begin to manufacture her own matches, an assumption which is very unlikely. It is more probable that before long Chinese matches would begin to compete in the world's markets with those of Japan and other countries. For the present, however, that contingency is a matter of the future. Certainly, just now, Japan's growing trade with China in the products of her factories seems to be outdistancing competitors.

Other evidence of the growing prominence of Japanese trade with China is seen in the great growth of her shipping. During the last half of the nineteenth century Great Britain dominated this trade and the greater part of it was carried in British ships. The last fifteen or twenty years have seen the gradual encroachment of German and Japanese interests until England's preëminence appears likely to slip from her. This result has been due not so much to the decline of British trade *per se* as to the fact that the extension of the Chinese trade, which has been rapid, has mostly gone to her rivals.¹

Japanese Finances

Japan has been forced to levy upon every conceivable source of revenue to provide funds for her military and commercial enterprises. First, there is the land tax, running from 2.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent of the assessed value. This supplies about \$4,300,000. Next

¹ The tonnage of the shipping which cleared Chinese ports for the past ten years was as follows; the percentages are those of approximate increase:

	GREAT BRITAIN	JAPAN	GERMANY
1902	3,627,364	1,223,601	1,023,775
1907	4,594,424 (34%)	2,416,400 (50%)	1,291,067 (30%)
1912	4,930,821 (6%)	2,991,411 (25%)	1,310,494 (1½%)

in importance is the income tax, on a sliding scale with a minimum of \$200. The percentage of taxation runs from 1 per cent on the minimum to 5.5 per cent on \$50,000 or more. It is of interest to discover that only thirteen individuals in the Empire have an annual income of more than \$20,000, only 67 pay on \$12,000, and only 140 pay on \$5500. Only seven out of every thousand make \$1400 per year. Yet the income tax yields the government about \$15,000,000 a year.

In addition to these two excises there is a business tax levied under some twelve different headings; this yields about \$10,000,000 more. Then there is a document tax on the "ad valorem" plan; a tax on soy (a Japanese sauce); a tax on medicine; a tax on liquors corresponding to our own "internal revenue"; a tax on sugar (from \$1 to \$5 a picul of 433 pounds); a 10 per cent to 15 per cent special tax on silks and woolens and a tax on traveling. Lastly there is a tariff which is nicely adjusted to the principle of bringing in all that the traffic will bear. Aside from foreign books, fertilizers, and certain raw materials such as cotton, rubber, ores, rags, and hemp, that are utilized in native industries, everything on the list bears the maximum charge, subject only to the "law of diminishing returns." The income from the tariff is roughly from \$20,000,000 to \$25,000,000 annually.

In addition to the usual methods of taxation the Japanese government realizes a direct profit from the control of certain monopolies. These are three in number: tobacco, salt, and camphor. In 1898 the government took over the control of leaf tobacco, requiring that all crops should be sold to it and reselling the product at a fixed profit. But the Japanese people consume incredible numbers of cheap cigarettes, and two or three Japanese firms as well as the American Tobacco Company (located in Kyōtō) began to develop and control a very large trade in the manufactured article. The government, having embarked in trade, could not tolerate a competitor, and in 1903 a law was passed making the manufacture and sale of cut tobacco and cigarettes also a monopoly. The companies received an appraised sum for their plants and stocks, and in addition 20 per cent profit on a year's sales. The American company, thus closed out of Japan, went over to Manchuria after the war and started a competition with the Japanese government.

The second monopoly is that of salt, which was taken under control in 1905. The government does not control the manufacture of salt, but only its sale. It is practically all made from sea water. The importation of foreign salt is discouraged and only allowed in special cases by permission of the government. For all Japa-

nese salt exported, a sort of bonus is paid the producer by the government. The salt monopoly is very unpopular.

The third monopoly is that of camphor, which is one of the principal products of Formosa, although a considerable amount of camphor is also produced in Japan proper.

These three monopolies produced a net revenue in 1912-13 of over \$30,000,000, which is approximately the annual income from this source.

It is needless to say that a financial system which is compelled to resort to such extraordinary expedients in taxation is a heavy burden upon the people. Particularly is it true that taxes on salt, kerosene, and cotton fabrics impose the heaviest load upon the poorest classes. The income tax statistics disclose the individual poverty of the Japanese compared with other peoples. But even this takes no account of the great numbers below the minimum income level who pay, nevertheless, indirectly, a heavy price for the privilege of existence.

In 1905 two well-known Japanese economists published the results of their investigation of the national wealth of Japan.¹ They summed up their evaluations

¹ "The National Wealth of Japan," by E. Igarashi and H. Takahashi.

under thirteen heads, viz., land, buildings; house fittings and furniture; domestic animals and birds; mineral wealth; marine products; gas, waterworks, and electrical enterprises; shipping; bullion; joint stock companies and banks; goods in stock; railways, telegraph and telephones; navy.

Considering how soon naval equipment is "scrapped," the last item (\$90,000,000) might, perhaps, be omitted from the table. The authors subtracted the amount of the national debt (\$202,708,000 in 1905) and arrived at the net sum of \$12,357,130,369. As the national debt in 1913 amounted to \$1,276,897,000, mostly occasioned by wars and hence not represented by a corresponding increment in the amount of the national wealth, the above sum would be decreased to something over eleven billions of dollars. This would amount to approximately \$201 per capita. The per capita wealth of the United States, by comparison, is \$1310, or over six times as great.

With the burden of taxation growing yearly heavier, the cost of living has been rising equally rapidly. This is a phenomenon that is world-wide and is to be ascribed only partly, if at all, to local conditions in Japan. A good index to this is the rise in the price of rice. In 1907 this was \$8.01 per *koku* (5 bushels), in 1912 it was \$10.18.

A few years ago a Japanese economist investigated

the status of what he called the "middle-class farmer" in Japan and published his results in a technical Japanese economic journal.¹ They were rather startling. He found the average income of such a man to be \$133.55 gold per annum and the average taxes to be 17 per cent. The approximation of the bare necessities for living, this economist estimated to be \$158.10, leaving a theoretical deficit of \$24.55. And I imagine that to a great many of the middle-class farmers in Japan there is a pronounced shadow of reality to that theoretical deficit.

National Expenditures

It is of particular interest to scan the debit side of the books of a nation so heavily in debt as Japan and whose bonds are held so extensively by foreigners. Has the borrowed money been invested in betterments of the whole nation or in remunerative industry or has it been sunk in the pit of military enterprise?

We have already mentioned the paternal character of government enterprises in providing bonuses, subsidies, refunds, loans at sub-market rates and similar aids to selected fractions of the population on the principle of ultimately benefiting the whole nation. This is an expensive policy and one that has never before

¹ Takahashi Hideyomi, in the *Tokyo Keisai Zasshi*, vol. 61, p. 116.

been attempted on so comprehensive a scale. Its outcome will be watched with much interest by foreign students of history and economics.

Somewhat the same considerations apply to the nationalization of railways which has been recently consummated. The purchase of those important lines that had been built by private companies involved a bond issue amounting to about \$250,000,000, but it is anticipated that this will be paid off out of the profits and the account is not included in the annual budget.

The ordinary budget expenditures total about \$207,000,000 annually, of which about \$58,000,000 go to the army and navy in the regular channels. The latter two also take about \$33,000,000 a year from the extraordinary appropriations, making over \$90,000,000, or nearly one third, out of a grand total annual expenditure of \$277,000,000, that goes for the upkeep of a military establishment. It is true that the same proportion is maintained by Germany, England, and even the United States. But it must be remembered that these are rich creditor nations that may waste their substance as they will.

This brings us to the complicated subject of the national debt, a full discussion of which would be in place only in a treatise on financial history. We may note one fact, however, that the curve of the national

debt of Japan has steadily risen, each year overtopping the last. In 1871, the first year of constitutional government in Japan, the national debt was \$2,500,000 or seven cents per capita of population; in 1890 it was \$124,810,000 or \$3.11 per capita; in 1900 it was \$251,488,000 or \$5.74 per capita. The subsequent changes may be noted in the following table:

TABLE OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL DEBT OF JAPAN FROM 1901 TO 1914
WITH THE RELATING PER CAPITA PERCENTAGE

1901	\$254,234,000	\$5.31 per capita
1902	262,113,000	5.44 "
1903	276,090,000	5.65 "
1904	280,790,000	5.66 "
1905	495,644,000	9.84 "
1906	936,190,000	18.45 "
1907	1,108,862,000	21.66 "
1908	1,138,410,000	21.45 "
1909	1,291,402,000	19.57 "
1910	1,325,178,000	19.77 "
1911	1,276,833,000	18.65 "
1912	1,246,960,000	18.05 "
1913	1,272,540,000	18.42 "
1914 (May)	1,267,511,000	...

In order to meet the annual interest on foreign debt, together with the annual unfavorable trade balance, the Japanese government is compelled to maintain a large gold reserve abroad. The gold thus hoarded at the end of 1913 (aside from a reserve of \$65,000,000 kept at home to maintain the gold standard) amounted to

\$120,500,000; \$102,000,000 in England, \$13,000,000 in France; \$3,500,000 in the United States and \$2,000,000 in Germany.

There is another side to this story, for if there were no compensating income to counterbalance the heavy outflow of gold, the drain would be heavier perhaps than the present system of finance could stand. We have already mentioned the amount of cash left in Japan by Occidental travelers, a variable but by no means inconsiderable amount. To this must be added a large sum that is annually remitted home by the Japanese abroad. The Minister of Finance recently announced that this sum amounted to \$13,000,000 for 1912. It is obvious that if a sufficiently large army of Japanese should be quartered on foreign soil, as it were, sending home the profits of their toil, the total amount alone might in time even up the adverse trade balance. Whether this would be looked upon with complacency by the foreign nations is another question. And this introduces us to one of the most vexing problems facing the Japanese people — the status of their nationals in foreign lands.

CHAPTER VI

THE "YELLOW PERIL" IN A "WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY"

THE dynamic view of history sees mankind in a constant flux, racial streams flowing this way and that, in great migrations through the years and the centuries. The clashes that have ensued when one wave encountered another, when the occupants of a frontier territory resisted the invader — these make up the tissue of historic narrative, which is chiefly concerned with fighting. These migrations began long before the dawn of history and have continued to the present and we have no reason to suppose that they will not persist in the future, for the inertia of the human stream is very great.

Until comparatively recently, such movements have been slow and hardly apparent to any one generation. Nowadays, however, thanks to mechanical aids to transportation, population movements are so rapid and the results so startling that mankind for the first time feels called upon to look ahead and, anticipating clashes before they come, to try to avert them.

For many centuries, Asia seemed the bottomless well whence came these human floods. The Persian inva-

sion of Greece, the conquest of Southeastern Europe by the Huns in the fifth century, the activities of the Tartars under Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, whose hordes not only overran Europe but even turned to the East, subdued Korea and attacked Japan,— these are conspicuous examples of the pressure of Asia upon the rest of the world.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European adventurers in their search for treasure disclosed the two Americas to conquest and before long India and the isles of the sea came under the sway of the Caucasian. In the last century Africa has been parceled out like a loaf of bread.

It might almost seem that the impulse which Asia gave Europe from the East has been transmitted around the globe. At any rate, the beginning of the present century finds the European white man in control of practically all the lands of the earth except the populous regions of East Asia,— China and Japan. Against the rock-like conservatism of these ancient Asiatic states the tides of Occidental power have beaten up and dashed themselves to spray.

The frontier of European civilization is the west coast of America and the island continent of Australia, and these lands face the Orient with peculiar interest, now that the Orient has awakened to the existence of

the rest of the world. It is this situation that inspires those long-distance prophets who see the Pacific-Ocean the scene of the most significant human conflicts the world has yet endured. For it is no longer a matter of Europe pouring itself out over the rest of the earth. Rather Europe has come to a stop and must brace herself to withstand the shock of East Asia pressing out in its turn.

The conditions that led to the comparatively recent domination by Europe of the New World, Africa, and Australia, were at the outset not those that have led to the great racial migrations of the past nor indeed to those of the present. It was not the pressure of overcrowding that led primarily to the discovery of the new lands and their settlement. Rather it was the lure of gold, the spur of adventure, the lust of conquest, or the promptings of religious zeal. Such motives led daring souls to forsake their old homes for the new. The spirit of such pioneers made possible the founding of our Republic, the astonishing development of its material resources, and the courageous vision that has made the Far West of America one with the East.

Our latter-day immigration from the Mediterranean countries and from Russia could never have achieved a nation in such a space of time. These latter are the overflow, crowded out by pressure of circumstances at home, and they are very different in their psychology.

The American immigrants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and of the first half of the nineteenth as well, struck out into the wilderness and subdued it, whereas their present-day successors huddle in cities and save their pennies.

Preëminently of the former type were the men and women who went to California and the West in '49, and their descendants retain many of their characteristics. A man of this type is accustomed to rely upon his own initiative and likely to assume the status of an overlord to "natives" or foreigners of a different caste. This feature cannot be omitted from a study of the problem of the Asiatic in California. The same thing applies as well to the white settlers of Australia and West Canada.

The Experience of South Africa

In India and China the population is so dense that the struggle for mere existence is extraordinarily keen. Partly on this account at least, we find in these countries a characteristic "coolie" class of unskilled laborers, accustomed to live on the cheapest fare and to do the hardest kinds of labor. Cheap labor of this sort means large profits to owners of plantations, and the presence of a large coolie class, by driving out the competition of the white laborer, leaves all the remaining whites in the status of employers and overseers.

From the middle of the seventeenth century, when the Dutch colonized South Africa, until the era of British domination in the nineteenth, labor in South Africa was all done by black and Asiatic slaves. The British freed the slaves, and in consequence the labor problem grew constantly more difficult. Finally, in 1859 they decided to import Hindus. To-day the Hindu population in Natal is greater than the white, and they control the majority of the shops and farms. A writer on the subject, after saying that the Hindu has driven out the white workman, since the latter cannot compete on the former's scale of living, states that "The Asiatic is worth less to the country than the white man he displaces." It is estimated in Natal that the Oriental only contributes £1/6/4½ a year to the public revenue, whereas the white resident contributes £30/11/4.

The Hindu problem for South Africa grows daily more menacing. The Hindu is a British subject, and when he has finished his term of indenture as an imported laborer in Natal and expresses a desire to stay on instead of returning to India, he quite naturally fails to see why he cannot do so; why, in other words, a British subject in one colony loses his rights in another. In the early part of 1914, the resentment of the Hindu broke out in the form of strikes and riots. The war has diverted public attention from this part of the world, but in this

apparently irreconcilable conflict between the white and brown elements of the British Empire is found one of the most difficult problems that British Imperialism has ever been called upon to face.

The White 'Australia Doctrine

In the early days of the gold excitement in Australia it was difficult to keep white laborers on the ranches, and Chinese coolies were imported, but the consequences of letting in the yellow flood were soon apparent, and exclusion laws were enacted by the various provincial governments. The Kanakas presented even a more difficult problem, and it was not long before opposition developed toward the entrance of all "off-colored" races. The idea of keeping Australia a "white man's country" took early root.

In Australia and New Zealand, perhaps because of the newness of their settlement and the lack of conservative traditions, the modern doctrines of the labor parties, including those of socialism, have made great headway. It is not too much to assert that politics in the antipodes is controlled entirely by the labor party. This does not mean that Australia is completely unionized, but rather that every issue is fought out as between labor and the rest of the community. The slogan of this party is "Socialism in our Time." And

it is not difficult to infer the attitude of such an element toward the question of the importation of coolie labor. In this they find themselves at one with the rest of the white population.

But the Australian labor party has been more than short-sighted. Not only have they opposed the immigration of Orientals; they have also bitterly opposed the immigration of Southern Europeans as well. As a consequence the sparse white population of this huge continent is almost stationary, although it would appear that the strongest sort of practical opposition to the pressure of the Orient would be the filling up of the Commonwealth with assimilable whites and thus increasing the European population. For the condition of Australia to-day with respect to the physical subjugation of the country resembles that of America a century ago.

In fact, the arrogant point of view of Australians to-day is much like that of Americans previous to the Spanish war. But the world has moved fast, and whereas America then could bluff with impunity, Australia may see her bluff called at any time.

Australia, like South Africa, is in a peculiar situation as a part of an Empire the majority of whose members are colored. The population and immigration question, being foremost in the minds of her statesmen, was a

determining factor in bringing about the consolidation of the various colonies into the Commonwealth at the beginning of the present century. In union is strength: and a united Australia could bring more pressure to bear upon the home country than could independent provinces.

That the immigration problem was one of the chief motives for the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth is evident from the fact that the first two laws passed by the new Parliament dealt with this subject.

These laws were original enough and drastic enough to merit special mention. They provided for the usual basis of exclusion of immigrants as paupers, criminals, etc.; but they provided also for a "literacy test," by which it was very explicitly stated that only such foreigners should be admitted into the Commonwealth as should prove themselves able to write at dictation fifty words in any European language and sign them in the presence of the immigration officer. Thus, if there were any reason for excluding Germans, they might be given a passage in Spanish or Polish. The act was of course devised against Orientals,—Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese. It was explicitly promised, in fact, that it should never be applied against Europeans. This discrimination against the Asiatic implied in the demand for a test in any European language gave great

offense, and in 1905 the act was amended by striking out the word "European." Accordingly the test may be applied by requiring the dictation in *any* language, which may save the Oriental's face, but does not help him much, for the high court of Australia has decided ¹ the precedent that "it is for the officer and not the immigrant to select the language for the dictation test." That the Asiatic is aimed at, however, is obvious from the fact that but one Oriental passed the test in 1905 and none has done so since then. The law was again amended in 1912, but the dictation test is retained. But one quite unexpected result was that white immigration into the Commonwealth almost ceased, it being diverted to New Zealand.

Since the recent military programs of the Japanese have been inaugurated, the Australians have become more fearful than ever. The expansive movement of Japan is viewed with what appears to be quite unnecessary alarm, seeing how far away from that country they are. Yet the sparsely settled condition of their continent is no doubt inviting to an over-populous nation, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance arouses misgivings as to what support England would give her dependency if a crisis should arise.

This has been the prime motive of a change of policy

¹ In the case of Chia Gee *vs.* Martin.

with regard to national defense. Hitherto Australia has given a subsidy of £240,000 to the home country. This has now been withdrawn, rather to England's disgust, if one may judge by current English criticism. The function of England's fleet for several years has been that of protecting Great Britain from Germany, British interests in the Pacific being left to her ally Japan. Such a plan has not suited the Australians at all, and they have set about building a fleet of their own.¹ The newly begun fleet early had a chance to prove its usefulness, not to Australia but to the British Empire, for it was the Australian cruiser *Sydney*, it will be remembered, not the Japanese, that put an end to the activities of the *Emden*. It is worth noting, also, that the Japanese fleet was unable to prevent the destruction of the English squadron under Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile.

Situated as they are, the Australians have a very keen interest in the progress and completion of the Panama canal. Not only Australia but all the South Pacific will without question be immensely benefited by it.

¹ The Australian "unit" consists of one armored cruiser, three unarmored cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, representing a total cost of £3,695,000. It is to be identical with the China and East Indian naval units. Before the project was begun £1,000,000 was raised by popular subscription to buy a "dreadnought" as a gift to the home country. This money, after being collected, however, was expended otherwise, one half going to assist European immigration.

It is likely that with their present independence of the mother country, Australia will before long enter into more intimate relations with America than with England. The Australian indeed might not be unwilling to extend such an *entente* beyond the domain of trade. For in the problems of the Pacific the United States and the Commonwealth have much more in common than the latter has with England. Such a feeling was evident when the American fleet made its memorable tour of the Pacific in 1908. Our fleet met with such an enthusiastic reception in Australia, exceeding in fact the welcome extended to the Prince of Wales when he went to open the Commonwealth Parliament, that England was astonished and a bit non-plused. Sir Joseph Ward, Premier of New Zealand from 1906 to 1912, is quoted as saying quite flatly that "Australia looks to America as her natural ally in the coming struggle against Japanese domination."

The Australian standpoint is graphically put by a writer in the *National Review*: "The Australian fleet (when there really is such a fleet) will be found (when the day comes for defining the situation) to exist, first, for the purpose of keeping Australia a white man's country against all comers, and second (only second) for the defense of the mostly colored empire. . . . The British fleet is for the purpose of defending the British

Isles against the Germans. This is of minor importance to the Australian as regards Australia.¹ What he wants to know, supposing a powerful Australian fleet is built and put under purely British command, which side the fleet will be on if the time comes to resolve whether the colored subject is a real yellow citizen or not." And again: "The white Australia idea is not a political theory. It is a gospel. It counts for more than religion; for more than flag, because the flag waves over all kinds of races; for more than the Empire, for the Empire is mostly black, or brown or yellow; is largely heathen, largely polygamous, partly cannibal. . . . In fact the white Australia doctrine is based on the necessity for choosing between national existence and national suicide."

In my own opinion the white Australia idea, as embracing the continent, is doomed to failure on account of climatic conditions. Experience has shown pretty definitely that the white man cannot endure in the tropics as a workman. He may be the brains of a tropical population but not the bone and muscle. The colored races will inherit the tropics in the end.

Now nearly half of Australia lies within the tropics, and never will be a white man's country in the sense that

¹ It would be a terrible mistake for Australia so to consider it.

white men will constitute the bulk of its population or supply the labor for its development. The following table gives some idea of this situation:

	AREA Sq. MI.	WHITE POPULATION, 1911.
Queensland	670,500	605,813
North Territory	523,620	3,310
West Australia	975,920	282,114
	<u>2,170,040</u>	<u>891,237</u>

This is a concentration of roughly one person to 2 2/5 square miles. When we learn, however, that 23 per cent of the population of Queensland is found in the city of Brisbane and 38 per cent of that of West Australia in Perth, the sparseness of population (about one man to 3 2/5 square miles) becomes more striking. There are about 100,000 aborigines in the whole continent. These do not count in "holding the territory."

This enormous area is not today "effectively occupied" by any race. Some day it will be. Certainly not by whites, although if they are lucky they may dominate it. Nevertheless at the present moment Australians will not consider such a possibility. Long ago Dr. Pearson, who in his "National Life and Character" first called attention to the "Yellow Peril," said: "Transform the northern half of our continent into a

Natal with thirteen out of fourteen belonging to an inferior race [Query: inferior from what standpoint] and the southern half will speedily approximate to the condition of the Cape Colony where the whites are indeed a masterful minority, but still only as one to four."

The Oriental in British Columbia

Very much the same sort of phenomenon that has been described for Australia has been witnessed in British Columbia at the first impact of the Orient. The Canadian province, however, is handicapped in its actions for the reason that it is controlled in international affairs by Ottawa, and Ottawa is more responsive to the wishes of England than to those of the people on the western frontier.

Like Australia, British Columbia is very sparsely settled, and as in Australia, too, the labor element is powerful. The first anti-Chinese law was passed in 1885, allowing but one Chinese per ton to the ship,—a highly original method of limitation. In addition, a head tax of \$50 was imposed. In 1901 this was increased to \$100; in 1904 to \$500. In addition, the law prohibited Chinese from working in factories or workshops, although they might be employed in canneries or as domestic servants. This statute produced a curious and unforeseen result. Immigration, of course,

stopped almost immediately.¹ The Chinese already within the province became increasingly important from an economic standpoint, particularly as domestic servants, in which capacity they are unexcelled. Their wages doubled and tripled. Mr. King, the Chairman of the Royal Commission appointed to consider the problem, reported that "without organization, without expense, without agitation, every Chinaman became a unit in a labor group more favored than the most exclusive and highly protected labor union."

When it came to the Japanese, and more recently the Hindus, the difficulties of the British Columbians became more critical, for the former are the allies of the home country, and the latter, subjects of the same king. In 1899 Great Britain concluded a treaty with Japan, granting full reciprocal privileges of residence, travel and protection. The treaty did not include all the Empire, India for instance being excluded, but Canada thought she saw a chance to cultivate trade with the

¹ Between June 30, 1900, and Jan. 1, 1904, 16,007 Chinese entered Vancouver; between Jan. 1, 1904, and June 30, 1907, only 121. Since then, however, the number has increased, as will be seen in the following table. In 1910 it was further required that each Chinese bring with him \$200 in cash.

1908	1887 Chinese entered
1909	2156 Chinese entered
1910	5278 Chinese entered
1911	6247 Chinese entered

Orient, and, sometime later, enrolled herself as a third party to the convention, in exchange for tariff reductions on certain Canadian exports.

Again things worked out in unexpected fashion. Shortly after the Russian war, anti-Japanese sentiment began to stir in California, and at the same time wages began to fall in Hawaii. Consequently thousands of Japanese descended upon British Columbia, and within a few years have possessed themselves of two important sources of natural wealth,—the mines and the fisheries. Very valuable copper mines worth above \$5,000,000 are now said to be owned and operated by Japanese, and the product exported. The fisheries are almost wholly in their hands. In this occupation, it was officially estimated in 1913 that 10,500 laborers were employed, each one of whom earned from \$500 to \$3000 a year practically all of which was sent home. It is worthy of note that foreigners are prohibited from either mining or fishing in Japan. Indeed, according to the law only British subjects are licensed to fish in Canadian waters. But naturalization involves merely a three years' residence and the oath of allegiance, and the law applies only to the fisherman proper, not to his boat-pullers or helpers. Nevertheless there are over 3000 such naturalized Japanese in British Columbia. The Japanese coolies take this allegiance so lightly that

the provincial government contravenes the Dominion law by prohibiting the naturalized Japanese from voting. This disfranchisement has been upheld by the Privy Council at London, England, on the ground that the province has power to limit its own electorate.

It is too much to expect that the whites, particularly the labor element, should view the rapid influx of Japanese with complacency. In September, 1907, a tramp steamer landed 1200 Japanese at Vancouver, and the event precipitated a riot. Agitators worked up the mob spirit and hoodlums attacked the Japanese quarter and began to wreck the shops. Finally the Japanese turned at bay and with knives, pistols, and broken bottles, counter-attacked so fiercely that the attacking whites took to their heels! A few days later the arrival of a consignment of Hindus started more rioting. The Ottawa government took a decided stand and promptly reimbursed the victims. Strong official pressure was put upon the Japanese press to make light of the incident and both Japan and Great Britain found it expedient to "change the subject" as quickly as possible. A scapegoat had to be found, however, and this the English press discovered in "paid agitators from California." The United States was thus responsible for the whole occurrence, and the *Yorozu*, one of the

irresponsible yellow journals of Tokyo, expressed the belief of a certain section of the Japanese public, in attributing the affair to the weak-kneed policy of the Japanese Foreign Office in connection with the San Francisco affairs.

The next year, the British Columbia provincial government passed a bill enacting the "dictation test" in force in Australia and Natal. Three times has this bill been passed, only to be each time vetoed by the Dominion government. Yet feeling still runs so high that when the Japanese training squadron under Admiral Ijichi, making its annual cruise, stopped at Vancouver, sufficient hostility was displayed to prevent a parade of Japanese sailors under arms.

The Hindu is the newest problem for British Columbia. For with his outlandish garb and his caste prejudices, he is far more exotic than the Japanese who gets into a "hand-me-down" and a "derby" hat as soon as possible after landing. When the Hindu cloud began to lower on the horizon, the Canadian immigration officials, never at a loss for original expedients, tried to ship these colored immigrants off to Honduras. But the Hindus naturally refused to go. Thereupon they passed a law providing that no Asiatics should come in, except by "continuous journey from the country of which they are natives or citizens and upon through tickets." Of

course as there is no direct steamer connection between India and Canada, the law presumably accomplishes a very effective if somewhat disingenuous check upon Hindu migration.

The complacency of the Canadian authorities was sadly shaken, however, when on the 23d of May, 1914, a Japanese steamer, the *Komagata Maru* appeared in Vancouver harbor with 350 Hindus (Sikhs) on board. Led by one Gurdit Singh, the company had chartered the boat and sailed direct from India. Arriving in Vancouver, they asserted their rights as British subjects to enter British dominions.

Faced by this emergency, the Canadian authorities dropped euphemisms and flatly refused to allow their fellow citizens from the Orient to land. In imitation of the suffragettes the Hindus began a "hunger strike," but the Canadians were unimpressed and the strike was abandoned. Threats were made to burn the ship, in the belief that the Canadians would rescue the passengers, but a lingering doubt as to whether the former might see it that way caused the project to be abandoned. Meanwhile the matter came before the Court and in July a decision was rendered against the Hindus. Still the *Komagata Maru* lay in the harbor and refused to go. Finally, under the guns of a Canadian war vessel (the *Rainbow*), she was towed to sea and told to

leave. This suggests the unsatisfactory method that metropolitan police not infrequently employ toward members of the vagrant class.

The Hindu in the United States has not risen to the height of a problem. Yet we could hardly look with indifference upon the immigration of any considerable number of Hindus into Canada. For if we should enact exclusion laws against them as we have against the Chinese, yet, should they be given free access to Canada, on the plea of their British citizenship, it would be a most difficult problem to keep them from filtering across the border into the United States, introducing one more racial problem for our distracted people to solve.

The Asiatic in California

In our own country very much the same history is to be related. The chronicle of the early contact of California with the Oriental and the consequent reaction is quite like that of British Columbia. California's experiences of course antedated those of the Canadian province, but in each case the Chinese were first invited, then repulsed at the behest of organized labor, and in each case the vacuum thus created was filled by the Japanese, producing a greater problem still.

The tale of our treatment of the Chinese is not a

pretty one considering the high moral tone of our long diplomatic intercourse with China.¹

In the early days of the gold excitement, there were no candidates for jobs as cooks, or in other menial employment. When the Chinese filled such places, they did not displace any white labor at all. When the Pacific railroad was building, it was absolutely necessary to import about 3000 Chinese workmen in order to complete the road within the time allowed by Congress.

The business depression that came in the '70's brought together a great number of discontented men, out of work, and the famous "sand-lot" agitation began. The Chinese and the plutocrats were picked out by the "Kearneyite" agitators as the enemies of the American workman. Several exclusion bills of various sorts were proposed in Congress, one of which was passed, and vetoed by President Hayes, and another one later by President Arthur. Meanwhile California submitted the question to a popular vote,—one of the earliest instances of the referendum in American politics—and out of practically the entire vote of the state there were 154,638 for exclusion and 883 against. In the face of this unanimity of sentiment, after a varied experience, an exclusion act was passed in 1882. This

¹ The interested reader will find a complete and dispassionate account in Dr. M. R. Coolidge's "Chinese Immigration."

first act was not difficult to evade and did not satisfy the West. In various places, anti-Chinese riots broke out. One in particular at Rock Springs, Wyoming, partook of the nature of a "Boxer" outbreak, the Chinese being hunted and shot "like antelopes."¹ In 1892 the Geary Act was framed, which not only excluded the Chinese, but provided for the most stringent regulations concerning the methods of its administration. This law was to be in force ten years, and in 1902 it was reenacted for an indefinite period. The act was later extended to include Hawaii, and likewise, by General Otis, to include the Philippine Islands.

It was not the exclusion act in itself that gave so much offense to China as the method of administering it. Incoming Chinese of the exempt classes — merchants, students, and travelers — were treated almost as criminals. Things reached a climax at the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904. The Chinese exhibitors at the Exposition, the invited guests of the nation, were forced to endure a situation beside which the lot of the Filipino savages on exhibition was an enviable one. The tales reported by these returning travelers no doubt lost nothing in the telling. They were the last straw, and precipitated the great anti-American boycott, in which

¹ Some time later Congress voluntarily paid China an indemnity for this outrage.

American trade and American interests in China suffered so heavily in 1906-8.

But however much of unnecessary severity and lack of tact may have attended the administration of our Chinese exclusion laws, they have been, at any rate, effective. The Chinese problem, unless we reopen it, is no longer a problem. Chinese house servants in the Far West have anything but the financial status of "cheap labor." Other races are employed only by those who cannot afford Chinese. As has been the experience of British Columbia, the success of Chinese exclusion created a sort of vacuum in the labor market. This vacuum the Japanese rushed in to fill and another problem was hatched.

In 1880 there were but 86 Japanese in all California. The increase, year by year, is seen in the table on page 166 (taken from Kawakami's "American-Japanese Relations"). From 1902 on the figures include immigration into Hawaii, which explains the sudden jump. But as great numbers of these immigrants merely used Hawaii as a stepping stone to California, the figures are not highly misleading. In the summer of 1907 the famous "gentleman's agreement" was entered into between Japan and America, by which Japan voluntarily agreed to cease giving passports to Japanese of the workman class for the purpose of coming to this country. Thus the ex-

clusion of Japanese immigrants at present rests not upon our own statutes, as in the case of the Chinese, nor upon a treaty mutually binding, but upon the goodwill of Japan. Officially, such immigration has ceased altogether since 1907. Probably it has really ceased to a

YEAR	JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS	YEAR	JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS
1881	11	1894	1,831
1882	5	1895	1,150
1883	27	1896	1,110
1884	20	1897	1,526
1885	49	1898	2,230
1886	194	1899	2,844
1887	229	1900	12,635
1888	404	1901	5,269
1889	640	1902	14,270
1890	691	1903	19,968
1891	1136	1904	14,264
1892	1498	1905	10,331
1893	1380	1906	13,835
		1907	30,226

large extent. But the writer spent the summer of 1913 in the Santa Clara valley and talked with numbers of Japanese workers in the strawberry fields. A great many of these, according to their own statements, had been but a few months in America. His questions as to how they had got into California were evasively answered.

There is little doubt that the Japanese government is sincere in its attempt to limit the immigration of its

citizens to the United States, although the real reason has not been dwelt upon. Of course Japan with all her present domestic difficulties is not desirous of creating an occasion for racial collision in America. But she is more concerned with saving her face by not giving any opportunity for discriminatory treatment. Above all, and this is the chief consideration, she must maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Whether the Anglo-Japanese alliance would stand the strain of an immigration conflict in British Columbia is a question better avoided than answered. And Japanese policy must be consistent with respect to the whole west coast of America. What will happen to this alliance in the readjustments certain to follow the World War no one can say, but if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance gives place to a Japanese-Russian *entente*, as is not at all unlikely, then the reason for maintaining such a "gentleman's agreement" may no longer hold.

The Japanese immigrants in rural California tend to hang together in groups, as is of course natural, since they speak little or no English and are not too warmly welcomed by the whites. On the one hand they hire themselves out on a contract system, particularly to the orchardists, who complain that they have no sense of the sanctity of contracts. In work that requires squatting, such as the picking of strawberries or the cultivation of

sugar beets, they have no equals in efficiency. They are not content long to hire out, however. When they have acquainted themselves with the local situation, they will lease a small farm, often at a high figure, and start in on their own hook. Others follow. "Gresham's law" begins to operate and the whites move out. Leaseholds become freeholds, and a permanent Asiatic nucleus becomes established. In this way they get a monopoly of certain products. In Southern California the celery and truck crops are chiefly in the hands of the Japanese; in the Santa Clara valley, the berry crop. Some of the richest and most prosperous districts of California (not necessarily sparsely settled regions) have settled up with Japanese until the entire complexion of the region has changed. Fresno and the Vaca valley are notorious examples. It is stated in the Twelfth Biennial Report of the California Bureau of Labor Statistics that "ninety per cent of all the people met, walking or driving on all the country roads around Vacaville, are Japanese." That is to say, the whites who formerly lived there have migrated.

In the trades also, Japanese competition has been keenly felt. In carpentering, laundering, construction contracts, they are undercutting their white competitors below the limit of doing business on an American basis. Cheap restaurants are also gradually passing into their hands.

It is needless to say that the native American in California took cognizance of the situation long ago. Contrary to general belief, especially in the Eastern United States, the anti-Japanese movement did not originate in union labor circles, though it naturally quickly enlisted a following among the working and tradespeople. Indeed the movement has been not a little embarrassed and deprived of the consideration it should have received in other quarters, by the unrestrained activities of the "Asiatic Exclusion League" and some of its spokesmen.

The San Francisco school troubles of 1907, already described, were quieted, and dropped from the limelight of public attention, but the feeling that had precipitated the affair was by no means dead. Two years afterward, in 1909, the California legislature considered various bills designed to segregate Japanese in the schools, prevent Japanese ownership of land, and in other ways restrict their activities within the state. President Roosevelt again intervened and induced the California officials to drop the matter. This was wise, as the bills were not carefully drawn and their passage would inevitably have involved the national government in difficulties.

In 1913 the California legislature again occupied itself with anti-Japanese legislation. Bills were pro-

posed in both chambers. In one of these bills the words "ineligible to citizenship" were used. Fearing that the enactment of this legislation might upset delicate international relations, President Wilson took the unusual course of personally interesting himself to the extent not only of telegraphing to the governor of the state his own views and wishes, but also of sending Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, to the coast to confer with the lawmakers. Mr. Bryan was cordially received and accorded a respectful hearing. He requested the Californians to defer action until President Wilson and the State Department should have had an opportunity, either alone or in conjunction with a committee of the California legislature, to negotiate with Japan, or else to enact a law similar to that of Illinois which allows aliens to hold land for but six years.

The legislature did not act upon any of those suggestions, but, instead, turned its attention to a new bill, drafted by the state attorney-general, U. S. Webb. The Webb bill passed both houses, but Governor Johnson had promised the President to refrain from signing it until a chance had offered for the national government to act in the matter. President Wilson did request that the bill be not signed until the matter could be taken up diplomatically with Japan. But the governor refused to see any "absolutely controlling necessity" for with-

holding his signature and it became a law, August 10, 1913.

The Webb Act provides first that "All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transfer, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this State in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this State." In the second section it was enacted that "All aliens other than those mentioned in section I may acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer, real property or any interest therein, in the manner and to the extent and for the purpose prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation and country of which said alien is a citizen, or subject, and not otherwise." Such aliens are permitted to lease agricultural lands for three-year periods.

In his detailed reply to the President's request that he withhold his signature from the bill, Governor Johnson said that other states had enacted similar laws, that the naturalization laws of the United States determine who may and who may not be eligible for citizenship; that the phrase "persons who cannot become eligible under the existing laws to become citizens of the United States" occurs in the immigration law passed by both houses of the Sixty-second Congress; and that Califor-

nia was merely following the statutes of the United States in any discrimination regarding citizenship. The governor further stated that the question was not "whether any offense had been taken [by Japan], but whether justly it should be taken."

The claim has been made, and perhaps with some show of justice, that party politics played more of a part in the enacting of this legislation than it should have done and that a "Progressive" governor was not averse to putting a Democratic President "in a hole." If this were true, it would betray an almost incomprehensible short-sightedness on the part of California's officials. For it has been well said that the "California Japanese question is 2 per cent California and 98 per cent national."

The Japanese government took official cognizance of the situation even before the Webb law was passed, Ambassador Chinda having called upon President Wilson the second day of his administration, and expressed the belief that should any of the bills pending in the California legislature become laws "the effect would be very serious." Later, Viscount Chinda made other representations, and it seems to have been a result of the pressure thus exerted that the administration took the unusual steps to influence state legislation that have been described. When the Webb bill

had become law, the Japanese government lodged a formal protest with the State Department (May 10, 1913), which pointed out that in the Japanese view the law was not only unfair and discriminatory, but violated the spirit of the American-Japanese treaty. The American reply pointed out that the difficulty was an economic not a political one, and that if the Japanese felt their treaty rights to have been abridged, they might have recourse to the Federal Courts. This did not satisfy the Japanese government and a second protest was lodged on June 4. This document contained the significant statement that as Japan and America were "geographically destined to be permanent neighbors," it behooved both sides to adopt an attitude of conciliation and coöperation and to avoid anything that might hurt the feelings of the other.

On July 16 the Secretary of State tendered his reply to this protest. In this document Mr. Bryan reiterated his statement that the difficulty is an economic one, not a racial one, and pointed out the similarity of the situation with the working of Imperial Ordinance 352,¹ designed to operate against the Chinese in Japan. The Japanese standpoint was that "the separate states of the United States are, internationally speaking, wholly unknown and entirely without responsibility," the cor-

¹ See page 188.

ollary of which is that the Federal government is responsible. Mr. Bryan, however, in his note, recurred to and quoted an indiscreet expression of opinion which Baron Uchida had made to Mr. Knox in a communication of an earlier date. In it Baron Uchida had said: "In return for the rights of land ownership which are granted Japanese by the laws of the United States (of which, I may observe, there are now about thirty) the Imperial Government will, by liberal interpretation of the law, be prepared to grant land ownership to *American citizens from all the States, reserving for the future, however, the right of maintaining the condition of reciprocity with respect to the separate States.*" [The italics are Mr. Bryan's.]

As there seemed no possibility of getting anywhere along this line, the Japanese government then undertook to arrange a new treaty, but this proposal was withdrawn after a time and has not been made public. At last account, therefore, the discussion had again swung round to what diplomats love to refer to as the *status quo*.

General Considerations

Along with the negro question there is no doubt that the problem of Oriental immigration into America is one of the most difficult and one of the most important that we have ever been called upon to face. Face it we must,

however, and solve it with whatever of political wisdom we may be able to develop. It is difficult to judge the facts wholly impersonally. The Californian is apt to consider the subject too objectively, the Easterner too academically. It is wholly unreasonable for one to ignore the standpoint of the other. We may set aside the opinion of the advocate of "cheap labor to properly develop the resources of the State," regardless of the future, as we may also that of the Harvard professor who finds that racial antipathies are "the childish phenomena in our lives, not noble phenomena." We are dealing with the vital problem of hundreds of thousands of American citizens who are as incapable of prostituting their children's inheritance for the profit of the moment as they are of ordering their lives by the subtle tenets of psychological analysis.

We hear a good deal about opposition to Asiatic immigration being "un-American" on the ground that our whole population is an immigrant one. But this ignores the important fact that when the strong tide of European immigration began to set toward the New World, it came first from those parts of Europe that had drawn the greater part of our original settlement population and hence were most easily assimilated. As these sources became exhausted and a larger proportion and increasing numbers began to come from Southern Europe and

Russia, the difficulty of assimilation became more marked and the question of regulating the flow came to the fore. But all the people of Europe are of one great race even if of various stocks (unless we wish to except the Jews), and all have the same social heritage, the same common historic background of tradition and religion. Compared with the Asiatic in assimilability it is as if Slav and Saxon, Sicilian and Swede, were of one family. If the assimilation of the "wop" is difficult, that of the "Jap" is impossible. It is vain to prove, as Professor Wigmore does, that the Japanese are not Mongolians. Granted. This gains nothing except perhaps the technical evasion of a law.

It is equally beside the point to speak of men like Kitasato, Takamine, Kawakami, Okakura, Nitobe, Asakawa, and scores of other Japanese who have gathered laurels in Occidental fields, as it is on the other hand to mention instances of individuals without any conception of the sacredness of contractual obligations. No one who knows anything about the Japanese at all will deny them their full meed of credit and praise for the possession of as many excellences as may be found in any people of Europe. Particularly is this true of the "common people." Nowhere else in the world are the peasantry possessed of those graces of manner and genuine courtesy that we continually meet in interior

Japan. Many a time have I traveled in third-class cars and put up at third-class inns that I might enjoy the genial companionship of the unpretentious country folk. Possibly this was because I was deferred to, which always makes for complacency! But because I may be proud to know a man like Kitasato or count a Mitsukuri as a friend, does not mean that I should care to have Hyakushoya Gombei for my next-door neighbor in California, occupied in gaining a living. One of the happiest years of my life I spent in a little inland village in Japan of less than two thousand inhabitants as the "paying guest" in a Japanese family; yet I hate to think what my experiences might have been if I had tried to operate a retail shop in that same town. For it makes all the difference in the world whether aliens meet one another as guest and host or as competitors.

Now the Japanese scattered throughout colleges in the East or as occasional curio-shop keepers are essentially guests, and the Easterner's relations with them are those of hosts; moreover, they are most often members of the gentry. But in the West the Japanese (almost always of the *heimin* class) are competitors, and, pulling together by a sort of racial surface tension, they attain a solidarity in competition that is not achieved by the whites, even in California. And, in

the main, it is a successful competition, by fair means or foul.

Many writers, arguing from the acknowledged excellences of the Japanese race and some of the best-known deficiencies of our own, believe that the admixture of a Japanese element would be a good thing for our population; that the Japanese would become good Americans. This is bound to be largely a matter of opinion. I believe, personally, that it is an economical and a biological impossibility for the two races to assimilate, except perhaps in an age-long interval of time that is now no longer available. And the presence of an undigested and indigestible alien mass in California cannot be other than a breeder of future trouble.

In this matter Americans will do well to consider the "French problem" in portions of Canada, especially in Ontario and Quebec. To the theorist, there should not be any very great difficulty experienced by the English in assimilating a people so intimately connected with them through centuries of history as the French. A good deal of the difficulty is at bottom religious, of course, and we should not expect a great amount of intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants, even in two centuries of association. But there seems to be something more fundamental than this. During all these years, the French of Canada have remained

French. The Germans in the United States, on the other hand, melt into the American mixture, as a rule, in a few generations. There is a racial solidarity about the French, when collected in groups, that resists and reacts against the attrition of another race, even if not a very alien one.

In 1912, as a result of a series of complaints, the Provincial government appointed a commission to inspect the schools of Ontario. They found the Roman Catholic catechism taught in thirty of the public schools, contrary to the rules. French was more extensively used than English and the teachers in many schools spoke English very imperfectly.

In the summer of that same year a Congress of the French language was held — the avowed purpose of which was to protect "the French life and the unity of the French race," which "depend upon the preservation of their language." Resolutions were adopted stating, among other things, that the French in Quebec and Ontario should be encouraged to migrate to other provinces and found colonies; that Frenchmen should insist upon a better status for the French language in the schools there; and that in any "bilingual school" the language of instruction should be that of the majority and that pupils should be permitted to choose the language for the written examinations. It will be seen that

citizenship has nothing to do with this situation, in fact increases the difficulty.

The racial solidarity of the French is as nothing compared with that of the Japanese,—one of the most inbred peoples of the earth. Let us imagine the Japanese admitted to citizenship and allowed free entrance to California. Will they scatter generally among the whites or will they form groups of their own kind? No one with the slightest experience of the situation can be doubtful of the answer to this question. The whites themselves hasten the result by moving away when the Japanese become numerous. Will they, with their love of home and country, their devotion to their national history and its ideals, be more likely to become more English-speaking or less, as the numbers of their own kind increase in a given locality? German officials are reported to deplore the loss to the fatherland of Germans who emigrate to America. There is little question that this race is the most easily assimilated here of any non-English that enter our country. Yet the writer has spent days in towns of Missouri and southern Illinois, settled by Germans long ago, and has never heard an English word spoken during his stay.

Suppose that in Solano County in California, the Japanese, each an American citizen with a vote, decide to adopt the attitude of the French Canadian with regard

to his native tongue. When his vote is one of a majority in that county, and he passes the same regulation that instruction shall be in the language of the majority of the citizens, could anything more effective be devised for the peaceful conquest of the country?

Those who pooh-pooh the Japanese danger fail to distinguish the difference between individual Japanese and Japanese in the mass. The dangerous consequences arising from the presence of the latter are due in the main to the good qualities of the race rather than otherwise,—qualities which abstractly we should praise.¹

The intermingling of Orientals and Occidentals *en masse* is something like the admixture of oil and water. They simply do not form a stable mixture if suddenly poured into one another. But if a trace of alkali be added to the water, the result is an emulsification of the oil so that an intimate and permanent suspension is produced. And the housewife knows that when she makes mayonnaise dressing, which is nothing but a thick

¹ How persistent racial prejudices are, even if without the slightest foundation in fact, will be attested by any one who has lived any length of time in the country districts of Japan, especially in the west. It is a deeply rooted belief there, that curly hair always goes with a treacherous heart (perhaps a relic of an ancient Nigrito experience). And many a young Japanese girl has had her life fairly ruined on account of a slight waviness of hair.

emulsion of olive oil, she must add the oil, drop by drop. To do otherwise would curdle the whole mixture.

I have not the slightest doubt that if Japanese were to be very slowly added to our body politic and, instead of aggregating in colonies, were to diffuse throughout our population, it would result in a sort of racial emulsification that would be of permanent advantage to both sides. This would take a long period of time to accomplish, however, and nothing would interfere with the process so much as hasty and ill-considered exclusive legislation.

After all, it is a practical problem. For what difference does it make whether or not the standpoint of the white population of British Columbia, California, and Australia is logically sound, so long as they think alike on the subject? And with a few conspicuous exceptions, they do think alike. If the eight or ten million whites in these countries were possessed of heterodox notions regarding transubstantiation, let us say, to the extent that they were prepared to fight for their opinions, no rational atheist could afford to ignore the situation.

The Other Side of the Shield

It is of interest to discover that the Japanese, on their part, have long had very clearly defined ideas on this subject and understand the situation and its implications better than we do.

In 1892 when Japan was taking the final steps in the way of concluding the current treaties with foreign powers, this matter of the alien danger perhaps to be encountered with the abolition of extraterritoriality greatly agitated her statesmen. Mr. (now Viscount) Kaneko took occasion to write Herbert Spencer, who was a sort of oracle on such things, asking his advice. Spencer answered at length.¹ Among other things he said: "The Japanese policy should, I think, be that of keeping Americans and Europeans as much as possible at arm's length. In the presence of the more powerful races, your position is one of chronic danger and you should take every precaution to give as little foothold as possible to foreigners. It seems to me that the only forms of intercourse which you may with advantage permit are those which are indispensable for the exchange of commodities and exchange of ideas. No further privileges should be allowed to people of other races, and especially to people of the more powerful races, than is absolutely needful for the achievement of these ends. Apparently you are proposing, by revision of the treaty powers with Europe and America, to open the whole Empire to foreigners and foreign capital. I regard this as a fatal policy. . . .

"In pursuance of the advice thus generally indicated,

¹ "Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer." II, 14.

I should say, in answer to your first question, that there should be, not only a prohibition to foreign persons to hold property in land, but also a refusal to give them leases and a permission only to reside as annual tenants."

"To your remaining question respecting the intermarriage of foreigners and Japanese, my reply is that, as rationally answered, there is no difficulty at all. . . .

It is at root a question of biology. . . . If you mix the constitutions of two widely divergent varieties which have severally become adopted to widely divergent modes of life, you get a constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of neither — a constitution which will not work properly, because it is not fitted for any set of conditions whatever. By all means, therefore, peremptorily interdict marriages of Japanese with foreigners."

"I have for the reasons indicated entirely approved of the regulations which have been established in America for restraining the Chinese immigration, and had I the power, would restrict them to the smallest possible amount, my reasons for this decision being that one of two things must happen. If the Chinese are allowed to settle extensively in America, they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject class in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approaching slaves; or if they mix, they must form a bad hybrid. In either

case, supposing the immigration to be large, immense social mischief must arise and eventually social disorganization. The same thing will happen if there should be any considerable mixture of the European or American races with the Japanese."

"You see, therefore, that my advice is strongly conservative in all directions and I end by saying as I began — *keep other races at arm's length as much as possible.*"

Viscount Kaneko has never revealed to what extent Spencer's advice was followed. But Spencer was the great vogue in Japan in the '90's and it must have had weight. The anxiety concerning mixed marriages in Japan seems to have been quite unfounded.

As for land tenure and foreign capital, the Japanese have been in a dilemma that was not understood by Mr. Spencer. Above all things, Japan requires capital to develop her industries, and in the absence of a large home supply, it must needs be foreign capital. Capital is anything but altruistic and becomes very timid when it is impossible to invest it in physical form. So fearful have the Japanese been, however, that this, their most crying need, has been smothered in their anxiety not to permit a foot of Japanese territory to pass into foreign hands.

In the earlier days, it was not unusual for foreigners to hold buildings and grounds in the names of Japanese

who were expected to function as dummies or in some cases as trustees. In not a few cases¹ the Japanese thus chosen failed to appreciate the obligations of trusteeship and converted the fiction of their property rights into reality.

Nowadays foreigners may hold land under the legal fiction of "juridical persons." A juridical person may be a partnership or a joint-stock company, but not an individual. In addition foreigners enjoy the right to lease land ("superficies") frequently for long periods, but these substitutes for ownership have not attracted capital.

In 1910 the Japanese diet passed a new law relating to foreign right of ownership in land.² Apparently the new law removes the restrictions. According to it foreigners may own land if the reciprocal privilege is granted to Japanese in his own country. He must obtain permission of the Home Office so to do, however, and his country must have been previously designated by Imperial Ordinance. The law does not apply to (1) Hokkaidō, (2) Formosa, (3) Saghalien, and (4) "Districts necessary for national defense." But foreigners find a "joker" in Article III of the law, which states that "In case a foreigner or a foreign jur-

¹ The Dōshisha school troubles, for instance.

² The "*Gwaikoku-jin no tochi shoyu-ken ni Kwan-suru ken.*"

idical person owning land ceases to be capable of enjoying the right of ownership in land, the ownership of such land shall revert to the National Treasury unless he disposes of it within a period of one year." In case the foreigner withdraws his business or moves away, the above period shall be extended to five years. To those who appreciate what "team work" the Japanese are capable of, the requirement to sell within a year appears to amount to confiscation. And it seems to be left entirely to the Japanese authorities to determine just what conditions may be under which the foreigner "ceases to be capable of enjoying the right of ownership in land." It may well be that such a privilege would depend upon the attitude of the foreigner's own country anent Japan. In fact the whole paragraph appears to be a weapon of retaliation against such nations as may in the future pass laws distasteful to Japanese emigrants. Although promulgated April 13, 1910, the law has not yet been put into force by Imperial Ordinance.

In connection with the indignant protests of the Japanese government regarding the Californian Exclusion Law and the protracted diplomatic interchanges between Washington and Tokyo that were at the last hearing still "unsatisfactory" to the latter, it is of a great deal of interest to look into Japan's own attitude toward the same problem.

We have seen the Japanese attitude toward foreign land holding, in spite of the great need for foreign capital which the present laws frighten away. We might think that a country not so large as California with a population half that of the whole United States need not fear foreign immigration, particularly of laborers. The idea is of course absurd — from the Occidental standpoint. But Japan is very close to China. If the pressure of population in Japan is great, in Shantung it is greater, and between the two a sort of international plasmolysis may very well occur if no restrictions be erected. If the Japanese can underlive and undersell the American in his own land, so can the Chinese underlive and defeat the Japanese if he has half a chance. Fifteen years ago Chinese peddlers began to be numerous in Japan, especially in the southern and central parts. They traveled all over the country and did a thriving business. Moreover, after the Russian war, Chinese coolies began to come into Japan, attracted by the high wages there to be had. Thus the Japanese found themselves confronted by very much the same problem that has vexed California, British Columbia, and Australia,—native labor displaced by “cheap foreign labor.”

In 1899 an Imperial Ordinance, No. 352, was promulgated regarding the residence of foreigners outside the

"treaty ports," in accordance with the new treaty relations with Europe and America. At this time, very likely with a Chinese invasion in mind, of which the peddlers were the advance guard, such residence was denied to laborers except by permission of the Home Office. This permission can be revoked by any provincial governor at his own discretion. "Laborers" were, at the same time, defined to be those engaged in "agricultural, fishing, mining, civil-engineering work, architectural, manufacturing, transporting, carting, stevedoring, and other miscellaneous work." Exception was made for cooks and waiters.

It is obvious that Occidentals were not in the mind of the Home Minister when he drafted this regulation, but as it is a general law, it is equally obvious that it is applicable to Americans, particularly when no one nation is specified. And there is little doubt that the Ordinance would be promptly invoked should American competition begin in any of the lines cited above. Of course the American tourist or student is welcomed (officially, as a matter of fact) as the Japanese traveler is in this country, and with much greater reason, as the gold the globe-trotter leaves in Japan goes a long way, as we have seen, toward offsetting the annual unfavorable balance of trade.

In 1907 several hundred Chinese were deported from

Nagasaki by the governor of the province. When the Chinese Minister protested, the Home Office referred him to the law just quoted by virtue of which the prefectural governor is empowered to use his own discretion and stated that it could not interfere. This was "states rights" of the American kind. It is significant that the deported Chinese were of two groups, one of the groups being composed of coolies and the other of skilled artisans.

Solution of the Problem in America

He would be a wise man, not to say a presumptuous one, who should attempt to outline a definite and conclusive solution to the problem indicated in the preceding pages. Not only must such a solution rest upon an intelligent and disinterested appreciation of numerous factors, apparently unrelated, but many of these factors are contingent upon future events, the outcome of which can be but vaguely predicted. Nevertheless certain fundamental postulates cannot be ignored in any solution.

First, it is not a Californian, nor a Canadian, nor an Australian problem, but a world problem. The white inhabitants of these countries are but the advance guard of the spreading army of migration that has circled the globe from East to West until it has come face to face with the Farther East. The empty places of the earth

are filling up. Some *modus vivendi* must be found along the zone in which East meets West. The conflict may be a potential one, but it is none the less real. Whether it be allowed to drift into a military or an economic conflict will depend in large measure upon the degree to which the peoples involved avoid false steps. To some it seems better to avoid a conflict and to leave the Pacific Ocean like a boundary fence between two incompatible neighbors. These are the exclusionists of one sort or another. Naturally the instinct of self-preservation places the dwellers on the Pacific shores in this class. Others with no personal interests at stake are willing to "let Nature take her course," confident that in such a struggle for racial existence Occidental civilization will be dominant over Oriental. This academic view, which holds that an armed conflict with the Orient is inevitable and hence to be prepared for (Hobson, Homer Lea), or that it is desirable and hence to be hastened (Kaiser Wilhelm), is obviously directly opposed to that of the first standpoint just mentioned. Yet an exclusion program that is unintelligently conceived or injudiciously administered may of itself lead to conflict.

For this reason it ought to be understood that the control of Japanese immigration is not a state affair nor even a national affair, but an international one.

The Japanese contend, and with justice, that they do

not wish to push in where they are not wanted and that they are not pressing for the right to emigrate *en masse* to America, where their presence is an increasing cause of friction. But they do feel themselves the equal of any other nation and they resent being treated as a class apart. They of course concede the right of any nation to determine its own conditions of immigration and naturalization, but they insist that all aliens shall be treated alike. The necessity for saving Japan's face in this matter is hardly appreciated enough in the Occident. It is not easy to believe that in the Far East the shadow is sometimes more highly valued than the substance. But any kind of an exclusion act that fails to take this important feature into account is certain to be a source of irritation and international friction.

The only plan that appears to the writer even partially to meet the difficulty (in the way of immigration, not in the side issues of owning land or of doing business) is the plan proposed by Dr. Sidney L. Gulick,¹ as well-equipped a student of American-Japanese questions as there is in either land. This plan bases the number of immigrants that may be admitted to this country in any one year upon our capacity to *assimilate* them.

¹ The interested reader will find the plan discussed in detail in "The American Japanese Problem," by Sidney L. Gulick. New York, 1914.

Since this task must fall chiefly upon those aliens naturalized or ready to be who are already here and know both languages, Mr. Gulick finds ready at hand a criterion by which to determine the number that may be safely taken in, and one that can give offense to no one, since it is based upon purely mechanical considerations. From North Europe, whence our most valued immigration has come in the past, we have such a large number of naturalized citizens that the present immigration falls far short of the proportion that might be allotted to such a population under the plan. From Southern Europe and Russia the allowable number would be much smaller, which would be highly desirable. From the Far East it would be negligible. Yet all would be treated on the same basis. Various objections have been offered to this scheme and many details would have to be worked out. Yet it is becoming increasingly evident that the whole problem of immigration into America from the East as well as from the West is in need of a readjustment based upon a broader and more far-sighted understanding of our future necessities than our present laws provide, and Dr. Gulick's plan certainly marks a long step in advance.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHANCES OF WAR

IN the beginning we have pointed out that a Japanese-American war may be inevitable, probable, or merely possible, according to the temperament of the prophet. Granting that anything of the sort is possible, the probability of such an occurrence or its inevitability rest upon somewhat different premises.

Moreover, it makes a difference which side is to be considered the aggressor. Let us begin by assuming that it is the United States. What grounds may be offered for declaring war against Japan? As Japan is many thousands of miles away, opportunities for collision are not very numerous. The writer can think of but three. First, a state of tension may arise that would lead to acts of hostility against Americans in the Orient, which we could not ignore; second, we may consider the academic proposition of maintaining the "Open Door" in China; and third, Japan may assume such an aggressive attitude toward helpless China that we should feel called upon to come to the defense of the latter.

The last we may dismiss without discussion. Wars are not made in America at the whim of rulers, and the people of this country are disinclined to interfere, least of all by arms, with the affairs of another and alien people. The second consideration is equally impossible. American interests in Mexico today are vastly more valuable than they are in China and the temptation to interfere infinitely greater, yet as a whole the American people are steadfast in their determination to keep out of Mexico if it is humanly possible to do so. The idea of fighting any country for the purpose of increasing the profits of trade is little likely to attract a following in America. We want an open market for our goods in China, but to pay for it with a costly war would be the worst sort of bad business. It is needless to say that sympathy for China would be very keen in America, particularly if Japanese ascendancy there meant loss of American trade, and that is something which Japan would do well to keep in mind as a possible offset to any assumed advantages of unnecessarily harsh measures on the continent.

As Japan and the United States rub elbows more and more, many opportunities may arise and probably will arise, from time to time, to mar the friendly tone of American-Japanese relations. Yet the chance of any

overt hostile act being committed against Americans in Japan is extremely remote. Almost universally, American residents in Japan are well liked and American tourists are welcomed, if for no other reason than the money they spend, and in any event it is very unlikely that Japan would fail to make full reparation for any real injury due to the acts of irresponsible Japanese citizens. The only reason that she might fail to do so would be that she would desire to take intentional advantage of such an occasion to declare her hostility. And this brings us to the other aspect of the question: Japan may be the aggressor. As a matter of fact, this is the only viewpoint adopted by those who preach the Japanese danger.

Again let us try to analyze the possible causes for a war which might be declared by Japan against the United States. The responsibility for such a conflict may rest upon our own unthinking heads. For instance, conceding that we are foolish enough to persist in a policy of irritation such as we have toward the Chinese, with respect to the administration of the immigration laws, or that we treat Japanese immigrants in California with barbaric harshness, mob them or lynch them, why then it is quite likely that we may goad Japan or force her into a false position, in which, under the current code of national honor, she may feel that

she has to fight even if it should be her downfall. But this must also assume that America will, without real reason, go back on her long record of friendship for Japan, and likewise that, in the wrong, we shall as a nation refuse to make such amends as one gentleman may make to another. We are a mercurial people, but I cannot believe that we are in any danger of acting so contrary to our honorable past history. The nation that followed out her pledge and gave Cuba back her independence, or that stuck to the letter of her bargain in regard to the Panama canal tolls, is not likely to do wrong by another nation and refuse just reparation. What other motive then will exist for a declaration of war by Japan upon America? There is left the motive of national aggrandizement. And this is the basic motive assumed by practically all the war writers.

The author possesses no secrets of the Japanese government. He would not presume to say that Japan has no idea of going to war with America for the profit to be made out of it. Nations are no wiser than their leaders, and nations have been foolish in the past. But the profitableness of past wars for Japan has been noted on a previous page.¹ And Japan's foreign policy has long been pursued with an astuteness

¹ See page 44.

and a far-sightedness that gives no hint of such stupendous folly as would be involved in the calculated bringing on of war against a power like America.

Let us keep the conditions clearly in mind. Grant that war will not be forced upon Japan by ourselves. Grant that if Japan becomes so incensed, or so humiliated, that her national honor will demand war, that the responsibility will be upon our own shoulders, not hers; then the only other motive left to consider will be that of cold, calculated design, the hope on the one hand of ruling the entire domain of the Pacific by eliminating the last great rival and on the other hand of appropriating, *à la* Rob Roy, the riches which America has so industriously accumulated and neglected to guard.

The money cost of modern warfare is appalling. To conduct an aggressive campaign a nation must have either an enormous gold reserve or else unlimited credit. Japan has neither. It is computed that the cost of maintaining a soldier in the field is at the least \$2.50 a day. Five hundred thousand is the very lowest number that could hope to effectively occupy any portion of the west coast of America. This would mean \$1,125,000 a day, to which must be added the enormous cost of transport 5000 miles from the home base. The interest on foreign debt which cripples Japan so badly at

present is but \$35,000,000 annually, enough to last, let us say, three weeks.

It has often been said that the lack of money has never yet prevented a war nor deterred a nation from declaring war. This is no doubt true, but it does not follow that the lack of money is of equally little consequence in winning a war. And according to our original premises, if an anti-American campaign should be inaugurated by Japan for her own gain, it could only be with the outcome clearly foreseen. Either (1) she should have made secret agreements with other powers so that enormous loans to finance such a war would be obtainable, or (2) she would depend upon striking quickly and paralyzing the American defense so that our prostrate country would be compelled to sue for peace and to pay an enormous indemnity, or (3) she might seize the coveted Hawaii and the Philippines with their boundless resources and make them her own, or (4) having done so, and not wishing to keep them, she might turn them over to some European power for a large cash sum and thereby realize the equivalent of an indemnity without even attacking continental America. All these possibilities have been discussed in one form or another by the American press and war experts. Let us examine them a little more closely.

First, let us consider the financing of such a war by a European (and presumably hostile) power. Assuming that any European power should have reason for such a conspicuous display of hostility, or particularly any advantage to be gained by it, its feasibility would depend primarily upon the conviction on the part of such European power that Japan would surely be the victor in the contest. To speak not too bumptiously, that would be a "long chance" to put much money upon. But let us be more specific. What powers could finance such an enormously expensive campaign? Would it be Russia? Russia has no money to lend, for one thing, and some who are weatherwise have even claimed that (at least until August, 1914) she was saving her pennies to retrieve her lost prestige of 1904. Would it be Germany? With the memory of Tsingtao in mind, that sounds like irony. Would it be England? The writer cannot conceive of any situation in which it would be possible, for no other nation in the world would lose quite so much by the humbling of the United States and its conquest by an Oriental power as England. The defeat of the United States at the hands of an Oriental power would mean the break-up of the British Empire. There is left France. But granting that France would care to oppose England as regards the Far East, her eggs are in the same basket with

Germany's. But all this is rather academic, men of straw whose knocking down merely rounds out the argument.

The second consideration mentioned above rests on the assumption that Japan could make a sudden raid, seize the coast, perhaps burn Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle, or hold them for ransom, and that the United States, helpless because unprepared, would be forced to pay a heavy indemnity in order to make the Japanese leave. Such a campaign, it is thought, would be comparatively inexpensive for Japan, and, if successful, might be very profitable. That the United States is wholly unprepared to resist invasion in force is of course well known. (We have omitted any consideration of the American fleet, which presumably might justify its existence.) Yet, granting everything, allowing that the Japanese expeditionary forces have landed at any of the many unprotected localities pointed out by the experts, what then? They would seize the towns, of course, but the coast states are mainly agricultural. Wealth is not concentrated as it is in industrial communities, and moreover the greater part of the country is rough and mountainous.

Any one who believes that the inhabitants of these Western states, whose fathers and grandfathers were the pioneers that subdued the wilderness a half century

ago, will meekly bow the head to the invader or that the nation as a whole would do so, has a singular conception of the spirit of the American people. These men and women are not Flemish peasants. Grant that our militia would be useless and the Japanese advance almost undisputed, yet in the mountains and in the districts away from the cities, there doubtless would ensue a protracted guerilla warfare that could last indefinitely, and the longer it lasted the worse off Japan would be. Past experience teaches that even savages can keep up an almost endless warfare of this sort and one that is very expensive for the invading force. Japan knows something about this from her twenty years' experience in trying to subdue the natives of Formosa. At any rate, the belief that because we have no large army to oppose a Japanese invasion, such an invasion would spell a quick victory and a prompt conclusion of hostilities with the levying of a crushing indemnity, is quite without justification. Moreover, the wealth of the four large cities named, even if all seized, would not be a drop in the bucket compared with the expenditures required to take it. The millionaires of Pasadena would not linger long to be captured. And the Japanese could not realize much more except by harvesting the crops on the ranches, which is their appointed task in times of peace. In short, the hope of a

sudden realization of profit would be doomed to failure, and Japan would be in for a long and ruinously expensive campaign.¹

The point is, not that Japan could not invade and conquer the coast states, but that, having done so, she could not stand the financial and economic strain of holding them for a long time under a necessarily military occupation. Hence if she realizes this, there will be no motive for her to attempt the enterprise.

The third consideration is one that has received more attention than any of the others. It is obvious that we could not protect the entire Philippine archipelago against invasion without the concentration of a very strong army there. Corregidor, high above the sea, might hold out for a long time, but in the end an attacking force would probably prevail. This, of course, on the assumption that it had the freedom of the sea, on account of the destruction of the American fleet. It has been pointed out, moreover, that Japan's policy, as exemplified in the Russian war, is to strike first and issue the declaration of war at her convenience.

There are some who feel that Americans, on the whole, would be glad to be rid of the Philippines, and would welcome any chance to transfer the responsibil-

¹ Ruinous because her American trade, and to a great extent the rest of her trade, would be automatically destroyed.

ities to another nation. This may be true, if it could be done in a legislative way, but to lose them in war, to have them taken by force, would be much more likely to rouse all the fighting blood in the American people and make them determined to keep the islands at all hazard; would, in fact, commit us irrevocably to the possession of them.

However, to continue our former assumption,—concede that Japan by a sudden *coup* captures the Philippines, which is a very probable contingency in the event of war. Concede, if you will, that the American fleet is destroyed so that we are helpless. Assume even that we have been forced to consent to an inglorious peace. Japan would then have achieved her design. She would be in undisputed possession of these treasure islands of the Pacific at the cost of a few broadsides. (Whether any European power would interfere at this stage is worthy of consideration, but we need not include such a contingency at present.)

Japan would then have on her hands a very large group of tropical islands with a decidedly mixed population. Some of the people are savage or part savage; some are fanatical Moros, and about 7,000,000, or one seventh of the population of Japan, are various sorts of Filipinos with a physical inheritance Malay, and a spiritual inheritance Spanish; that is to say, Ro-

man Catholic with a mediæval attitude toward the heathen.

Japan would find herself in essentially the same position in which we were at the close of the Spanish war. It took us three years of exasperating guerilla warfare before opposition to our presence finally disappeared. And how did we succeed at last? By killing off as many of the population as possible? Hardly; if that had been our policy, we should be doing it still. We only succeeded when we convinced the Filipinos that we were not there to exploit them. This is a truth that no one acquainted with the facts would think of denying. We have given of our best as only a very wealthy nation can. We have respected the religious prejudices of our new wards, whatever they were. In the personal relations we have treated them with unswerving honesty and fair dealing. In short, we have assumed an obligation of humanity, although not without the hope, perhaps, that our bread cast upon the Pacific might return after not too many days.

Now the obvious presumptions are against Japan playing that sort of a rôle. We have already commented¹ upon the peculiar difficulties that Japan would be called upon to face in the event of an occu-

¹ See page 103 ff.

pation of the archipelago. She would find all the population arrayed against the "heathen" invader, and in remote quarters which she could not hope to subdue. At once the old inter-tribal feuds would break out again. In short, anarchy would reign in the islands, mitigated here and there by military despotism. This sort of occupation would cost Japan as it did the United States.¹ Japanese statesmen might then begin to wonder when the profits came in. The potential wealth of the Philippines, as we have seen, is enormous; but it is only available under conditions of protracted peace. Metals, hardwoods, hemp, rubber,—these products are only translatable into money by peaceful commerce. The first gun fired at Manila would mean the total collapse of all the money-making machinery in the islands. Moreover, the development of commerce there waits upon the investment of large amounts of capital, that of which Japan herself is so greatly in need, and under any circumstances the wealth of a country is in the hands of the people who make it and it would be a generation before Japan as a nation could profit by occupying the Philippines. It would be much better business to let Uncle Sam make the investments and take

¹ In August, 1911, General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff, stated that "For the past ten or twelve years our army expense had been \$167,486,000 *in excess* of the cost of maintaining an army of similar size in this country."

the responsibilities and then to develop a peaceful commerce with the islands, as England does. On the whole, if Japanese statesmen have ever contemplated enriching their nation by seizing the Philippines, it would be well for them to carefully consider the debit side of the account.

The fourth consideration, that of seizing the islands for the purpose of turning them over to some other power, need not detain us. Any other power would have almost the same difficulty that has been just described. But more than this, the last thing in the world that Japan would seek would be to intrench a rival power in the Far East. America is for her innocuous, for America has never had nor ever will have any idea of territorial aggression in China. So far as Japan is concerned, American possession of the Philippines "neutralizes" them for her. This would not be the case with any other power. To make this clear — although it is the purest speculation of course — let us conceive of a situation in which the United States should be at war with another power. Just as was the case with Spain, we should be vulnerable to attack in the Philippines. We can believe that rather than permit any other power to take the Philippines from us, Japan would come to the rescue as an ally. For it is obviously so much to her advantage that we, rather than

a European nation, should hold the islands, that war might seem to her justifiable to prevent our possession of them being threatened.

But from the standpoint of national profit, there is another aspect of the case which must be included. It is not without significance that America is the only large nation that buys more of Japan than she sells. The declaration of war would put an end to this. What Japan makes of us as profit in a year (\$31,000,000 in 1913) practically pays the interest on her national debt abroad. With any other country her foreign trade might cease and, temporarily, Japan would be the gainer. This would not be true for the United States. The \$70,000,000 of silk and tea which she annually sells us would have to seek (in vain) another market. The American cotton which she requires in order to hold the Chinese market she would no longer have, and Indian cotton, if hostilities continued, would drive the Japanese from the Chinese field.

In all her foreign trade, which she has so sedulously cultivated for many years, equally hard conditions would obtain; for an inspection of Japan's foreign trade summaries reveals the interesting fact, that with the exception of China, the great bulk of her exports to other countries are luxuries and the great bulk of her imports are necessities. We are discovering now how the con-

fusion of war affects the business of so solvent a nation as the United States, far from any active campaigning. How much more devastating for Japan would be the effect of a war with a nation with which she is so intimately and dependently connected, as the United States; always keeping in mind, of course, that the original premise was based upon the idea that such a war would be profitable.

So far, in order not to complicate the argument, we have omitted the consideration of two factors which should not be ignored. First of these is the United States fleet which, now that the Panama canal is completed, should be an additional hazard to be taken into account by Japan if she contemplates hostility. Secondly, we have dealt with only the two nations, Japan and ourselves. The first of these we need not consider otherwise than to mention it, since we are not concerned so much with the probable course of a conflict as with the question whether Japan will bring on such a conflict, and the American fleet figures in such a discussion only to the extent to which it enters into the calculations of the Japanese. As to this we know nothing. It is likely, however, that other considerations should be much more of a deterrent than the opposition of a fleet which is subject always to the possibility of elimination by defeat. The second point is more significant.

It is difficult, almost impossible, to conceive of such a conflict being limited to the two powers primarily involved. Just as in Europe, the declaration of war upon Servia by Austria brought the whole house of cards tumbling down, so in a very different way does the Pacific situation involve much more than Japan and the United States.

We may decry racial antagonism as much as we please. It remains an historical fact that has been the cause of much woe to empire builders who have ignored it. Those who have traveled about the earth and who have the leisure and opportunity to read and observe may reflect that men are pretty much alike the world over, that the good and evil in different races balance off rather well and that criticism of a foreigner's characteristics is bad taste in one who realizes by comparison the faults in his own kind. But the mass of the population in any country, imbred and provincial, whose whole energy is exerted in gaining a hard living, whose prejudices become elevated into precepts, and whose peculiarities are exalted to virtues, to such as these, a genial cosmopolitanism is denied. Toward the stranger they have the instinctive antipathy of the street dog toward the stray cur who has wandered out of his usual orbit.

Race prejudice is an evil, and we should strive by

every possible means to eradicate it, for our own sake. But we cannot ignore it. It is a state of mind, if you like, without material reason for being, but we cannot cure it, as we can some personal disorders, by ceasing to think about it.

Now to any one who examines the facts, the most striking characteristic of the white peoples that inhabit the lands bordering the Pacific is their instinct of racial solidarity against the Oriental. I should not call it enmity, for it is, as a rule, impersonal. At bottom, the difficulty is an economic one, and for that reason so fundamental that it transcends the artificial divisions of nationalism.

When Japan fought Russia, Germany and France did not view the situation with equanimity, although they did not interfere, partly because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and partly because the battlefield was many thousand miles away. Like China, Japan has profited by the mutual jealousies of the "Powers," and the reluctance of any of them to offer a lead to any other.

But should Japan declare war against the United States, particularly on the plan so often discussed in this country, the situation from the European standpoint would be very much graver. Were the antagonist any other than an Oriental one, we may well believe

that a good many European nations would view the thorough trouncing of the United States with complacency. But the defeat of any leading Occidental power by Japan would be a calamity from the standpoint of any nation in Europe. England would without doubt be given the immediate alternative of renouncing the Japanese alliance or of losing Canada and Australia from the Empire. At any rate it is inconceivable that England should be anything but neutral in a matter in which her own self-interest would be so much concerned. But with England neutral, that is, with Japan deprived of the backing of the English alliance, both Russia and Germany would appear on the scene of continental Asia, the one with keen recollections of Port Arthur and Dalny and the other with equally keen remembrance of Kiao-Chau, and both ready to seize the long-deferred chance to secure themselves in China by evicting the Japanese.

Japan would find herself isolated, beggared, and with all the delicate structure of her new and hardly won economic development crumbling to ruins about her. In the midst of a world of enemies, she would fight on, no doubt, indefinitely. For there are no braver folk on earth, no more steadfast and loyal to their own, than the fifty million stout-hearted people who fill the islands of the Japanese Empire. But is it very reasonable

that she should deliberately bring on all this, in the belief that she would profit thereby?

There are some¹ who grant that there is no immediate danger of conflict on the Pacific, but who, taking a long-range view, looking down the vista of the twentieth century, foresee certain trouble from the very fact that two strong powers are bound to rub elbows with one another in the Pacific.

It is very difficult to conceive of what the next two decades will bring forth in any part of the world. The political writer who, by drawing on his imagination, should have attempted fifty years ago to describe the war of 1914, with its submarines and its *aéroplanes*, its siege howitzers and its wireless telegraphy, yes, even its automobiles and bicycles, would have been laughed into oblivion as a Jules Verne without the saving grace of probability. Any writer of 1815 who should have attempted to foresee the probable relations that would exist between England and the United States at the end of the century would have been wide of the mark in just the degree to which he should have based his predictions upon actual knowledge of current history of that time and an understanding of the trend of the past.

The belief that conflict is sure to come in the course of time is a vicious one; illogical because based upon

¹ Mr. Mann is apparently of this group. See page 2.

no data that may be relevant to the future and impolitic because a persistent fear stimulates the feeling of reprisal and aggression.

We owe a duty to our grandchildren not to place difficulties in their way by inconsiderate action now, and naturally, we should shape our present course with as intelligent an appreciation of future conditions as is possible to get, but after all, instead of a policy based upon specific conditions that may, or may not, come to pass, our best legacy to posterity will be the record of foreign relations carried on as successful business is carried on between individuals, that is, based upon common honesty and the recognition of the rights of others.

CHAPTER VIII

JAPAN'S DILEMMA

WE have already noted the small amount of arable land in Japan proper. A yearly gross increase in the population of 682,000 creates a problem that is difficult of solution. It is nearly the number of all the factory operatives in the country. In other words, the agricultural limit has been nearly reached on the one hand, and on the other, no imaginable development of industrialism can provide work indefinitely for so many new hands. Migration seems to be the only relief, and the internal pressure of population will seek a vent at any possible outlet. This contingency is perhaps not now so imminent as might be thought, since large areas in the Hokkaidō are but sparsely inhabited. These northern provinces are fertile, but the winters are severe and they will not accommodate many extra millions. Sooner or later the pressure of population will be felt throughout the Empire.

A glance at the map of the Pacific will reveal the possibilities for Japanese emigration. Beginning with Alaska, except for the break of British Columbia, the

Pacific is bordered by the territories of the United States down to the thirty-second parallel. Then comes Mexico, Central and South America; next Australia, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines; then China proper, lastly Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia.

We may as well disregard the idea of extensive Japanese colonization of North America or Australia, at least for the present. China is over-populated already. Siberia is out of the question, for the Japanese is not the type of the hardy pioneer. The Philippines we have already considered. There is left South America and the adjacent Orient.

Brazil, Peru, and Chile, it is understood, have made overtures looking to Japanese colonization. They would be welcomed in those scantily settled regions as they would not be in more northern states. A Japanese steamship line connects Japan with South America, and it may be that sometime in the future we shall see a considerable immigration into the more temperate parts of the southern continent.

Brazil, seeking cheap labor to develop her industries, has made great concessions both to Germany and to Japan. As a result of the former there is a thriving German colony in the South American republic. Brazil is said to have offered a free grant to Japan of 122,500 acres in São Paulo, with the privilege of buying more,

and free transportation for the emigrants. It is officially stated that the Japanese population in Brazil is but 10,000, but it is claimed that two or three times that number are under contract on the coffee plantations.

Peru, like Brazil, has welcomed the Japanese and made similar concessions to them. There are probably many more in Peru than in Brazil, and they appear to have adapted themselves very well.

Mexico in turn has tried to turn some of the tide her way, but the political conditions in Mexico have sufficed to greatly restrict such emigration.

But South America, particularly its eastern portion, is many thousands of miles from Japan, and connection with the northern country would always be rather tenuous for Oriental colonists there. Moreover, it is the avowed policy (as well as the logical policy) of the government to direct Japanese immigration toward adjacent territory rather than to distant parts of the earth. Not only are perplexing social and economic problems incident to contact with wholly alien races thus avoided, but the colonizing Japanese are thereby concentrated and occupy the new territory far more effectively than they would if scattered to the ends of the earth. This is of particular significance in the practical occupation of the sparsely settled province of South Manchuria.

When we come to the Orient, Formosa at once claims attention. But Formosa has proven an unexpected problem for Japan. This island, ceded to her as a prize of war at the conclusion of the struggle with China, has many of the superficial aspects of the Philippines. Its area is about 15,000 square miles, but it is very mountainous and wild and its population is made up of a number of fierce and uncivilized tribes who are constantly at war. The climate is hot and the Japanese cannot endure labor in the open, as can the Chinese and hillmen. As a consequence, they mostly congregate in the coast cities. Every effort has been made by the central government to stimulate colonization and induce Japanese to migrate to Formosa, but in spite of subsidies and financial aids of all sorts, in the twenty years during which the island has been in the possession of Japan, less than 100,000 Japanese have been induced to settle there, amid three and a half million aborigines and Chinese.¹ The prospect of any considerable percentage of surplus population overflowing into Formosa or any other part of the tropics does not seem bright.

¹ In 1912 some 1750 farmers in family groups were assisted by the government at a cost of \$200,000. These are settled in communities, about sixty families to a village, the paternal government furnishing houses and medical and educational facilities. Each family, however, had to have \$100 capital.

Manchuria and Korea, on the other hand, are much more favorably situated. Either is accessible now, within a few hours' steamer and rail journey from Japan.

Korea is the natural outlet for Japan, and since its annexation in 1911, the way has been cleared for extensive immigration. The area of Korea is 86,000 square miles and the Korean population (1912) is 14,566,783, or about 173 to the square mile. Comparing this with Japan or China, it will be seen that there is room for many Japanese, in spite of the 40,000,000 acres of forests and mountains in the peninsula. As a matter of fact, there were probably not more than 50,000 Japanese in Korea ten years ago, whereas there are now more than 200,000. As a Japanese publicist puts it: "Each square mile in Japan has contributed six persons to each square mile in Korea."

Rice, soy beans, and barley are grown in Korea, and there may be a future for upland cotton, which would be an important factor in the development of Japanese industry. Silk is also an important product. But the most striking feature of Korea is the opportunity it affords for stock raising. If the Japanese can break away from their conventional point of view, and, instead of producing a scant crop of rice at the expense of infinite labor, devote themselves to the raising

of cattle and hogs, without doubt they can develop a source of wealth in Korea beside which the gold mines would be insignificant. For the Japanese have a fondness for beef, and if it were made cheaper, it would be of vast benefit to the nation to introduce it more extensively into the national diet. The by-products would also be made use of as effectively as they are in America. On the other hand, the Chinese are fond of pork, and hogs raised on the farms and pastures of Korea would find a ready market near at hand. The fisheries also provide a maintenance for great numbers of Japanese. On the whole, Korea affords a congenial and remunerative field for Japanese expansion. Emigrants cannot make money so fast, nor so easily there, as they can in California, but their settling stirs up no new sources of trouble. The native Korean must accommodate himself as best he can.

Japan had a foothold in Manchuria before Korea was definitely annexed, and of course annexation could never have been accomplished so long as Russian influence was all powerful in Manchuria. There is little likelihood that Japan will relinquish what of the latter province she holds, and the more she can settle her citizens there, the stronger will be her claim to the whole south province. The problem is a somewhat difficult one, however, and one fraught with peculiar dangers.

To those who have been accustomed to consider Manchuria as a part of China (as it still is in diplomatic fiction) a comparison of the relative density of population between this province and the other eighteen provinces of China is startling. The area of China proper is 1,588,000 square miles,¹ with an estimated population of 407,518,750; that is, a concentration of 256 per square mile throughout the Empire. The concentration in the populous coastal provinces, however, is double that. (The concentration in Japan is 342 per square mile, exceeded only by Great Britain and Belgium.) Manchuria has an area of 376,800 square miles and a population (before the Russian war) of 8,500,000. This represents a concentration of 22½ per square mile, about equal to that of Kansas and much less than that of Minnesota and Wisconsin. The almost untouched natural resources and the agricultural possibilities of this country are sufficient to support a population many times greater than the present one, so long as peace is maintained and industry encouraged. Here would seem to be a natural outlet for Japan's surplus population, and indeed, since the Russian war, the national government has made every endeavor to induce an immigration to South Manchuria, now under

¹ These figures are from L. Richard, "Geographie de l'Empire de Chine."

Japanese control. The stimulus of subsidized railways and steamship lines, of freight and customs rebates, and even less justifiable means have been used in the aid of Japanese immigrants.

One reason for the scanty population of Manchuria, previous to the building of the railway, was the existence of wandering brigands, "Hunghuntzies," who terrorized the country. The new government of the Japanese is stable, if arbitrary,¹ and under its ægis, Chinese are attracted as well as Japanese. This may be an advantage or otherwise to the Japanese, according to circumstances. If the Chinese supply the unskilled labor necessary to develop the resources of the country and are amenable to Japanese control, it may work out to the great advantage of the latter settlers, who would thus have the prestige and the profits of employers, instead of being employees. If, on the contrary, the Chinese assume the position of rivals in commerce and industry, it may not work out that way, for it is not at all certain that as rivals in the same field the more mercurial Japanese is a match for the keen and industrious Chinese.

¹ The actual legitimate control in the hands of the Japanese is confined to the Kuantung district, in which Port Arthur is situated, and the regions contiguous to the railway, its branches, and the mines. This, however, very effectively dominates the province.

We have already mentioned a well-known rule in theoretical finance termed Gresham's law, the essence of which is that in a given locality a baser or cheaper metal coinage will drive out of circulation the more valuable. An economist has attempted recently to apply this law to competing races in the Hawaiian Islands and claims to have found the same sort of effect,—“cheap” labor displacing higher priced labor.

It will be of much interest to watch the interplay of racial influences in Manchuria from this standpoint. Before the Russians came, stable government seems hardly to have existed outside the large cities, and, of course, where the economic motive was lacking, settlers stayed away. The Russians not only brought order but stimulated industry very greatly by the construction of the railway, the fiat city of Dalny, the works of Port Arthur, etc. This stimulation was artificial and was bound to have come to a natural end soon if the rapid progress of events had not brought it to an abrupt close by war. The Chinese, however, profited greatly by this régime. They migrated into Manchuria from Shantung and other provinces, and as the Russians paid good wages and were absolutely dependent upon this sort of labor for the carrying out of their plans, things were in a very satisfactory state from the standpoint of the Chinese. A peaceful rule

of the country, even if in the hands of foreigners, offered every advantage for permanent settlers, and the Chinese part of the population increased correspondingly.

The war, of course, upset things considerably, and for a year or so after the Peace of Portsmouth the Japanese had everything their own way. But even the army men understood that there was no final advantage in maintaining a military rule in a country whose only use was as a field for commercial exploitation. And with the withdrawal of the troops and the establishment of civil law again, the Chinese once more began to settle down. It makes no practical difference to a Chinaman whether Manchuria, on the map, be Russian, Japanese, or Chinese, so long as he is allowed to take his profit in peace,¹ and it cannot be too often repeated that for Manchuria to be ceded to Japan entirely would avail the latter country little, so long as there were more Chinese than Japanese in the province, or so long as those Chinese that are there are able to compete to advantage with the Japanese. For Japan to attempt to exclude Chinese from Manchuria,

¹It is true that in the throes of the "rights-recovery" fever a few years ago the Chinese made the occupation of Manchuria one of the grounds of the great anti-Japanese boycott, yet this agitation was most conspicuous in Canton, far away. Your Shantung Chinaman is a practical man, taking the world as he finds it.

as they are excluded from America, would be practically impossible, but if they continue to settle in this region in the future as they have in the past, one of two things must happen if Japan is to reap any advantage from the possession of the province. Either more Japanese settlers must enter the province than Chinese or else those that are there must prove themselves more efficient and more successful than the Chinese. The latter alternative is very unlikely. The former is the problem that faces the government of Japan today.

In her continental ambitions, Japan has two serious obstacles to overcome, apart from the natural reluctance of her people to uproot themselves and settle in a new country, as pawns in the great game of higher politics. One of these is the opposition of China herself, and the other is that of the European powers, Russia, Germany, England, and France, who for many years have attempted to sap their way into the territory of China, dismember that country, and distribute the pieces among themselves. As Japan looks to China for her own future market, such an eventuality would probably be disastrous to her interests. On the other hand, any encroachment upon Chinese territory on the part of Japan brings that nation into rivalry with the European Powers. In the keen diplomatic

contest that has been waged in Peking for many years, the Japanese have played their part with skill, and when fortune and an audacious opportunism carried Russia down into Manchuria in the early years of the century, with the likelihood of dominating Peking and the certainty of dominating Seoul, Japan did not hesitate to change the game from a diplomatic to a military one. It was because Russia utterly failed to understand Japan's real interests and because Alexieff could not believe that she was not "bluffing" that the Russians allowed themselves to be dragged into that unfortunate and unpopular war.

But Russia has not been the only rival of Japan in China. England, so long as she feared the Russian bear, deluded herself with the notion that she was protecting her interests in Asia by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In reality it was Japan that profited most, since by tying the hands of England she eliminated, temporarily, another rival. For the natural interests of Great Britain—her national instinct, one might say—places her in the opposition to Japan in all that concerns China. England's trade along the China coast led all the rest until very recently, and it has chiefly been her partner in the alliance that has played the successful rival and reduced the relative importance of that trade. No one can say what results will follow

the conclusion of the Great European war. It is doubtful, however, if Russia is ever again the bugaboo to England that she has been in the past, and if that is so, then the chief motive on England's part for maintaining the Japanese alliance will disappear, and her own interests, as well as the pressure which Canada and Australia will exert, will force her into the other camp. For the time being, however, her hands are tied and the recent retrocession of Wei-hai-wei to China eliminates her from further participation in the dismemberment of that unhappy country.

The third dangerous rival has also but lately been eliminated. This is Germany. Germany's activities in East Asia have been so startling in their crude aggressiveness, her frank contempt for the Oriental and his institutions, and has seemed so likely to make future trouble, that the "Peace of Asia" seems a great deal nearer realization now that Kiao-Chau has been captured by the Japanese. German trade threatened a serious rivalry to Japan's, and this fact, in addition to the strong influence that Germany exerted toward the dismemberment of China, made it highly advantageous to Japan that this power be eliminated from the stage of Far Eastern politics. Japanese have not forgotten, either, that it was Germany who in 1895 led the coalition of the Powers that checkmated Japan's first move in the game.

What Japan will do with Kiao-Chau is a question that may be foolish to speculate upon at the present writing. Probably Japan herself does not know very definitely. It is unlikely, however, that she will give the district back to China, preferring rather to consider herself the heir of the ninety-nine-year lease granted to Germany. Port Arthur is of course a precedent for such a stand. Shantung, however, is too full of Chinese to be much of a field for Japanese colonization. The actual possession of the province would entail heavy expense without any corresponding profit, and it will doubtless appear to the Japanese officials that eventually more is to be gained by using it as a pledge to exact some other *quid pro quo* from China than by indefinitely retaining it. The same consideration would prevent Japan from ever conquering or controlling to any extent any of the populous provinces of China proper. The possibilities lying before such an enterprise would be such as to daunt the boldest gambler in Japanese politics.

The partition of China, therefore, has become, in recent years, an apparently remote contingency (unless Japan herself essays the task), and England, Germany, and Russia no longer threaten Japan's dominance by territorial possession.

But China herself is a factor that must be considered.

This huge unwieldy nation has undergone some startling changes within recent years. Some of these changes may be more superficial than the casual American might believe. The individual Chinaman, except for a haircut, is doubtless much the same sort of a man that he used to be. But one transforming change has been working in the Middle Kingdom that cannot be undone and is of profound significance. The Chinese within the last decade have discovered themselves, in other words have developed a national self-consciousness that previously did not exist. The opening up of communications in the form of railways, posts, and telegraphs, on the one hand, and the development of a vernacular press to publish and distribute the news of Asia and the world, on the other hand, have combined to transform a group of detached provinces with practically nothing in common but their ancestry and their ignorance of one another into a unified nation.

In the past, South China has been indifferent to what European Powers were doing in North China. Nowadays, the inhabitants of remote parts of the Empire are keenly alive to any such encroachments and, furthermore, a vigorous "rights-recovery" agitation has been set going, the purpose of which is to retrieve the losses of the past. This movement is patriotic, however unwise it may be.

Naturally the new spirit in China does not look with any too much favor upon Japan's activities in Manchuria, nor, it may be added, in Shantung either. What China wants is for Japan to keep out of Chinese territory (including Manchuria) altogether. Japan's "manifest destiny," to say nothing of her pressing necessity, on account of the pressure of population, is to do otherwise. And as Japan has the army and navy, there is not much doubt which contention will prevail. Yet complete success would likely be a Pyrrhic victory for her, since the motive for her whole national policy is the development of an industrial system with particular reference to the markets of China. And it is self-evident that profitable trade can hardly be forced at the point of a gun.

China is an adept at "playing both ends against the middle" and setting rival powers by the ears. Her safety in the past lay in the number of her enemies. For the moment, Japan is alone and mistress of the situation, but no one knows how long this will last. She may have to pay for her temerity, and it is the fear of such retaliation that makes her so feverishly pile up her armaments, with no enemy in sight. More than this, the apparent calm of political conditions in China is notoriously deceptive. Any day an explosion may occur that will throw that nation into chaos. In such

an event, Japanese intervention would be a foregone conclusion, if only to prevent the worse alternative of European intervention.

We are now in a position to appreciate the dilemma in which Japanese statesmen find themselves. On the one hand, confronted with the absolute necessity of transforming their nation from an agricultural into an industrial commonwealth; on the other hand, faced with the necessity of finding an outlet for a surplus population that increases at the rate of three quarters of a million a year. In seeking such an outlet they find themselves excluded from the greater part of the earth's surface and in the most likely quarter, confronted with rivals and powerful opponents. To contend with the latter they must spend the bulk of their revenues for unproductive war machinery instead of putting them into profitable industrial machinery. This impoverishes the people and necessitates huge foreign loans. It is a vicious circle and there seems no stopping place. It might appear as if every penny of revenue were already extracted from a long-suffering people. Yet one more asset remains. The standing of Japanese bonds indicates that the borrowing power of the nation has been nearly reached. If the Manchurian-Korean situation demands more expenditure still, then the only way that any considerable amount of money could be

raised abroad would be to hypothecate national assets such as some of the monopolies, or the customs, and this would be the beginning of the end of Japan, as a first-class power.

American readers, it is hoped, will appreciate that Japan's armaments are necessitated by her interests in continental Asia and that to use them in another quarter (*i.e.* against the United States) would be to incite attack in the very place in which she is most vulnerable and which is of the most consequence to her.

Is there a way out for Japan and the rest of the world? Will the nations ever learn that the attempt to grab everything in sight simply to prevent another from grabbing leads to complicated ruin? We insist upon the Monroe Doctrine for America. Why not for Japan in Asia? The cautious engineer provides a safety valve for his own protection, not primarily for that of his boiler. Why not provide a safety valve for Japan and help our own peace of mind?

When dreams do not come out right, we sometimes fall asleep again and dream them over. But we cannot roll back the carpet of history. Asia can never again be what it was before the Cassini convention. Korea is a part of Japan now and South Manchuria is under her control. Let us accept the situation. China may well heed Japan's contention that she took them, not

from her, but from Russia, against whom the former was helpless. Japan's needs for expansion are real and obvious. Manchuria and Korea could hold the double of the Japanese population. Why try to "head her off"? They are her safety valve. If the stream flows that way, it will not flow to us, nor to Canada and Australia. If Japan does not fear aggression in Asia nor opposition in her natural trends, she need not break her back with the enormous burden of armament and she therefore may be able to build up her industrial system as she wishes to. If she could do so, and could become strong and wealthy, instead of impoverished and debt-burdened, it would profit Russia more, and Germany and England more, than if any of these countries "owned" or administered any territory in East Asia. For a wealthy Japan means a bigger market for European and American goods, and a Japan impoverished by the necessities of armed defense means the loss of such a market. Why, then, cannot the white nations profit themselves by assisting, instead of trying to block, Japan? For this seems to be the way out for her and for us.

Summary

Japan, with a rapidly increasing population, has nearly reached the limit in the home country. In-

ternal pressure of population and the expanding energy of the people forced her to seek an outlet. Racial opposition, dense population, or climatic conditions limit the field of such expansion, except in the contiguous territories of Korea and Manchuria. In these provinces, however, Japan has encountered the antagonism both of China and of various European Powers intent upon territorial aggrandizement. In order to control the situation, Japan has been compelled to fight two wars and build up an expensive military equipment that is breaking her down financially. So long as other nations threaten Japan's natural expansion, she will be compelled to maintain this armed preparedness. In the writer's opinion it would profit the other Powers' selfish interest to no longer oppose this movement, on the ground that a solvent Japan is of more value to them than a bankrupt Japan. Japan's future commercial prosperity depends upon the integrity of China and her interests in that quarter are consonant with those of America. We need not fear that Japan will ever permanently control China proper, even as the result of a successful war. There are too many Chinese, and it would be too expensive an undertaking.

CHAPTER IX

THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST

IN the previous chapter the Monroe Doctrine was mentioned. As this is a subject that touches America very nearly it may be profitable to examine it in more detail.

The United States until very recently can hardly claim to have had a foreign policy, in the European sense. The isolation of America, due to the two oceans that wash her shores, has rendered unnecessary the careful consideration of "policy" required of the states of Europe whose alien peoples are separated almost entirely by artificial boundaries. Moreover, there have been in America no dynastic houses the perpetuation and aggrandizement of which would have been the occasion for the formulation of "policies" unconnected with the economic needs of the people.

In Washington's famous "Farewell Address" he warned us to beware of "entangling alliances" and we have followed that injunction very literally. Whether we can continue this policy much longer is very doubtful since our national interests are now no longer confined to the New World and our former isolation is now gone.

On the other hand, the American people and their leaders have cherished one dogma with a reverence that has been at times the source of much irritation to Europe. This is the famous Monroe Doctrine.

After Napoleon had been finally disposed of at Waterloo, a reaction set in in Europe that aroused great fear in the hearts of American statesmen,—a fear that was only too well justified. For the "Holy Alliance" of Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and Spain was organized with the avowed purpose of rooting out, once and for all, the growth of democratic ideas that had made such headway in Europe during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The weak and struggling republic of the United States had every reason to fear this combination, for one of the objects of the alliance was to retrieve its waning influence in the New World, to restore to Spain the control over her revolted American colonies, to get back for France the great territories in the northern continent that had passed from her hands, and in particular to block off any further expansion of the United States. And in spite of the fact that the liberal tendencies of Great Britain forbade her to join the Holy Alliance the people of the United States had been in conflict with that nation so recently that they feared her most of all.

The Spanish colonies of South America had taken ad-

vantage of the collapse of Spanish power to free themselves from her tyranny. And the North Americans, so lately become independent, could not help but look with friendly sympathy upon these newer states, founded on democratic principles and modeled, externally at least, after their own government.

Thus the New World, from the standpoint of ideals, was sharply opposed to Europe; the one, the center of democracy; the other, the focus of reactionism and abolition. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was, in fact, the expression of the instinct of self-preservation, than which, we are taught, there is no higher law.

The events of the first half of the nineteenth century amply justified this point of view. The Spanish claims to the whole Pacific Coast and their refusal to cede Florida to the United States although themselves unable to control that province, the English claims to the Northwest, the startlingly rapid extension of Russian influence in the same region,¹ the encroachment of all the European Powers upon the Latin-American states, which culminated in the attempt of the French to seat the Austrian Maximilian, as Emperor, upon the throne of Mexico,— such a succession of incidents might well in-

¹ In 1821, the Russian government forbade any foreign vessel to approach within 100 miles of the west coast of America down to the 51st degree of latitude.

spire fear in the youthful republic. It is not too much to say that the energetic pretensions of the United States prevented both South and North America from being portioned out among the powers of Europe as Africa has been and as Asia is likely to be. And this, in spite of the fact that it has been the menace of England rather than our own prowess that has deterred the Continental powers.

The Monroe Doctrine has been thus a most significant factor in our short national life. Even if we should assume that our great territorial expansion was not absolutely necessary, that the American people might have worked out their salvation in a territory limited, let us say, by the Mississippi River, more intensively but equally successfully, it would still remain true that had the rest of the continent been the scene of the schemings and dickering of European powers, with "spheres of influence" and a finely adjusted "balance of power" the nature of that destiny would have been very different. The possibility of conflict on our borders would have necessitated a large army, and the presence of many alien powers would have compelled international relations and obligations from which, happily, we have been free. Americans have done well to give the Monroe Doctrine the place it has in our estimation, notwithstanding the United States is no longer weak and that she has little to fear nowadays from European aggression.

In later years the demand of this country has been, in substance, that the rest of the world should recognize both American continents as her "sphere of influence" in that foreign powers shall not be permitted to acquire any part of the New World as vassal territory nor even to attempt armed intervention. The Monroe Doctrine has never been accepted by any European government except very recently by England and it is probable that it would have been challenged in war ere this had not the mutual jealousies of the challenging powers, notably Germany and England, acted as a restraint upon one another.

Asia for the Asiatics

From the standpoint of modern (European) civilization America and Japan are the newest nations and in their relations with the older peoples of Europe whose culture has in varying degree been transmitted to both of them, they share many problems in common. Each is the dominant economic and military power in a large area of the earth's surface. Each is the object of the thinly veiled jealousy of the "Powers" of Europe.

Moreover, the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese is strikingly like that of the Latin-Americans toward the people of the United States: a blending of respect for acknowledged power, on the one hand, and

contempt and personal aversion on the other, due to fundamental differences in race and national traditions. Now the Monroe Doctrine, as has been said, is far from being an unselfish policy, although as a matter of fact it has been administered in a very altruistic spirit. The North American has no particularly brotherly interest in the Latin-American. Primarily for the former the policy is one of self-protection; secondarily it is based on the belief that the preservation of the national existence of these weaker sister states will be ultimately of greater advantage to us than would be the case if they became provinces of some European power.

Precisely the same considerations hold with respect to China from the standpoint of Japan. The "break-up of China" and the parceling out of her provinces among the European Powers, which seemed so imminent fifteen years ago, threatens the same danger to Japan that a similar parceling out of America would have threatened to the United States seventy-five years ago. The latter met it with the threat or bluff of the Monroe Doctrine which, fortunately, she so far has never had to back up by force; Japan has had to defend her interests twice by arms, first in the Russian war of 1904 and latterly in the Tsingtao chapter of the great European war. It may be urged that in both cases Japan has substituted herself for the European aggressor and that her policy has been

one of aggrandizement. This is to a certain degree true, but we must not pass too hasty a judgment. In fact, without any intention of extending our own domain by conquest, we have done precisely the same thing in the Philippines. Nor can we justly claim an analogy between Japan's occupancy of South Manchuria and her latest activity in Shantung. There is little in common between Manchuria and Shantung. The former was a sparsely settled province of which China was merely the nominal owner. The Russians, and after them the Japanese, occupied it as Americans occupied California and annexed it for the same reason. Shantung is in a different category. No foreign nation can ever effectively *occupy* that province. There are too many Chinamen there. What Japan has done is to displace the European, and this was a vital matter to her. Russia's activity just prior to the war of 1904, her intrigues, evasions, and dilly-dallying with Japan, particularly her obvious designs in Masamphō, left no doubt in any one's mind what fate Japan was to expect. Since Russia's "set-back," Germany's activities in the Orient have been directed toward the same end. After the retrocession of Port Arthur, Japan would have been blind indeed to have failed to see the consequences to her of Germany's avowed policy in the Orient.

The land-hungry European has been a real menace

to Japan's existence as an Oriental power. Since China has been impotent to protect herself, it has fallen to Japan's lot to come to her rescue,—not, be it understood, from altruistic concern for China, but as a matter of self-interest and protection for herself.

The American with his nation's history in mind and the importance which he himself attaches to the Monroe Doctrine ought to be able to keenly appreciate Japan's position in this difficulty and to sympathize with her as a European might not be expected to do. Rightly or wrongly, we believe that much of our national success has been due to our insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine. Believers, as we are, in the principle of "Live and let live," shall we not grant to Japan in her greater difficulty the same freedom that we have demanded for ourselves?

But the question is more than an academic one. There are many people in this country who admire Japan and wish her well. But such an appeal can hardly be made to the majority of Americans, particularly to the many to whom Japan looms only as a threatening bugaboo. To such it should be brought home that our own self-interest demands that we recognize her claim of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. National policies are and should be those of enlightened selfishness. A business man who may dispose of his own wealth as he sees fit

is bound to safeguard to the extreme the property of which he is a trustee. Statesmen and governments are the trustees of a nation and particularly of that nation's future generations. We must consider whether it is for our future advantage or disadvantage that Japan should be supported in her contention.

It reduces to the question of whether it would be to our own advantage or contrariwise that China should be the scene of the pulling and hauling diplomacy so conspicuously the feature of the past two decades' history, or whether we should profit most by the elimination of the European Powers (Russia, England, Germany, and France) from political control of Chinese territory and interference in Chinese politics.

We, in this country, wish peace in the Pacific and its shores. We wish to find the greatest possible market for our goods in both Japan and China. We have seen something of the present status of the Oriental trade. We have seen that the greatest current market at present is for cotton manufactures; secondly, for such goods as matches, umbrellas, cigarettes, lamps, oil, etc., the use of which is easily acquired and is increasing in China. In the third rank are the manufactures, the use of which will have to be acquired by the Chinese as their scale of living changes,—such things as sewing machines, electrical appliances, scientific instruments, phonographs,

household conveniences, plumbing supplies. We may add structural iron and railway equipment.

The market for these at present is embryonic. Now, of the first class, that of cotton yarns and cloths, Japanese goods are attaining a startlingly rapid ascendancy in the Chinese markets. Neither Europe nor America can hope to compete with Japanese cotton mills, employing work girls at fifteen cents a day and running nineteen to twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four.¹ But, as we have seen, Japan depends to a great extent upon American raw cotton to supply this market, since a certain admixture is necessary to bring her product to the proper standard. In other words, since the Chinese customer demands the best he can afford, if Japan should attempt to do without American raw cotton, depending upon that from China and India, then her control of the market would pass. Here, therefore, Japan's success is really America's joint-profit and Europe does not count.

In the second class, all essentially cheap articles, it is likely that with the exception of kerosene oil the trade will also tend to settle into Japan's hands, although in this case in certain lines her competition may come from Europe. Oil we shall doubtless continue to supply.

It is in the third group of manufactures that American industry has its greatest opportunity. The product of

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, Spec. Agt. Rept. 86, p. 186, 1914.

American workshops, employing the highest grade of skilled labor, need not fear competition from the Japanese, at least not for many years to come. There is every reason to believe that the Chinese demand for such products will grow apace. *Our competitors here, however, will be Germany, England, and France.* Again we find our interests are not threatened by Japan, but by those powers that have tried to establish a control over large portions of Chinese territory, and have been opposed by Japan in that attempt.

Commercially, therefore, and from the standpoint of strict national selfishness, it is to our advantage to keep Europe out of East Asia, which involves the acceptance of Japanese dominance in Far Eastern affairs. Every consideration points to a community of interest between America and Japan with reference to the development of China's trade, provided only that Japan does not make the mistake of attempting to monopolize the whole trade.

Such a policy on her part, the attempted closing of the "Open Door," in other words, in the long run would prove fatal to her best interests, for it would not only alienate American sympathy, which is very valuable to her, but would stifle or at least delay China's own development, and this would be likewise a disadvantage to her. The greater purchasing power that China de-

velops, the more goods Japan can sell to her, and the development of this purchasing power is dependent upon foreign capital which Japan is unable to furnish and which would not likely be furnished by any other power, if Japan should seize political control.

The Monroe Doctrine has been in the past an unacceptable thesis to the states of Europe. But in 1903 Great Britain accepted it "unreservedly." Without doubt her motives were not entirely unselfish. She was very willing to block Germany from acquiring a large slice of South America, which has been the avowed intention of the latter. But on the other hand, while thus protecting herself, she has greatly profited by the kindly feeling and the more intimate relations that have developed between herself and America. May we not take a leaf out of the same book? If we accept the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" with respect to continental Asia, we shall not only regain the good will of Japan and the advantages of closer and more friendly intercourse, but on the other hand we shall profit ourselves by assisting in blocking off European aggression (passively, of course, but none the less effectively) and keeping the Chinese market open to our own trade. Indeed we might even make the firm establishment of the "Open Door" a *quid pro quo* in exchange for such acknowledgment.

To repeat, our real competitor in the Chinese market is Europe, not Japan. Nothing could suit Europe's purpose better than to divert American sentiment from this essential point by stimulating antagonistic feeling between the Japanese and ourselves. We have a strategic advantage over Europe in the contest for the trade of the Pacific. It remains to be seen whether we shall be fools enough to waste our opportunity antagonizing Japan instead of dividing the field with her.

CHAPTER X

SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE

THE writer has no intention of plunging into prophecy. He has seen too many prophets in Far Eastern matters covered with confusion by the real progress of events, to have much faith in his own conjectures. Prophecy, except at long range, is a precarious pastime, in any quarter of the globe. But prophecy in Oriental politics should be left to the trained writer of romances.

Yet we must concede it to be a matter of momentous significance, that the decisions which America shall be called upon to make in the near future, as to her Oriental policy, shall be wise decisions; that they shall be based upon all the knowledge available regarding this part of the world and our place in it, and that they shall be illuminated by the light of justice and fair-dealing which lies back of any ultimately successful diplomacy. Many of us as schoolboys learned the stirring oration of Patrick Henry in which occurs the phrase: "I have no light to guide my footsteps save the lamp of experience." We may well ask what our own brief history has to teach us regarding our Oriental policy, and with what measure of success it is likely to be attended.

To this end, I shall briefly review some of the features of our long intercourse with England, with which power our international relations have been perhaps more conflicting than with any other, in the hope of discovering some parallels between them and the situation with regard to Japan.

We are just getting far enough away from the nineteenth century to begin to get a perspective, to hold it off at arm's length, as it were, and appreciate the real significance of various incidents and the trend of events, and to determine the causes of important effects whose nearness has made us hardly conscious of their existence. When we do so, one of the most striking things that we discover is the fact that while in the first half of the nineteenth century the United States, speaking generally, looked upon England with suspicion and distrust, envy and fear, and England in turn looked upon us with contempt not unmingled with exasperation, on the other hand, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the relations between the two nations had grown so cordial and so firmly grounded in reality as to cause the opinion to be universally expressed in both countries that war between them is unthinkable.

What has wrought this wondrous change? Why have the two nations come to a cordial understanding instead of drifting apart in the course of a century? It is of

course contrary to all human experience that peoples recently at war with one another should forget the hatreds engendered by conflict and the disaster wrought in battle as soon as a treaty of peace is signed. The Revolutionary War was fought out on American soil, and it is inevitable that Americans should long cherish the ancient grudge, not only against the mother country whose stupid policy had made her a tyrannical oppressor in the eyes of the colonists, but also against the colonial Tories who had taken sides against them and who concentrated across the border in Canada. On the other hand, England's interests were all directed toward European affairs, and she thought of her former subjects, whenever she did think of them, as presumptuous upstarts whose attempts at starting a democracy were foredoomed to failure. England was mistress of the seas and the dominant power in the world. This position made her imperious and arbitrary, and led to such acts as the enforcement of the right of search on American vessels and the impressment of seamen, which culminated in the second war of 1812, a war that renewed all the vindictive feelings toward Great Britain inherited from the previous conflict. The treaty of Ghent, at the conclusion of this war, did not decide the real issues, although the return of Napoleon from Elba diverted all attention in Europe from affairs across the ocean. The treaty of

Ghent "did not weaken the conviction in the minds of many Americans that a leading principle of British policy was to bully and dragoon the United States into a condition of dependence as near as possible to that which had been thrown off in 1776; it did not extinguish the fear among the English in Canada that the United States was resolutely bent on conquering and annexing them; it did not qualify the belief widespread among the ruling aristocracy in England that the American democracy was a barbarous, brawling political organization whose growth was to be restricted by all possible means in the interests of civilization. For each of these various beliefs there was not lacking a certain foundation in fact."¹

Following the war of 1812 we have had no other armed conflict with Great Britain, but we had had an astonishing succession of exasperating controversies both with England and with Canada. The early part of the century was the period of an extraordinary expansion on our part and conquest of territory, some of which has only recently become adequately settled. England felt it her duty to obstruct us so far as possible in all this. In Florida, in Oregon, in California, and in Texas she endeavored to prevent us from assuming control of the new territories. Although she failed in all except the northern part of Oregon, yet the distrust and resentment

¹ Dunning, "The British Empire and the United States." 1914.

engendered in America by her policy fanned the old flame and kept it alive. Moreover, she maintained the "right of search" which the United States could not concede, on the ground that it impaired her sovereignty. And it was not until 1858 that England finally acceded to the American point of view.

The Civil War, to the European soothsayer, marked the end of the extraordinary experiment of democracy. The ultimate success of the Southern cause was never questioned in England, and her decision to maintain strict neutrality (which involved the right to sell ships and arms to whomsoever she pleased) had the result of exciting anger and resentment on the part of both belligerents, each of whom ascribed a large share of its troubles to her attitude. It is not strictly true that England favored the Confederate cause, in spite of the notorious case of the *Alabama*, but it would have been impossible to convince a Northerner of that fact.

In 1847 and 1848 the terrible famine in Ireland drove hordes of starving Irish to America, and the immigration increased until the Irish element of our population became an important one. The average Celt has two characteristics that are of great significance in considering him as an element of the American population. These are his fondness for politics and his hatred of England and all her works. The former gave him a

chance to play an important part in our democracy and the latter became an irresistible source of appeal in the hands of political leaders interested in securing the Irish vote. In consequence, no grievance against England was ever allowed to die down, but "twisting the lion's tail" became recognized as the most effective weapon in political campaigning. All this tended to keep alive the anti-English feeling, until, being overdone, it lost its effect.

The climax of all this sentiment came with the famous Venezuela incident of President Cleveland's administration. The English were wholly unable to comprehend the American attitude in a matter in which rationally they might be expected to have scant interest. The explanation seems to be that unconsciously, or subconsciously, the American people were looking for a chance to demonstrate their coming-of-age politically, and their right to a voice in the settling of the world's affairs. England conceded this point then, and from that time on, Anglo-American relations have been relatively tranquil. When the throw of the dice made of the United States a colonizing power, far from opposing us, England consistently aided and applauded us, knowing that in shouldering the "white man's burden" we have made her cause our own.

England's ministers have often been noted for their

lack of tact, but rarely for a lack of good sense. They have long realized that war between England and America would be economically so disastrous for her that no possible gain in territory or in prestige could compensate for it. They have waited with a greater or less degree of calmness until we should mature sufficiently to realize the same fact.

In the earlier decades of our national existence we were not unlike an overgrown boy with his first pair of long trousers, clumsy, crude, obstreperous, and belligerent. In the middle of the century we might be said to bear a resemblance to the same youth in his late teens, when he acquires the use of cigarettes and tilts his hat over one ear. Now at last, having passed the hobbled-hoy period, we have reached maturity and are ready to take a hand in the world's business. And England, like an anxious but not always tactful parent, is more than willing to forget the irritations of the past and to take us into the firm. What lessons can we read in all this that may help us to understand Japan?

In the beginning we must confess that nothing like the occasions for disagreement between England and ourselves have occurred between Japan and ourselves. Of course the century is young, and no one knows what the next several decades will bring forth. But we have no stinging memories of conflict to stir up bitterness.

Even the worst jingo in America has no hatred of the Japanese. He merely fears or mistrusts them, or else looks down upon them with a toplofty tolerance infinitely more galling than hatred. The "Jap is cocky." "He is dishonest and tricky." "He knows not the sanctity of contract." "He has no morals or home life." These, after all, are mild aspersions compared with the English view of an American a half century ago. "Swagger and ferocity, built on a foundation of vulgarity and cowardice," are the characteristics of "an ideal Yankee," said the *London Times* discussing the Mason and Slidell affair in 1861.¹

England has forgotten these brave words and many like them and so has America, though more slowly, for nothing lingers quite so long in the mind as the sting of a contemptuous speech. But how much better it would have been if they had never been said. And can we not take a lesson from our own experience and refrain from the same kind of utterance, knowing how useless it is and how productive of ill feeling.

The Japanese may be expected to overlook the heated language of the man in the street or of the editor of a yellow newspaper (the Japanese themselves have a press of which the hues of saffron exceed anything known in this country); but the speeches of members

¹ Quoted by Dunning, *etc.*

of Congress and of Senators are on a different status. As a nation we have discarded the bumptious practice of "twisting the lion's tail." But there is danger that in seeking an outlet for our energies we may grow too much accustomed to airing our suspicions of the motives of our Oriental neighbors. We are in danger of getting the "Japanese habit," as some one has called it.

The "certain condescension in foreigners," particularly Englishmen, the tacit assumption of superiority, the unmerited satires of Dickens, Mrs. Trollope, and the rest,—the older generation among us still recall how productive of ill feeling they were, and how really significant in postponing a settlement of differences and the establishment of cordial relations between ourselves and Great Britain. With this recollection so fresh in our minds, may we not appreciate the advisability of not doing "as we have been done by" anent Japan?

For many years the irreconcilable difference between Great Britain and the United States was the former's insistence upon the right of search,—a small matter to insist upon, we think to-day, and one that might have been conceded the new republic without damaging the prestige of the British Empire. Suggestive of analogy is the Japanese contention that our laws, whether local ones regarding schools or state ones regarding land-ownership, should recognize the Japanese as on a par

with the European and American, a contention which every one with enough knowledge of the subject to be entitled to an opinion knows to be just. In this case it is we that will not concede the point; but shall we allow it to muddy the water for years as England did the former question, to no profit to ourselves, but rather to the detriment of cordial international relations? This of course does not imply unlimited immigration.

Japan is passing through her own hobbledehoy period. Her cockiness, her bumptiousness, her exaggerated sense of dignity, her concern to be recognized as an international power; all these phenomena we ourselves have displayed in our time and with far greater crudity. It was a passing phase with us and it will be with the newer nation if we do not take it too seriously. At any rate, nothing is so futile, so stupid, as international recriminations. We have much to gain by retaining Japan's personal friendship, we have everything to lose by losing it.

England's attempts to limit our expansion to the Pacific were based upon *a priori* considerations, not on her own desires for that territory. The United States expanded through its own exuberant energy rather than through necessity or pressure of population, and England's attempts at hindrance roused the fiercest resentment.¹ Japan's present-day expansion is also partly a

¹ The slogan of 1844, "Fifty-four Forty or Fight," will be recalled.

phenomenon of national vigor as well as of economic pressure, and the attempts of foreign nations to curb it excite the same resentment that we ourselves have experienced. Again, have we any call to put ourselves on the side of Japan's opponents?

To summarize: During the past century, we have had many acrimonious disputes with England and our self-love has suffered from her affronts. Our Irish contingent has constantly kept the kettle boiling until we learned to think of her as our hereditary enemy. In the end, we have outgrown these feelings and have come to realize the value of an international friendship with Great Britain. How much more reasonable seems the hope that strained relations between Japan and the United States shall cease to exist; two nations that have never been at war with one another, whose territories are not adjacent and whose past history has been until very recently one of uninterrupted friendship. If the one difficulty has been solved, shall the other, so much simpler one, long vex us?

Many statesmen from Seward to Roosevelt have looked westward to the Pacific Ocean and have visioned it as the scene of the world's greatest events in the immediate future. As international activities in the past have been concerned chiefly with war, it is not

unnatural to think of the Pacific as the stage for a great conflict.

But business men have learned that coöperation brings more success than cut-throat competition. The nations most interested in the Pacific are those whose shores are washed by its waters. The interests of America, Japan, and China are so diverse, and at the same time so interrelated, that if the three nations can work in harmony, each will profit vastly more than if each attempts to shape its future independently or in conflict with the others.

America wishes the "Open Door" in China, Japan wishes the equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine for the East. If America supports Japan's contention, and Japan, America's, Europe will be forced to acquiesce, and peace in the Pacific will be assured.

In a word, we must abandon, once and for all, the anti-Japanese policy inaugurated by Knox; more than that, we must abandon the *laissez-faire* indifferent policy that many advocate to-day. Rather our policy should be one of active coöperation, an alliance, if you will, though not necessarily one in the conventional military sense.

As a first step toward such a consummation, an international conference on Pacific problems might be called, to be participated in by accredited representatives from the United States, Canada, Japan, China, Australia,

and perhaps Chile and Peru. The discussions of such a conference might deal with such subjects as:

Trans-Pacific trade relations and tariff reciprocity.

Immigration and naturalization.

The supply of capital for the development of Oriental industry.

Fiscal reform of China.

Publicity bureaus, planned to facilitate the exchange of information between East and West, increase facilities for tourists, devise a basis for visiting or exchange professors and students, nullify canards and disseminate true information.

The reports of such a conference might be made the basis for international conventions that would insure peace and prosperity on the Pacific for decades to come.

But the skeptical ones, while granting of course the highest measure of disinterestedness on the part of the United States, will concede to Japan no such far-seeing motives. They believe that Japan is trying to supplant all the European aggressors in China and seize huge slices of Chinese territory for herself. And they point to results in South Manchuria and Korea and later in Kiao-Chau as confirmatory evidence.

We have already discussed the essential difference between the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and

Korea and that of China proper. But let us assume that Japan does fulfill the prophecies of these critics and attempts to appropriate Chinese territory and administer it as her own. How would it work out?

We learn, for instance, that the Germans had developed a considerable industry in strawbraid in the Kiao-Chau province, of which they were just about to reap the advantage, and that the Japanese have fallen heir to this industry. Of course the people who profit by such an industry, in the first instance, are the Chinese who make the strawbraid. The Japanese may take their profits also as *entrepreneurs*. Well and good. This is legitimate. But if they must charge off against the other side of their ledger the heavy cost of military occupation, these profits are going to dwindle to the vanishing point.

The Chinese of course are easy to conquer in a military way. We can easily believe that if the occasion demanded it, Japan might seize half the Empire and by quartering enough troops at strategic points might maintain that condition, perhaps not indefinitely, but for a considerable length of time. Having done so, she must reap some very great economic advantage to compensate for the great expense. She could of course seize the natural resources, the coal, iron, and copper, but she could hardly choose a more expensive and unprofitable way of acquiring them. Let us assume then that she would try

to control the channels of trade, to give her own goods a clear field by excluding foreign competition. The easiest way to do this would be by a preferential tariff.

This has been done before in various parts of the world (by the French in Madagascar, for instance), but never with a large and prosperous nation against the will of that nation. If Japanese goods already have a good market (cotton yarns, for instance), they need no such bulwark to protect them; they beat their competitors in the open market. If, on the other hand, they are inferior in quality or higher in price, and the Chinese is prevented from buying in the most favorable market,—and this is the only way in which it is conceivable that a military occupation could be made profitable,—then the Chinese would discover that he was being exploited in the interest of his enemy, and there is little question as to what he would do.

He has, as a matter of fact, a far more effective weapon than any manufactured by Krupps. This is the boycott. Whether any other nation could successfully carry through a national boycott or not is hard to say. The Chinese are the only ones who have done so. And it is a weapon that they have employed with increasing frequency as their contact with foreign powers has grown more intimate and disagreeable.

The long record of grievances against the United

States culminated in 1904, and the first great boycott was inaugurated against us. This lost us millions of dollars in trade and we have never recovered the old status. Japan, as well, has been the victim more than once. The Manchurian program, particularly the Mukden-Antung Railway controversy, the affair of the *Tatsu Maru*, a Japanese ship that carried arms to the Chinese rebels, and numerous other subjects of difference aroused the national self-consciousness of the Chinese and kept a boycott going to the very great loss of the Japanese trade. Numerous other minor boycotts have been inaugurated in recent years, enough to show that the weapon is a very effective one, and one that the Chinese are ready to use. It is reported that a very active boycott was instituted in Shanghai against Japan on account of the recent "demands" made upon China by that nation (February, 1915). It is significant that the most important and far-reaching of these boycotts have been based upon academic grounds, and moreover have originated, and have been maintained with greatest fervor, in Canton and the southern provinces, even the one due to the Manchurian controversies.

Now it is manifestly impossible for even the wildest Japanese jingo to think of holding all the eighteen provinces of China, with their 407,000,000 inhabitants, by a military occupation. The most she could do would

be to hold some of the populous districts of the north or the Yang-tse Valley. If, however, the analogy of past events has any weight, such a condition would result in the most active boycott that the south and west have ever known. And Japan could not make enough from the conquered provinces to compensate the losses from the rest.

But the whole thing is the dream of a madman. Japan's future success must be an industrial and commercial one. Her greatest, her most vital market is China. The tradesman does not try to stimulate business by affronting and antagonizing his prospective customers.

More than this, the tradesman, if he be wise, knows that his greatest prosperity lies in the prosperity of his neighbors; that the green-grocer cannot buy of the baker unless he himself sells his own wares. As Japan looks to China for her future trade, more than to other parts of the world, as the Chinese trade is more vital to her than to other nations, so an impoverished and humiliated China must mean loss to her; whereas an independent and prosperous China would mean her own national success. These considerations are so obvious that we can hardly believe that Japan's future policy in China will take permanently any other direction.

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
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
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
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
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